Evolving understanding of work-related hostility

– a biopsychosocial exploration

Paul Cooper

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Warwick Business School, University of Warwick

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***I especially want to thank the members of my family for their support, and I dedicate this thesis to my Mum and Dad, my brother Martin and my nephew Perran*.**

Declaration

This thesis represents the author's own research. The contents have not been submitted for examination for a degree at any other institution at any time. Some of the material used in some of the literature reviews were used in the author's MA dissertation submitted to Warwick Business School in 2010.

Abstract

This theoretical (non-empirical) thesis presents a new conceptual framework for studying behaviour in organizations. This is synthesized from the theory of evolution and commensurate concepts (the biopsychosocial approach to behaviour and human ethology) and is offered as a meta-theory. This accommodates in pluralist, trans-disciplinary manner diverse (i.e. biological, psychological and social) research streams. I argue it avoids the super-organicism inherent in the standard social science model, and offers opportunity for a more comprehensive understanding of behaviour, e.g. by incorporating biological issues into study.

The conceptual framework is applied to an exemplum behaviour - work-related hostility (WRH) - to demonstrate its relevance. Hostility (and its associated stress and emotion) are presented as evolved biopsychosocial behaviours conferring survival benefit. They are located in a specific context – service work.

I explore numerous aspects of service-based WRH – the dynamics, impacts, effects and outcomes of hostile customer-worker service interactions. My analysis goes beyond current thinking and theorizing in the field, e.g. by considering complex intra- and interpersonal reactions and responses; recognizing behaviour and experiences of same are biopsychosocial and add to workers' inner conflict and stress; proposing WRH comprises ritualized behaviours having powerful effect through biopsychosocial impact.

The conceptual framework adopted offers insights into WRH the current literature has not, e.g. helping explain issues such as why WRH is so effecting even when it is nonviolent; why parties retain their relative status; why staff's counter-aggression seems rare; why WRH continues to occur despite efforts to manage it. I claim the conceptual framework and my analysis considers more facets of WRH than past studies have, e.g. what happens in interactions; what mechanisms/systems/complexes function; why; how; who is effected; and what the results are.

I conclude by discussing limitations of the thesis, suggesting empirical study using the framework and indicating other potential applications of it.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this thesis –

AQAL – Wilber's All Quadrants, All Levels model

BCS - British Crime Survey

B - Service worker's behaviour in response to the customer's behaviour

BMA - British Medical Association

BPS - Engel's biopsychosocial model

C –Customer

CSEW - Crime Survey of England and Wales

CV - Cardiovascular

DIT - Dual Inheritance Theory

E - External

EL - Emotional Labour

EP - Evolutionary Psychology

ER - Emotion Regulation

FFF - Fight, flight or freeze

H - The customer's hostility

HBE - Human Behavioural Ecology

HPA - Hypothalamic-pituitary axis

HSE - Health and Safety Executive

HSM - Health and Safety Management

I - Internal

ILO - International Labour Organization

LCA - Last Common Ancestor

LS - Limbic System

LUCA - Last Common Ancestor

Mya - Million years ago

NE - Neo-evolutionary theories

NHS - National Health Service

O - Organization

OB - Organizational Behaviour

OMS - Organization and Management Studies

RCN - Royal College of Nurses

RMT - National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers

S - Service staff

SSSM - Standard Social Science Model

TE - Theory of Evolution

USDAW – Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers

WRH - Work-related hostility

X - Stressor eliciting the customer's hostility

α - The most senior member of a social group

β - The second most senior member of a social group

γ - The third most senior member of a social group

INTRODUCTION

This thesis argues for using a new conceptual framework to study behaviour in organizations synthesized from the Theory of Evolution (TE) and related neo-evolutionary concepts (NE), the biopsychosocial approach and human ethology. The thesis is theoretical (non-empirical) and puts forward the framework before applying it to an exemplum topic - service-based work-related hostility (WRH), and associated behaviours (stress and emotion). I argue that this results in insights into WRH and service work previous research has not yielded; TE and commensurate concepts have not been applied to WRH, emotion, stress or service work (to my knowledge).

TE is the ontology accepted; ethology is the epistemology accepted (and could be used as the research methodology). The biopsychosocial concept relates to the ontology in seeing human behaviour as influenced by biological, psychological and social factors. The call for using TE in Organizational Behaviour (OB) is not new, but linking it with the aforementioned concepts – which augments TE and operationalise its use – is novel. I argue we need to expand our perspective when studying behaviour in organizations, and the conceptual framework here offers a way to do so. I hope the application of the conceptual framework successfully defends it as a relevant approach for OB and Organization and Management Studies (OMS) generally.

The evolutionary approach

I accept the general tenets of TE, primarily that human beings and behaviour are evolved for survival purpose. Hostility (and stress and emotion) are adaptive behaviours and experiences propelled by complex mechanisms/systems/complexes which have evolved over many millennia and which are geared to foster individuals' survival in challenging and sometimes life-or-death situations. I consider the complexity of these evolved behaviours in terms of biological, psychological and social factors and influences, and suggest TE is considerate of all these influencing humankind and its development, and does not equate to reductionism. I posit that human behaviour and experience is biopsychosocial because it is

evolved, and a more complete understanding of it requires a multi-faceted approach cognizant of such complexity.

I further argue for the use of an ethological lens through which to analyse behaviour, and I apply this in later chapters. This lens draws from human ethology, a branch of ethology - the science of animal behaviour and one of the disciplines studying evolution. TE can accommodate and perhaps integrate diverse paradigms and different disciplinary findings focusing on specific domains (i.e. the biological, the psychological and the social).

TE is sparse in OB/OMS research, reasons for which are later outlined. Yet despite discomforting some social scientists it is a powerful explanatory framework for understanding human behaviour. Its adoption may broaden understanding in OB by using an approach evident in recent social science which challenges the standard super-organicist social science model. That our species retains evolved mechanisms/systems/complexes priming powerful adaptive body-brain reactions and behavioural responses (i.e. fight or flight) strongly suggests such behaviour and associated experiences has important functional value. I know of no WRH study which adopts an evolutionary stance or locates WRH as an adaptive behaviour serving functional purpose. Similarly, I know of no study in OB/OMS which analyses the biopsychosocial facets of such behaviours and experiences, or does so through the ethological lens.

Work-related hostility in service work

Aggression and violence associated with work and the workplace - what I term work-related hostility (WRH) - is researched in OB/OMS as a challenging and damaging issue facing workers and employers. WRH manifests in numerous forms but this thesis considers one as an example of my general approach - customer-to-staff hostility in service work.

It is selected because service workers routinely interact with the customers, patients, etc. in 'high-contact' (Sinclair *et al*., 2002) face-to-face roles. Staff occupies an important role in representing and embodying organizations to key customers in co-present encounters, and function as vehicles for customer service delivery. However, face-to-face encounters could become situations in which physical harm (and psychological damage) could occur. Routine general customer interactions are demanding, as research shows, but hostile

customers may increase demands on staff. Emotional labour and emotional regulation required in service encounters may increase as staff experiences a stress reaction to the aggressor. Yet despite the important and demanding role staff plays in delivering service, service workers are not necessarily well-trained and -supported regarding dealing with WRH (Turnbull, 1999).

Aims, objectives and intended outcomes of the thesis

This thesis argues for the aforementioned conceptual framework and applies it to show its relevance. To do so, it explores the dynamics, impacts, effects and outcomes of WRH in service work, including the relationships between and effects of biopsychosocial behaviours. This exploration considers a range of issues; the functional quality of (evolved) behaviour; the mechanisms/systems/complexes involved; the connections between hostility, stress and emotion; the biopsychosocial effects of such behaviours and experiences for interacting parties; and the context in which behaviour occurs. As such, it explores many facets of WRH and behaviour; why, when and how behaviours appear as they do (e.g. what mechanisms/systems/complexes operate; why; what function behaviour has); who is affected and how.

Earlier studies have focused on establishing WRH's extent, e.g. its frequency, sectors it appears in, and identifying contributory factors influencing WRH, e.g. organizational and personal antecedents and outcomes. They have not examined how or why such behaviour occurs, how or why WRH functions as it does, how it produces significant negative effect, and why hostility appears as it does.

The exploration works through a series of smaller aims or objectives, which are now outlined.

I argue hostility, emotion and stress are evolved, functional human behaviours and experiences which promote survival. This frames them in a way never before used in WRH research. WRH has been typically studied in a legal discourse defining it as delinquent and requiring corrective management. The literature has ignored the possibility WRH is not easily managed, controlled or eradicated (such objectives comprise the dominant organizational approach to respond to WRH).

Because they are evolved, behaviours are biopsychosocial complexes - multifaceted and complicated - and have biopsychosocial impacts and effects. I draw from theory and research in numerous domains outside organizational fields to gain insights on hostility, emotion and stress to inform understanding of WRH's mechanics, dynamics and effects. WRH studies do not consider hostility in a biopsychosocial frame. OB/OMS and WRH research have historically seemingly focused on psychological and social domains rather than incorporate biological issues. However, the disciplines OB/OMS draws from (e.g. psychology, sociology) have incorporated such issues and also draw on TE. OB/OMS lags behind on both counts. Holt (1970: 10) believes "complete theory must take into account" biological factors. The biopsychosocial and evolutionary approaches reintroduce biological issues - but connect them to psychological and social ones in a pluralist manner. I argue incorporation of bio-physical as well as social and psychological factors in analysis of behaviours and experiences is required. Hostility, stress and emotion occur in the body's physiological arousal and neural and biochemical functioning. Service work and its effects are embodied and are felt corporeally. Including biological factors helps position WRH as a biopsychosocial issue (Renfrew, 1997; Scarpa and Raine, 2007). Many researchers note social and biological factors are mutually influential (Barchas, 1976) and require inclusion. Thus it seems reasonable to approach WRH (and stress and emotion) as an issue influenced by and appearing in biological as well as psychological and social domains. Campbell (1975) urged adoption of this approach forty years ago.

I aim to show the link between hostility, stress and emotion. The hostility chain model posited indicates how these behaviours are connected and make intra- and interpersonal impacts. It seems reasonable to accept –

- being aggressed is unpleasant
- being (or feeling) aggressed results in stress and 'negative' emotions (e.g. fear, anger) irrespective of type of aggression (e.g. physical or psychological)
- sentient, conscious beings are interested in avoiding harm, and incline towards self-protection in hostile, stressful and emotionally-charged (work) encounters.

This is the view I take regarding the sequence of events (the 'hostility chain') I propose occurs in hostile service encounters. This model connects WRH in context with emotion (e.g. emotional labour and its requisite emotional regulation) and stress. Research has connected stress to emotional labour (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995; Fineman, 1993; Hochschild, 1979, 1983) and to WRH (Grandey *et al*., 2004; Hoel *et al*., 2001; Rew and Ferns, 2005; Sinclair *et al*., 2002). Hopp *et al*. (2012) link WRH, stress and service work. However, no study draws on integrative approaches (e.g. TE, the biopsychosocial approach) to accommodate diverse perspectives (viz., from biological, psychological and social research streams).

This thesis aims to explore what is happening internally in staff's (and aggressors') minds and bodies as well as in the social realm as parties interact (in situated social interaction). Moreover, it aims to explore their connections and mutual influences. (Psychological and physiological factors - emotions and arousal level, respectively - in the hostility chain may trigger or influence each other.) Specifically, it explores what the effects of elevated physiological arousal and emotion experienced in hostile encounters are and the ways the body, brain and behaviour may be impacted. (As such, it touches on whether – and how – workers' experience has detrimental impact on their interest in or ability to maintain service delivery.) This aims to show connections between WRH, stress, emotions and subsequent behaviours are complex, e.g. stress may be felt but its damage remain unseen; emotional regulation itself may be harmful; counter-aggression may not be enacted in behaviour but nevertheless be inclined towards and felt in bodily arousal. Tracing these influences is challenging but may help indicate the extent and subtlety of reactions to hostility and its manifold impacts.

WRH research often de-contextualizes behaviour from its social setting. I aim to contextualize WRH in two ways. First, I look at WRH in a specific context - service work. (It is but one context WRH can appear in.) Second, I draw on wider hostility research to inform understanding of this example of hostility. (I do the same re: stress and emotion). WRH research typically separates WRH from other forms of hostility and attempts to integrate findings on aggression and violence from different research domains is limited despite calls to (Anderson and Bushman, 2002; Dodge and Sherrill, 2007).

In considering behaviour in its social setting, I explore the nature/character, dynamics, impacts, effects and outcomes of hostility emanating from customers on and for service staff. WRH research to date has not considered in detail such issues. Research has presented general models identifying factors contributing to WRH but has not explored their interaction. It has identified some of WRH's negative impacts and effects without exploring the dynamics of their appearance. As noted, it has located WRH as pathological or criminological behaviour requiring control or eradication (e.g. through Health and Safety Management) without entertaining the possibility such behaviour might be explicable as functionally 'normal'.

This exploration is achieved through a theorizing process which draws on, sifts and links extant literatures, concepts and theories rather than undertaking empirical research. I claim that this effort explores more facets of WRH and thus potentially offers more insight into WRH than existing approaches do (or can), and through this expands understanding of WRH's complexity. It considers and accounts for more facets of WRH than previous research, without oversimplifying a complex topic. (I do not adopt a managerialist stance regarding WRH but anticipate insights gleaned in this thesis could benefit organizations' efforts to address WRH, which in turn might benefit staff. The theorizing process could prompt numerous empirical studies and offer practical benefit for workers and organizations through organizational reframing of WRH.) Similarly, the theorizing process indicates the benefit of OB/OMS adopting a pluralist approach to studying behaviour, specifically one informed by TE, ethology and a biopsychosocial perspective.

Thesis structure

Part 1

Part 1 follows this Introduction. Six chapters focusing on philosophical and theoretical issues comprise this section. Chapter 1 offers a summary overview of the theory of evolution and its neo-evolutionary counterparts. I give an overview of the theory and its core tenets as accepted in this thesis. Human evolution is used to illustrate the influence of biological and social factors on human life. The dichotomies of Nature vs. Nurture and biological vs. social perspectives are questioned.

Chapter 2 outlines how the concept of emergence can help explain evolution and how multi-faceted complexity (of which humans are an epitome) occurs. In Chapter 3, I argue behaviour and experience are biopsychosocial in nature/character; i.e. complex and multi-faceted, and comprehensible only if all facets are considered. Wilber's AQAL model is presented as a biopsychosocial model helping one visualize how biological, psychological and social facets of behaviour are connected in an evolutionary framework.

In Chapter 4, I look at the bio-social divide still evident in social science and outline the 'traditional' discipline and domain hierarchy that separates disciplines and their study foci. I indicate this divide can be contested, arguing social science's super-organicism, which propelled and exacerbated the divide, can be bypassed by using the biopsychosocial, ethological and evolutionary approaches. I then use the topic of the body as an illustration of how the biological and social can be bridged in the study of behaviour and experience (I return to the body in service work chapters because it is essential to such work). In Chapter 5, I argue for the necessity of a pluralist mentality and trans-disciplinary effort to support the application of the outlined concepts. In Chapter 6, I argue for the application of human ethology as an epistemology and methodology through which to 'read', analyse, interpret and understand human behaviours and interactions. Ethology is commensurate with evolutionary thinking and inclusive of biological, psychological and social factors in behaviour. Human ethology comprises my epistemology; a position accommodating both physicalism-materialism and interpretivism. Ethology's methodology is outlined as a pragmatic one for the analysis of actual behaviour and thus represents a viable methodology for OB (though it is not used as such in this theoretical thesis). An overview of the history of ethology and human ethology, its qualities and critiques levelled at it, precede this.

This section seeks not to refute previous research findings from specific sciences regarding hostility, stress or emotion (a later section includes brief overviews of these) but to expand beyond such approaches and argue for the evolutionary perspective as a way to integrate such diverse streams in a framework cognizant of biological, psychological and social aspects of and influences on behaviour.

Part 2

An overview of WRH, which covers both practitioner- and organizational-based issues comprises the single chapter in this section. Chapter 7 indicates the difficulty of defining WRH (which goes under numerous names, e.g. workplace or work-related aggression or violence). I cite various statistics regarding WRH's frequency and impacts, contesting inferences drawn therein and challenging such statistics' bases and the agenda of stakeholders presenting them. I introduce typical organizational methods used to address WRH, and contest these as questionable and limited. I also provide a summary overview of academic research on WRH, including the recent call for alternative perspectives. I query the former by questioning their bases and support the latter by concluding that to understand WRH we need to understand its 'work-related' and 'hostility' aspects more deeply (which later chapters aim to do). I also posit that the theory of evolution offers a powerful alternative perspective on WRH.

Part 3

This section focuses on hostility, stress and emotion as associated behaviours and experiences. Chapter 8 outlines the 'hostility chain', a model showing how stress, emotion and hostility are linked (and also how the internal/personal and external/public realms are connected). In Chapter 9, I argue for the position that hostility, stress and emotion are adaptive behaviours conferring survival advantage. Chapters 10 and 11 expound on hostility and stress and emotion respectively, with a summary overview of some of the biological, psychological and social literature on each given to indicate the complexity of these behaviours, the diversity of the streams of general research on them and to provide relevant information necessary for understanding later analysis.

Part 4

This section specifically considers the context in which WRH occurs - service work. Chapter 12 presents information about the extent of service work, indicates some of its challenges and outlines the nature/character of service interactions. The relative status of workers, customers and the organization is presented (the service triangle), but the notion of customer sovereignty is questioned.

Chapter 13 considers in more detail the demands made on service workers, especially the emotional challenges such work has. The concept of emotional labour (EL) is explained as professionalised, commercial, emotion work attempting to engender positive reaction in customers through staff's emotional and behavioural display. I introduce the artifice and requisite role adherence involved in EL. Emotional regulation (ER), as the way emotional labour is effected, is outlined and negatives associated with EL and ER are explored; these include stress, psychological and emotional dissonance, alienation, and ill-health (positives associated with service work are also indicated).

Chapter 14 draws from dramaturgical models of social life to show something of the theatricality of service work, specifically the performativity inherent in worker-customer interactions. I also indicate the risks associated with such endeavours failing illustrate the importance of maintaining service roles. The complex challenge and effect of doing performative work is also explored.

Chapter 15 returns to the topic of the body. This is the vehicle for service interactions, the site for personal emotion and experience, and the target of hostility. The effects of service work role-playing are considered. The socialization of the body through subtle means into its obedient use to fulfil organizational (service) requirements is also presented.

Part 5

This section comprises chapters of analysis in which the synthesized conceptual framework is applied to WRH. I infer insights about WRH from this. These could lead to the development of hypotheses and research questions for future empirical research projects.

In Chapter 16 I focus on the dynamics of WRH interactions. It considers the complex interactions between and within parties in service interactions by looking at trajectories of stress and emotion and reaction and response in the 'hostility chain' model. Reaction and response are explored; so is the interaction between internal (personal, subjective, psychological, emotional) and external (interpersonal, public, social, behavioural) realms relating to reaction and response in context. In this, it focuses on ethology's interest in

proximal causation – what triggers or releases reaction/response – and phylogeny – the evolved mechanisms/systems/complexes operating.

Chapter 17 considers the multiple conflicts in WRH (for staff) and the stress of maintaining the service role. This leads to analysis of biopsychosocial impacts of WRH experiences. In Chapter 18 I focus on the effects of behaviours. I posit the novel idea that ritualized behaviours (propelled by evolved survival-based systems) occur in WRH and have potent biopsychosocial effects on and in individuals producing them in hostile service work interactions. I thus contend WRH can be understood in ethological terms. This relates to the ethological focus on phylogenetic facets of behaviour; ritualized behaviour is propelled by phylogenetic complexes triggered by proximate causes (e.g. a hostile customer). It also connects with the adaptive, functional facet of behaviour; ritualized behaviour – and the complexes fuelling it - plays a part in the individual's survival drive. I then suggest the experience of WRH has the same effect on staff (and customers) as ritual, and operates through subtle but potent biopsychosocial processes.

I extend this argument in Chapter 19 to propose that the outcome of the ritual is to train staff and customers to remain in their allotted roles (positions in a status hierarchy and power vector created by the service triangle) which thus promotes a dominance hierarchy enabling hostility to be enacted, which sustains the cycle. This relates again to the adaptive and functional facets of behaviour.

This section essentially argues for the plausibility of my theorizing and re-framing of WRH by applying the conceptual framework. The numerous inferences drawn from analysis remain propositional and inherently hypothetical, but are valuable in showing the application of the framework to topics. Future empirical research could study the inferences made.

Theorizing can be defended as a good test of multi-faceted complex phenomena because it offers a more comprehensive overview and analysis of topics studied. Though theorizing is a broader-brush presentation, and analysis is based on concepts not in-depth, fine-grained empirical study, it arguably enables the inclusion of more facets of topics in analysis at any point. This enables connections to be made between them. In this case, it allows for consideration of ethology's foci – phylogeny (biopsychosocial complexes propelling behaviour, automatic ritualized behaviour displays), ontogeny (the individual's

behaviour as influenced by social as well as personal and genetic inheritance, e.g. the civilizing process, organizational service credo limiting ‘natural’ behavioural displays), proximate and ultimate causation (an aggressor triggering body-brain systems releasing stress, emotion and ritualized (hostile) behaviours), and adaptive function of behaviour (stress as survival-driven; ritualized behaviour to negotiate social order, status, etc.). These could all be included in analysis of a single event or more generally, or one selected for in-depth study. (An empirical study dealing with a raft of inter-connected and complex issues as this thesis does is likely to be multi-faceted.) The theorizing and inferential processes achieved in this thesis seem to be a sensible trade-off between providing ‘proofs’ or evidence about topics under study and reframing perspective about them. Moreover, as empirical study works from some theoretical or conceptual basis, having that in place before empirical study begins seems sensible.

Part 6

The final part of the thesis comprises a single chapter outlining what contributions to academic and practitioner fields this thesis may make, presenting a critique of what might be seen as the limitations of the thesis and indicating potentially fruitful future research suggested by the thesis. Future empirical study could explore the inferences I draw. Suggested ways to organize such a study are included. I also offer some suggestions for organizational practice regarding WRH in order to show how reframing WRH could benefit employers and workers, and thus how the conceptual framework synthesized, applied and argued for is valid and useful.

The core intentions of sections can be represented schematically –

Table I.1 - schematic presentation of thesis structure and intentions

Section	Intention
1	Introduces thesis
2	Synthesizes and defends the need for the new conceptual framework
3 & 4	Outlines the behaviours studied
5	Outlines the context of these behaviours
6	Applies the conceptual framework to the behaviours in context in analysis to glean insights
7	Indicates benefits and future potential of the framework re: WRH and OB/OMS

PART 1

This section of the thesis introduces the theory of evolution (TE), associated neo-evolutionary theories (NE) and related concepts as a relevant way to study behaviours in organizations. As such, it offers a novel conceptual framework for studying the exemplum behaviours considered in this thesis.

Chapter 1 presents TE and NE in OMS (specifically OB), offers a summary explanation of the core tenets of TE accepted, and includes a brief outline of mankind's evolution. TE is defended as a useful way to understand human behaviour.

Chapter 2 uses the concept of emergence to illustrate how complexity occurs in the evolutionary process. It helps explain how humans become complex beings and are influenced by biological, psychological and social factors, which have co-evolutionary effect on individuals and the species. The benefits of adopting such a perspective are presented. (Appendix 3 gives an example of emergence to further explore how biological, psychological and social domains are linked.)

Chapter 3 considers humans and their behaviour as biopsychosocial complexes - because both are evolved. The AQAL model is presented as a pragmatic tool for locating biological, psychological and socio-cultural facets of human life/behaviour in an evolutionary frame. This helps one visualise and conceptualise the relationship between facets of biopsychosocial complexes functioning at different 'levels' or phases of evolution for any (single) incident and in the most general sense, and is later used in analysis.

Chapter 4 explores the bio-social divide in social science, especially the super-organicist standard social science model (SSSM) which fuelled and resulted in disciplinary division. Attitudes driving and resulting from the 'science wars' are outlined to show the powerful forces operating which turned social scientists away from biological issues generally and TE specifically. This is challenged by noting the bio-social division was preceded by a social science perspective not segregating the two, and that disciplines influencing OB have in recent years begun to draw from approaches to challenge the

division. The body – a topic relevant to WRH, stress and emotion in service work - is used as an example of how bio-social division is questionable and unhelpful, and how recent efforts to incorporate it in social sciences demonstrates an attempt to recover the pre-division mentality.

Chapter 5 proposes pluralism and holism as ways to overcome the division. The conceptual framework synthesized from TE, emergence, the biopsychosocial perspective and human ethology exemplifies this. It accommodates biological and psychological and social explanations of behaviour - viewing humans as biological, psychological and social beings - rather than limiting appreciation to biological *or* psychological *or* social ones (as per single disciplinary perspectives). Trans-discipliniarity (Miller, 1982) is posited and defended as a way to avoid division without dismissing what sciences specializing in particular domains can contribute to understanding[1]. The framework offers a way to address the shortcomings associated with super-organicism and SSSM. (Later chapters, in Part 3, summarily overview biological, psychological and social perspectives on hostility, stress and emotion. Studies show hostility, emotion and stress and its work-related contexts can be seen to possess biological, psychological and social factors and facets.)

In Chapter 6 I argue human ethology, which studies behaviour from an evolutionary perspective, is useful epistemologically and methodologically as a way to view and interpret complicated, multi-faceted human behaviour appearing in interactions between parties in social context. I make this argument because ethology acknowledges biological and psychological aspects of behaviour occur in social settings, and acknowledges human agency. Such an epistemology - commensurate with TE's ontology - can make sense of what are evolved/adaptive, survival-oriented biopsychosocial behaviours and experiences in action. Ethology, as a methodology, can study this, though I do not use it as such because this thesis is theoretical; I rather draw form extant ethological findings in analysis chapters.

The combined effort of these chapters constitutes my argument for and defence of a new conceptual framework for studying behaviour in organizations. This extends calls for

[1] Trans-discipliniarity locates topics in a meta-theoretical framework (Miller, 1982). Here, that framework is TE.

TE's use but is novel in connecting it with the biopsychosocial approach, emergence and human ethology, which help augment TE and operationalise its application. This conceptual framework is later applied to WRH, emotion and stress. It enables one to consider more facets of behaviour in context than previous approaches to WRH, for instance, do. It is also relevant for other behaviours, and marks an alternative approach for OB/OMS generally.

Chapter 1 Evolution – theory and process

Introduction

In this chapter I present the theory of evolution (hereafter, TE) and neo-evolutionary approaches (hereafter, NE) it spawned as a way to understand human life and behaviour, and thus WRH. (References hereafter to TE encompass NE; NE will be used specifically for neo-Darwinian theories.)

Later chapters link TE to commensurate concepts of emergence, the biopsychosocial approach and ethology. Here TE is presented as a way to help us deal with what findings across numerous sciences has indicated - that human life and behaviour is complex and has been and remains influenced by biological and social (and psychological) factors rather than being reducible to a social, psychological or a biological explanation alone. The theory provides us with answers to how biological, psychological and social influences have functioned and continue to function in human behaviour. It remains attentive to context, development and change (e.g. learning (Hodgson, 2013)), and continuity, and helps us understand such matters on both the individual (ontogenetic) and species (phylogenetic) levels. It aids understanding of issues such as why behaviours appear as they do; what systems contribute to their appearance; and what the effects are.

In this chapter I present an overview of TE in OMS/OB. I then outline the benefit of TE's capacity to accommodate biological and social influences on human life before indicating TE's benefits to establish its credibility as a relevant conceptual framework for OB/OMS.

The Theory of Evolution in OB/OMS

TE is rare in OMS (I outline the reasons for this elsewhere). Initial TE use centred on firms' emergence and survival, e.g. Aldrich (1999), Cordes *et al*. (2008), Hannan and Freeman (1989), Nelson and Winter (1982), and echoes Sumner's proposition that Natural Selection enables individuals' successes in free market economy competition (Laland and Brown, 2011) - a Social Darwinist view Darwin himself never adhered to or invented. This

use continues (e.g. Hodgson, 2013) and sees TE used at a macro level to analyse and help explain organizations' capacity to adapt and compete in challenging environments.

Nicholson (1997, 1998, 2000) pioneered TE's application in OB, though Jay (1971) prefigured this. However, adoption in OB has been slow and sparse despite a renewed call for it (Nicholson and White, 2006). Importing TE has prompted extreme reactions and counter-reactions, e.g. Markóczy and Goldberg (2004), Sewell (2004a, 2004b). However, Nicholson and White (2006) remark TE is relevant for many organizational topics, and studies exist on e.g. gender in small work groups (Colarelli *et al*., 2006), job design (Nicholson, 2006) and work choice and behaviour (Ilies *et al*., 2006). Other topics TE can help explore and explain include "human emotions and motivation…human universals… judgement… interpersonal dealings, [and] negotiation" (Nicholson and White, 2006: 117). My use of TE and NE apropos behaviour echoes this claim and responds to this call. Though not mentioned by them, hostility and stress seem entirely relevant topics to approach using TE, the former not least because of aggression's perceived centrality to (human) survival.

TE's under-use in OB/OMS is teasing, especially as disciplines influencing OB draw on it (Nicholson and White, 2006), e.g. economics, (social) psychology (see Schaller *et al*., 2006). Reasons outlined elsewhere help explain resistance to the theory, notably TE running counter to the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM). However, because TE has such widespread relevance for the topics focused on in this thesis (and OB issues generally), it is a defensibly-relevant paradigm, it represents a rich avenue for OB's exploration (Nicholson, 1997, 1998), and an alternative approach with potential explanatory power. I argue hostility, stress and emotion can be understood as evolved behaviours or experiences conferring adaptive advantage; they are behaviours and experiences which possess biological, psychological and social facets and thus require a pluralist or holistic approach (Keltner *et al*., 2006) which restriction to single specialized disciplines (e.g. psychology, sociology) seemingly disallows.

Thus, I extend initial efforts to use TE by extending it to study behaviours not identified by Nicholson and White and by linking it with commensurate concepts, i.e. of behaviour being biopsychosocial in nature/character and by using human ethology as a way to study the same. I hope this defends its relevance and enables its application. The

adoption of the evolutionary frame of reference and concepts opens up possibilities for an alternative study of well-established topics in such a pluralist manner.

Theory of Evolution

TE is synonymous with Darwin, though others contributed to and influenced the theory (Pallen, 2009), e.g. Mendelian genetics blending into a synthetic evolutionary theory (Ingold, 2000). A range of neo-evolutionary theories (NE), all essentially commensurate with Darwinism (Laland and Brown, 2011), has developed. I take a generalized 'broad church' approach to TE in this thesis, based on Darwinism and drawing from commensurate evolutionary thinking.

TE is widely accepted in science but provokes debate in wider discourse (see Kitcher, 2007). Kitcher (2007) cites Dobzhansky's claim that evolution makes sense of biology. For Ayala, (2012: 6) evolution is biology's "central unifying concept" (Ayala, 2012: 6) confirmed by research across biological sciences, e.g. genetics, palaeontology, biochemistry, ecology, ethology, neurobiology and molecular biology.

The table below shows the following general tenets of TE I accept in this thesis (see Appendix 2 for more details, notably regarding speciation, human ape-lineage and human evolution) –

Table 1.1 – accepted core TE tenets

TE tenets
Individuals in a species differ; differences are partly transmitted through genetic inheritance
Variations (e.g. mutations) and differences emerge as organisms interact with their environments; these can become established if conferring survival advantage and pass down (what Darwin termed 'descent with modification' and later 'natural selection')
On-going survival requires adaptation to the environment
Competition among a population requires individuals to gain and use advantage
Not all variations, mutations or adaptations survive; neither do all branches of the evolutionary tree
Evolution is not teleological but occurs through emergence, chance, descent with modification, and adaptation
Species split from common ancestry; such speciation occurs throughout evolutionary time
Homo sapiens descended from apes, earlier mammals, and before these ancestors shared with other animals; humankind is part of the natural world
Studying other animals can be valuable in gaining some insight into our own species without denying the differences between the same. This is especially true of our closest genetic cousins, apes, and particularly chimpanzees and bonobos (the genus *Pan*) with which we share c. 98.5% genetic material and whose societies are similar to ours. Differences are as important as similarities, and one cannot consider chimpanzees or bonobos proto-humans.
Biology and culture may be (have become) co-evolutionary and mutually-reinforcing influences on ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels, though cultural evolution is epigenetic and seems Lamarckian (cumulative) in character.

I do not believe genetics or biological factors propel or explain everything in human life (which is tantamount to biologico-reductionism). As outlined below, social (and for humans, psychological) factors are also important and influential. However, biology (e.g. genetic inheritance, physiology, etc.) influences and supports behaviour without fully causing behaviour. “Finite physiological mechanisms and anatomical architecture cannot contain the infinite possibilities available in emerging behaviour” (Dent-Read and Zukow-Goldring, 1997: 8) but they do contribute to what occurs, how it happens, and what effects subjects experience.

I base my argument about behaviour (and TE’s relevance) on the belief humans are evolved animals, so our behaviour is evolved, and that behaviour has functional utility (in promoting survival). Successful behaviour – influenced by phylogenetic and cultural inheritance - remains ‘current’, enabling continued adaptation. For Darwin, evolution results in organisms being organized functionally, i.e. fitting their environment. Organisms become “adapted to certain ways of life” in their ecology, and their bodies, brains, behaviours, etc. adapted “to perform certain functions” (Ayala, 2012: 16). This implies behaviours have benefit because they serve functional need (as explored elsewhere).

Homo sapiens sapiens is a complex species, differentiated from other species by our intelligence and culture. These characteristics seemingly occurred through brain development. The brain allows organisms to “obtain and process information about environmental conditions and adapt to them” (Ayala, 2012: 77) and is “the most distinctive human organ” (*ibid*.). Brain size correlates to capacity “to react to environmental information” (*ibid*.) for all vertebrates, evidenced by growth of the cerebral hemispheres and neo-pallium (which coordinates information in the brain). Humans have disproportionately-large brain-to-body-size and cerebral cortex-to-brain-size ratios. Brain development and associated elevated intelligence arguably enabled technology development (e.g. tool use), language development, the establishing of agriculture, etc., which fostered social life and the emergence of society through reciprocity and cooperation (e.g. Ingold (1986), Trivers (1985); see also Dubreuil (2010) on evolved social institutions).

But culture is part of this evolution. Klein (2000) claims behaviour could drive and result in culture, though culture seemingly follows a Lamarckian evolutionary path and is thus

super-organic. (This does not mean it is unconnected with biological life. Culture can – and tends to - change (much) faster than biological evolution, which takes generations to alter, though a small change in the latter can have very large later consequences. As such, once humans achieved a certain complexity, another stream of evolution and influence was seemingly established.)

The 'both/and' approach to natural and social facets of life

TE does not fall into the trap of biologism or reductionism. Quite the opposite is true, given that evolution is the epitome of emergence (see next chapter). TE does not dismiss human culture's importance nor reduce the importance of social factors in influencing our lives and species. It neither rejects human consciousness and action/agency, nor seeks to explain human life and behaviour in reductionist (e.g. physicalist) terms. It acknowledges culture and social factors, agency, and biological factors contribute to complex human life on ontogenetic (individual) and phylogenetic (species) levels. For Darwin, behaviour was malleable in the light of environmental circumstance (Laland and Brown, 2011). This means there is no reason why we cannot actively foster our own development (e.g. away from hostility).

TE considers biological aspects of behaviour operate in social contexts – and that a mutual influence rather than mutual exclusivity exists between the social and biological realms (Barrett *et al*., 2002; Buss, 2004; Dunbar and Barrett, 2007; Tooby and Cosmides, 1989; Toth and Schick, 2005; Wilson, 2000). NE, e.g. Evolutionary Psychology (EP), Human Behavioural Ecology (HBE) and Dual Inheritance Theory (DIT), though differing in focus, emphasis, methods and explananda (Laland and Brown, 2011; Smith, 2000) all accept culture as well as biological factors influence human life. Smith (2000: 32) states, "behaviour is jointly shaped by genetic, cultural and (non-social) environmental influences", and Richerson and Boyd (2001; page number unknown; emphasis in original) claim that -

> "Rather than a neat, narrow boundary between innate and cultural processes that can be characterized by a short list of simple biological constraints on human behaviour, we imagine a wide, historically contingent,

densely intertwined set of phenomenon *with causal arrows operating in both directions*."

(though like Wilson (2000) they advocate locating social sciences in natural science). Richerson and Boyd (1978, 2001, 2005) endorse the notion "genes and culture are two inheritance systems that interact on the *same level* to produce human behaviour" (2001: page unknown, emphasis in original). (I read "level" to mean the site of influence for phylogenetic and socio-cultural factors - the individual human being, and by extension the species.) DIT shows how this results in a co-evolutionary path in which both genetic and epigenetic (non-genetic) factors influence human development. Culture is epigenetic, so once socio-cultural phenomena (structures and institutions) emerged they became profoundly influential, operating as an apparent 'proximate' cause of adaptation (Tinbergen's terminology), developing faster than phylogenetic factors (which are 'ultimate' causes) do and responding quicker to changing environments and needs. As brains and intelligence evolved, and social life developed, culture emerged - and once emerged, it evolved. It becomes more complex and exerts influence back on individuals in the culture it operates in and through (Durham, 1976). This suggests culture could (or has) become an 'ultimate' cause. Social/cultural influences seem able to constrain behaviour through institutions and social forces (e.g. normative social rules, law) over long periods of time (e.g. Elias's civilizing process).

An illustration of complex, interactive, bio-social inheritance can be seen in early mankind's development, sketched here in a grossly over-simplified way (see Dubreuil (2010) and Sedikides *et al*. (2006) for overviews). Body development occurred via a changing environment (physical ecology), perhaps enforced by climate changes (Richerson and Boyd, 2001). Altered diet (e.g. inclusion of meat) directly affected morphology (Klein, 1995; Toth and Schick, 2005); anatomy changed (e.g. cranial capacity increase, altered leg-to-pelvic-girdle position, musculature, limb ratios, lung capacity, dentition) as the physical body adapted to environmental changes (Scarre, 2005) and dietary change. Brain development (and thus increased intelligence, resulting in, e.g. tool use, weapons development) was promoted. Ecological shifts and physical development resulted in new food-gathering tactics,

habitation locales (and migration), and fostered group-based social life and organization, e.g. shelter-finding or -building, structuring hunting parties, division of domestic labour, organizing defences against attack (following agriculture's establishment) (Pettitt, 2005)). Social institutions (e.g. law) develop accordingly as power centralized in developing society (Dubreuil, 2010). Seemingly, a co-evolutionary development of social and physical factors occurred in early *Homo* species as physical and biological factors affected each other.

Tensions between biological and social evolutionary forces

Human bio-morphology occurs far slower than socio-cultural change (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997; Klein, 1995). This helps explain why modern *Homo sapiens sapiens* retains mechanisms/systems/complexes evolved in and developed to meet the needs of a different environment than that currently occupied. For instance, the human brain and associated systems (e.g. limbic system, endocrine system, FFF) has remained unchanged for many millennia (Flinn, 2007), but society has developed far more rapidly in the recent (evolutionarily-speaking) past (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997; Smith, 2000). Wrangham and Petersen (1997) claim we retain what de Becker (1997) calls stone-age minds in space-age times (see also Huxley, 1996). This seemingly fits findings re: humans' neurology, endocrine system and basic survival support mechanisms (e.g. stress reaction system), though it may understate *Homo sapiens sapiens*' capacity to adapt to changing (social) environments and effect change on them. EP contends humans are *mal*adapted to current conditions but well-suited for past environments; DIT conversely implies we have successfully adapted to a much-changed environment. Both EP and DIT may acknowledge extant psychophysiological systems are not always suited to contemporary situations and sometimes exert what seem to be atavistic ('primitive') behaviours or behavioural inclinations (e.g. fight or flight). I am unsure if we are maladapted *per se*, but tension may occur for humans operating in social contexts substantially different to the epochs in which early mankind employed such systems frequently in life-or-death encounters.

Summary

This chapter presents TE as a broadly valid way to understand human behaviour, and thus WRH and associated issues (stress and emotion). Though called for in OB, and apparent in some studies, it remains largely unused as an explanatory framework (for reasons outlined in a later chapter). TE offers particular opportunity as an integrative perspective accommodating diverse and different paradigms.

I outlined TE's core tenets and emphasized TE is not synonymous with biological reductionism because it acknowledges social influences on humankind. Culture is evolved (Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Trivers, 1985), though not in the same way as biological evolution, and is one of the influences on our phylogenetic (species) and ontogenetic (individual) development. TE does not view biological factors as the sole influence on behaviour. This supports the argument that one cannot frame human beings, behaviour and experience as biological or social, but should do so as both. We cannot separate humankind from the natural world; we are of and in it. *Homo sapiens sapiens*, as a complex species, has been influenced by social (and psychological) factors in addition to biological ones over vast time periods, resulting in huge complexity. However, this chapter has suggested tensions between biological and social factors may occur, which might manifest as quasi-maladaptation to the current social milieu (which has developed at a faster rate than morphology).

The next chapter offers an illustration of how complexity may occur.

Chapter 2 Emergence and complexity

Introduction

I suggest the concept of emergence augments TE by helping elucidate how biological and social facets of life/being relate, and how complex beings (i.e. humans) come into existence. Rather than attempt to identify an origin point, e.g. of life or any specific life form, emergence consider the process of development undergone.

I introduce the concept of emergence and draw from it to explicate how complexity may occur. I then posit emergence could be the driving force in evolution for human beings; TE is an example – perhaps the epitome - of emergence because I suggest complexity is evident in our species' very being and behaviour. (Appendix 3 gives an illustration of emergence using Koestler's notion of holons.[2])

Emergence and complexity

Re-surfacing in the 1970s (Goldstein, 1999) the concept of emergence is a "pragmatically-useful ontological commitment" (El-Hani and Pihlström, date unknown: 1) in describing (perhaps explaining) "how complexity evolved" (Corning, 2002: 2). Ontological emergence is contested but I claim TE demonstrates animals' (including humans') existence has developed from earlier organisms which manifested emergent properties. Emergence is seemingly centrally-related to – and effectively propels – evolution for humans. A deep connection obtains between evolution as the process of adaptive development as species interact in and with their environments (and pass on naturally selected traits because of survival benefit) and the appearance of novelty; new adaptations become established and genetically (and in some examples, culturally) transmitted to later generations because of their utility.

[2] This is one example and not definitive or exhaustive. Holons, which span levels and build into an holarchy, rather than an hierarchy, can be seen to link biological and social domains (through the psychological one). The result of holons' interactions can shed light on how new physical and nonphysical mechanisms/systems/complexes emerge in/through the evolutionary process.

Emergence maintains qualitatively novel (Corning, 2002; Hartmann 1975/1953) entities, properties, etc. (Goldstein, 1999), i.e. “material changes… [which] cannot be expressed in simple quantitative terms” (Corning, 2002: 2), result from ‘lower’-level entities mutually interacting *over time* (Elder-Vass, 2010); ‘higher level’ nova emerge that cannot be predicted (or deduced) from lower level entities (Goldstein, 1999). Hartmann’s (1975/1953) Theory of Emergence is useful as an example helping conceptualize how gaps can be – and in life are – spanned. This helps one see how complex (human) life emerges.[3] Hartmann describes the concept of emergence in positing laws that operate in reality, detailed in the table below –

Table 2.1 – Hartmann’s Emergence laws

Hartmann’s law	**Description**
Recurrence	Lower categories recur in higher ones, never the reverse
Modification	Higher levels shape and modify elements of lower levels included in them
The Novum	Novelty appears in higher levels following interaction of elements at the lower level(s)
Distance Between Levels	Punctuated (non-continuous) development occurs; gaps show between differentiated levels because of novelty

Lower elements build into higher ones successively, enabling their existence. New features or functions emerge in higher, more complex levels not present in lower ones (never

[3] Hartmann’s organic, psychic-emotional and intellectual-cultural levels could be mapped onto the domain/disciplinary hierarchy cited later and the holarchy cited in Appendix 3, and basically seems to equate to the biological, psychological and social quadrants in Wilber’s AQAL model, also presented later.

the reverse). Elder-Vass (2010) uses Broad's (1925) notation to show this occurs through relationships and interactions. Relationship R occurs as parts (A, B and C) of an entity interact; R (A, B, C). From this a property or properties beyond its constituent parts emerge – R (A, B, C) > (A, B, C)[4]. The resultant can act as a causal mechanism which, in further interactions, can create nova which then become part of the next emergent process, and so on. At any point, nova may appear. Interactions are non-linear (Corning, 2002; Goldstein, 1999); emergent properties or entities are self-organizing and created from interactions; they are not created, organized or ruled from 'above' teleologically (by design or to achieve pre-decided objectives) and are not 'designed' from below; they arise synergistically from interactions.

Emergent (higher level) entities/properties are dependent on lower ones (whose relational interactions 'create' them) but are not reducible to them. An entity or property cannot be "*totally fixed* by the lower-level properties" from which it emerged (El-Hani and Pihlström (date unknown: 10; emphasis in original). This voids reductionism, which would claim entities and properties of higher (novel) complexity can always be expressed apropos their 'basic' or essential building blocks and root one domain in another, e.g. the psychological in the biological. However, emergence maintains interactions result in nova which manifest complexity. Using the example of the psychological 'level', though this "is built *on* the lower biological and physico-chemical levels" it is neither entirely physical (or non-physical) but "something which is, *at the same time*, a psychological property and a quite complex set of biological and physico-chemical properties and relations" connected and related to it (El-Hani and Pihlström (date unknown: 12; emphasis in original). Privileging lower levels over higher ones, or *vice versa*, is questionable.

Social entities and properties are emergent (see below). Emergence offers a description of how "complex [higher-level] entities become causal players" (Murphy, 2007: 1 – 2). For Scott (2007), the biological and psychological-cognitive branches of levels of reality or complexity meet in the formation of the brain, from which the mind (including consciousness) emerges. This connects to and is influenced by society and culture. For

[4] > is used in its mathematical sense of 'greater than'.

Scott (2007: 192) “levels of social reality… must be included in… models of the human brain”. I suggest the reverse should also obtain. Interactions “among the various levels… should be included in the overall theoretical picture” (Scott, *ibid*.). This is difficult when disciplines are still segregated despite inter-disciplinary overtures, and when disciplines may still ignore, fail to recognize or (actively or unwittingly) resist ideas and praxis beyond their own boundaries.

Emergence disturbs Western and scientific thinking which tends to seek unity, consistency, ultimate laws, ‘the’ method and answer (Pattee, 1978), accepts simple cause-effect relations and maintains dichotomies (Ingold, 1988, 1991) (though consider non-linear science for a different mentality). Nova perplex reductionists; emergence or evolution of new entities is discomfortingly magical (Corning, 2002). But development, at individual (ontogenetic) or species (phylogenetic) level, is “not a simple process; it has a multidimensional, almost mischievous character” (Miller, 1997: 500) defying simplistic conceptions and explanations. The paradoxical character of emergence (synergistic higher-from-lower entities or properties occurring non-teleologically; dependence without reductionism; requisite pluralism) challenges and undermines linear cause-and-effect and prediction-based science; it functions in open, dynamic systems characterized by non-linear interactions. I suggest it is only comprehensible if a pluralist approach is adopted; trying to understand evolved/complex/biopsychosocial behaviour using a solely biological or social approach will fail (Pattee, 1978).

Emergence of complexity involved in evolution (and thus evolved behaviours) helps one avoid the trap inherent in the quasi-traditional hierarchy of scientific disciplines and the domains they study (see Chapter 4) because it suggests the social is linked to the biological, not unrelated to it. (See Appendix 3 for notes on holons as an example of this.) Though the links are complex, such a reconceptualising and refiguring aids navigating round the extremes associated with reductionism and super-organicism, which are both outcomes of the hierarchy. Fuller understanding of a complex phenomenon or reality, like human behaviour, is arguably only possible if a broader, more open and holistic or multi-faceted interdisciplinary perspective is adopted.

Summary

Emergence helps explain how evolution occurs and indicates how the biological connects to the social. Over vast periods of time, complexity occurred for humans (though not for all animals). I suggest the outcomes of emergence in evolution are biospsychosocial beings and behaviours, i.e. simultaneously biological, psychological and social, but irreducible to any single 'level' or facet associated with the complex whole. The next chapter introduces and explores this.

Chapter 3 The biopsychosocial concept

Introduction

In this chapter I argue that the complex outcomes of emergence in human evolution can be viewed, described and explained as 'biopsychosocial'. The human species and our behaviours biopsychosocial complexes because they comprise, are influenced by and effect biological, psychological and social facets. (I later argue that the behaviours and experiences specifically studied in this thesis - hostility, stress and emotion – are biopsychosocial). I offer a model which enables one to see relationships between these facets within an evolutionary frame of reference (later used in analysis chapters).

The biopsychosocial complex

A biopsychosocial complex, e.g. a human behaviour, cannot be reduced to its biological 'ingredients', though these form part of what it is. Likewise, seeing it as devoid of such ingredients is tantamount to super-organicism. The combination of biological, psychological and social factors give the complex its biopsychosocial quality and character. This perspective offers a way to see how the bio-social 'division' might be bridged (i.e. how domains are not segregated but connected and therefore need not remain divided). The approach gives researchers and theorists an opportunity to draw from wider research, and apparently-incommensurate streams of science, to better understand topics; Campbell (1975) specifically referred to the biopsychosocial approach as a general inter-disciplinary and holistically-inclined mentality forty years ago.

The biopsychosocial approach

The conception of behaviour and experience being biopsychosocial is not new but to my knowledge it is unused in OB/OMS.

Engel's biopsychosocial model (hereafter BPS; 'biopsychosocial' will refer to a more general multi-faceted or -levelled conception, like Campbell's) is useful in indicating how a dominant approach in a field can be challenged by expanded thinking. Engel indicated illness and its treatment was more complex than the then dominant medical model afforded; they

were influenced by biological, psychological and social factors involved (Smith, 2002). The medical model ascribed disease to pathogens, injury, abnormality or genetic factors, diagnosing disease accordingly and treating patients metaphorically and literally as passive objects. Engel placed illness, diagnosis and treatment in a more comprehensive context, considered more contributory factors and involved other relevant health professionals. BPS perceived and treated patients as active agents re: illness and recovery, and included them in the physician-patient relationship. BPS was progressive, expansive and additive (Smith, 2002), and is echoed in current ideas regarding stress (e.g. Sapolsky, 1998; Wilkinson, 2001).

BPS illustrated how a stimulus in one domain affects others, e.g. a stressor in the social domain (e.g. job loss) negatively affecting physiological function (e.g. sleep patterns, substance use) and psychological health (e.g. depression) – and thus bears similarity to models of WRH antecedent and outcome models – but did not show *how* the biological, psychological and social domains are linked (Adler, 2009).

A biopsychosocial model which does show how biological, psychological and social domains are connected is Wilber's All Quadrants, All Levels (AQAL) model. Importantly, AQAL connects these facets in an evolutionary frame. Sattler (2008) supports Wilber's claim that AQAL, though developed in the field of transpersonal psychology/spirituality studies, and despite limitations, is applicable to many aspects of life (e.g. medicine, education, and business). If not achieving a "full spectrum model" (Engler, 1986: 44), AQAL does try to integrate to avoid weaknesses associated with analysis restricted to single disciplines or domains. As such, AQAL is a useful tool for visualizing how biological, psychological and social facets of behaviour relate. In offering an evolutionary context, one can see the historical development of mechanisms/systems/complexes in domains (Wilber, 1983; Mella, 2009). AQAL serves to show activity and relationships between relevant factors at ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels. AQAL quadrants are explained in the illustration below (adapted from Sattler, 2008).

Figure 3.1 - AQAL quadrants

Psyche, feelings, senses, Self, consciousness, intention, spirit.	Organism, brain, behaviour
Psychology, phenomenology, theology.	Natural sciences – biology, chemistry, etc.
I *Individual (interior, invisible, subjective)*	**IT** *Individual (exterior, visible, structure: objective, empirical)*
WE *Collective (interior, inter-subjective, inter-relational)*	**ITS** *Collective (exterior, visible structure; inter-objective, interdependent, inter-relational)*
Culture, ethics, values.	Social systems, e.g. law, government.
Social anthropology, the arts, politics.	Complexity, Chaos and Systems theories, sociology, economics.

The horizontal axis marks the individual from the collective; the vertical axis marks the internal (psyche/Self and culture as embedded personal socialized and enacted norms) left hand quadrants from the external (organism/behaviour and society) right hand quadrants.

One can see quadrants correspond to the exemplum domain/discipline hierarchy offered later (and holarchy; see Appendix 3); upper left quadrant to the psychological; upper right quadrant to the biological, anatomical, chemical; the two lower quadrants to the sociocultural. However, Wilber's map also shows human evolutionary development, and thus allows one to see systems and behaviour in ontogenetic and phylogenetic frames simultaneously (see Appendix 4). Wilber (1983: 25) repeats the notion "ontogeny

recapitulates phylogeny"; the individual is an example of the wider evolutionary process which produced him or her. What is analysed ontogenetically implies phylogenetic context and evolutionary depth, involved in and connected to specific and individually-situated social interactions. For this thesis, that 'deep' natural historical context is supplied and incorporated in analysis and theorizing, not excluded as per much analysis of hostility and associated issues in OB/OMS.

AQAL usefully allows one to see correspondences between quadrants to note correlations and connections in biopsychosocial activity (viz., in biological, psychological and social domains simultaneously) for events (here a hostile encounter) and the relevant complexes/systems/mechanisms contributing to them in an evolutionary context. AQAL offers a way to view relationships between domains in the broadest historical (viz. evolutionary) frame of reference and allows for consideration of issues on ontogenetic (individual) and phylogenetic (species) levels because they are linked. The diagonal axes in the figure below depict evolution on both ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels. As Wilber (date unknown) notes, each phase of human development corresponds with a broad cultural and social context and associated behaviours driven by (then) dominant brain-body organs. That is, external levels of sociality, culture and human behavioural complexity are associated with developmental phases of the individual as an example of the species. (The diagram below is taken from Wilber (date unknown) at www.kenwilber.com.../IntroductiontotheIntegralApproach).

Figure 3.2 - Wilber's AQAL 'map'



Information in the quadrants is largely self-explanatory though one should consult Wilber for definitions (see Appendix 4 for further details.) The important point is to note the quadrants chart biological, psychological and socio-cultural domains and each has an evolutionary axes relating to developmental phases of humankind. Thus, one can link points across the map because, as Wilber notes, a feature in one at a specific level has correlates in the others. For instance, connecting points 8 clockwise from the upper left quadrant shows emotion relates directly to the (mammalian) limbic system (see later chapters), a social world based on small family-based kinship groups, and cultures based on undifferentiated human mind-body states. This helps one see what is happening at levels relating to humans' contemporary evolved stage, e.g. at level 12. One can see, as analysed later, that at such

later phases, behaviours and mechanisms/systems/complexes associated with earlier phases are still involved (operative) and influential.

Summary

The biopsychosocial approach to behaviour is not new but unused on OB/OMS to my knowledge. It represents a position on behaviour and experience that is pluralist and trans-disciplinary in accepting behaviour is complex and multi-faceted, and is commensurate with TE because behaviours of a biopsychosocial, evolved, complex species will themselves be biopsychosocial. This links domains separated in the quasi-traditional hierarchy in modern science (see the following chapter). To fully acknowledge our characteristics, we should acknowledge our biological nature (we have bodies and are driven at least partly by biological needs) without ignoring we are also psychological (self-aware, agential, cognitive) and social (subject to social norms and influences).

Wilber's AQAL model is cited as a tool with which to map correspondences across biological, psychological and social domains in an evolutionary frame of reference. It remains pertinent for individuals in specific events (ontogenetically) and general species-wide development (phylogenetically) because the individual is an example of the evolutionary process. One can see how earlier and later (e.g. contemporary) evolutionary phases relate and are in possible tension. I return to this later when analysing activation of survival-oriented behaviours and experiences in contemporary social contexts.

The next chapter presents the questionable bio-social divide in (social) science which the standard social science model maintains; the aforementioned biopsychosocial approach and TE flies in the face of this. The divide helps explain much social science's apparent discomfort with biological issues and TE, but it can be bypassed.

Chapter 4 Bridging the bio-social divide; (re)connection and integration

Introduction

I have argued evolution, through emergence, results for humans in biopsychosocial complexes (e.g. our species and human behaviour). However social science has tended to separate biological and social domains. In this chapter, I outline the questionable split and tension between biological and social domains and sciences, and sketch something of its history and effects. This is required because it has had potent effect on claims to knowledge and social science practice.

The standard social science model (SSSM) (Nicholson and White, 2006) resulting from the bio-social divide maintains the social is different to the biological, and specifically that social science should concern itself with social explanations of social behaviour and phenomena. This super-organicism (Heyer, 1982) was seemingly triggered by Durkheim's belief social issues could only be explained socially (see also Callan, 1970).

I take a different line to the quasi-traditional division between biological and social domains and associated sciences. I argue that the divide was historically-contingent, political, based on mutual caricatures. I also claim that the recapitulation of the pre-division social science mentality, evident in some social scientists' recent efforts to address corporeal, biological and evolutionary issues helps us circumvent the problems associated with the divide. In adopting TE, emergence, the biopsychosocial approach and ethology, I offer an alternative to the dominant super-organicist approaches in social science (including OB/OMS), i.e. SSSM (Nicholson and White, 2006).

Super-organicism

This notion maintains the social is 'above' or 'beyond' the biological domain[5]. Lorenz (1964: 40) stated about the super-organicist view –

[5] I partially accept this; culture is super-organic and seemingly operates in Lamarckian not Darwinian fashion.

> "Men like to think of themselves as something outside and above nature. They dislike hearing what a small part of nature they really are and they hate the thought of being subject to its universal laws."

However, by separating the biological from the social *per se*, super-organicism severs any and all connections between them and sciences studying them. In maintaining 'the social' is such because it is 'other' than 'the biological', super-organicism exemplifies extreme social constructionism (see Craib (1997) on constructionism as psychosis).

Concepts and theories to be introduced and applied later in this thesis, as well as those previously introduced, counter such super-organicism. The TE argument previously presented claims socio-cultural life is evolved as and when organisms interact with(in) their environment (which acts back on them) and that social and biological factors mutually influence each other in a hugely complex interaction over time. They are not separate, but intermeshed.

Bio-social division

Super-organicism resulted from the 'science wars' (Flyvbjerg, 2001) in which natural and social sciences' took entrenched positions and discharged mutually antagonistic criticism rooted in binary oppositions, e.g. arguments about object(ivity) vs. subject(ivity), relativism versus non-relativism, interpretativism versus objectivity, open versus closed systems, control and cause-and-effect versus exploration and explanation of meaning, etc. (Flyvbjerg, 2001). This expressed deep division and mutual distrust arguably propelled by mutual caricatures (Mitchell, *et al*., 1997)[6] propagating (still-extant) misunderstandings, ignorance and prejudice which exacerbated the initially-questionable division. Once divided, (some) scientists sustained it; Richerson and Boyd (2001, page unknown) state –

> "The superorganic concept was a tribal ploy used by twentieth century social scientists to create and maintain disciplinary boundaries with biology".

[6] E.g. see Myers (1993) on non-neutrality of hard science research and Flyvbjerg (2001) on hard science's use of interpretive methods.

Super-organicist SSSM would seemingly deny TE's use in social science because the latter would be seen as 'biology', though some researchers have attempted fusion, e.g. Ingold (1986, 2001) in anthropology.

Hierarchy of domains and disciplines

Social science turned from its earlier natural science template (Benton, 2001), rejecting the biological (Ingold, 1991). It apparently feared absorption into (reductionist) natural science (Johnson and Duberley, 2000; Weingart *et al*., 1997)[7]. This resulted in a quasi-traditional hierarchy of sciences. An exemplum adapted from Benton and Craib (2001) is presented in the table below[8] -

Table 4.1 – domain and discipline hierarchy

Domain	***Associated science/discipline***
Social	Sociology, politics, economics
Psychological	Psychology (including biopsychology and social psychology)
Physiological/anatomical	Physiology/anatomy
Biological	(cell) biology
Bio-chemistry	Bio-chemical
Chemistry	Chemical
Physical	(particle) physics

[7] This is understandable given Wilson's (2000) statement neurophysiology and sociobiology would ultimately subsume social science.
[8] Collier (1994), Ellis (2007) and Scott (2007) present similar examples.

Such hierarchies are a “central image throughout the modern era” (Murphy, 2007:1). Ascending levels of “order and phenomenology and… [real] ontology” (Ellis, 2007: 127) up to and including the psychological domain and psychology in which “real physical structuration” arguably exists[9]. Beyond this, domains become conceptual though their manifestations, e.g. structures (like social institutions) can be physical and have tangible (material, physical) effect.

Such hierarchies are impositions of order or structure; “no description of the world… is Nature’s own” but rather a human construction (El-Hani and Pihlström, date unknown: 23), though Nature presents hierarchies of life/being wherever life exists (Koestler, 1967). Such a hierarchy implies human value and organization, and is an historical separation of domains and disciplines (van Langenhove (1995) citing Manicas (1987)). One’s position, disciplinary background, bias, etc. could express disciplinary-based agenda, viz. indicate perceived and desired importance of one domain or discipline relative to others. Locating, positioning, ordering, and interpreting science seems subject to social, historical, philosophical and political agenda (e.g. the science wars). Reductionists would argue ‘lower’ domains and associated disciplines are fundamental to and essential for ‘higher’ levels (viz. the pyramid’s foundation). Conversely, super-organicists would argue ‘higher’ levels are more ‘sophisticated’ (viz. the pyramid’s apex) or unrelated to ‘lower’ levels and explanation. (In this thesis, terms ‘lower’ or ‘higher’ refer solely to position in the hierarchy, not my ascribed value.) But domains and disciplines are not always discrete; the hierarchy shows overlaps exist (e.g. bio-psychology, social psychology) despite sciences’ apparent attempted segregation (Scott, 2007).

Differentiation of domains through disciplinary activity is understandable as disciplines define - and defend - areas of specialism. However, segregation by active disciplinary isolation seems unnecessary, unhelpful and might stall broader scientific progress (Cartwright, 2000).

I consider it invidious to assume ascribed ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ values of disciplines and to uncritically accept the notion everything could be reduced or summated to single domains

[9] Scott (2007) believes different but related and overlapping hierarchies exist for biological and cognitive realms.

or disciplines. For instance, regarding human hostility, considering the chemical domain in the hierarchy as more or less important *per se* than the 'social' one, or *vice versa*, seems questionable; I argue both are relevant. Yet, super-organicism sets the social above and separate to the biological. Implicit value does not necessarily reside in one domain or in a single or discipline, though one may claim or try to impose this; value exists across domains and disciplines. However, much contemporary science seems to manifest the hierarchy and adheres to scientific difference and division. This is especially evident in the discomfort modern social sciences have until recently tended to exhibit apropos matters like the body or biological facets of behaviour or experience.

Contesting the divide

Such questionable mutual understanding and identified (if unacknowledged) common ground (Fraser and Greco, 2005; Wheeler, 1978) could foster successful interdisciplinary efforts to bridge scientific gaps (Dietz *et al*., 1990).

Dissatisfaction with the biological-social division has seemingly influenced recent calls for such approaches regarding the study of human life. Some contemporary social scientists urge a resurrection of the pre-super-organicist social science mentality not differentiating biological and social realms. Heyer (1982) claims many (early) social scientists saw social and biological life as connected. Callan (1970) cites attempts made by social scientists from c. 1960s onwards to overcome the bio-social divide, which requires significant effort (Dietz *et al*., 1990). Its attitude unequivocally states "dynamic and interactive relationship[s] between environment, mind and body" (Wainwright and Calnan, 2002: 78) requires acknowledgment, and it attempts to include both natural and social scientific insights into the study of human life and behaviour. Wheeler (1978) may overstate a close relationship exists between biological and social sciences but illustrates correspondences and 'cross-over' disciplines, e.g. socio-biology and Evolutionary Psychology. Scott (2007: 180) remarks social and biological sciences analyse "heterogeneous subsets" of open systems rather than the "homogenous sets" in physical sciences' closed systems, indicating parallels exist. Collier (1994) states many social sciences share TE's interest in history. EP, HBE and DIT, as well as the concept of

emergence and TE, and more recently-developing inter-disciplinary efforts like cultural neuroscience (Chiao *et al*., 2010; Reynolds Losin *et al*, 2010) and social cognitive neuroscience (Evans, 2008; Lieberman, 2007), might be able to connect what in relatively recent history were organized into quasi-incommensurate domains. In OB/OMS, calls for the use of the evolutionary paradigm and to integrate physiology (Carney and Mason, 2010; Heaphy and Dutton, 2008) and neuroscience (Becker *et al*., 2011; Becker and Cropanzano, 2010) are examples of this. All advocate locating human life in a broader frame of reference than that offered by a 'purely' social science perspective and practice. (All draw from natural and social science realms' research findings, i.e. from specific specialized disciplines, in order to inform understanding.)

This is apparent in interest in the body. This is a topic of relevance for this thesis because the body is connected to behaviour and experience like stress, emotion and hostility. It is the site of personal experience, the vehicle of inter-personal interaction and the target of aggressors. This interest in the body is outlined now in preparation for later reference to the body in service work.

The corporeal turn

Contemporary social sciences' interest in corporeal issues manifests evident dissatisfaction with the separation of biological and social domains. Bodies are essential to human life, and are present and used in work activities as the later chapters on service work aims to illustrate more fully. Lupton (1998), citing Merleau-Ponty (1962), claims our being-in-the-world, and knowledge of it, occurs through bodies which are phenomenologically requisite for existence, connecting us to our world and enabling our sense-making of it and of ourselves (Polhemus, 1978). This includes behaviour and experience in organizations and corporations, the etymology of which imply corporeality.

The span of issues associated with the body indicates its complexity – and echoes that of human life and behaviour as implied by TE. Its form, development, parts and (dys)function has been studied by natural and applied sciences. The body can be seen as object (e.g. machine, organism) by natural sciences - acted upon by external forces (e.g. see later notes on stress). It can be seen as part of the subjective self by psychological/social

sciences - an active vehicle for interactions between subjects and thus propelled by internal forces. It is a locus for internal experience yet can impress itself on the world and other people. The body is partially what humans are as living beings, but also something we possess or inhabit. One's body (as possession) may inform one's sense of self yet bodies are related to social influences (e.g. discourse, institutions; see Howson, 2004) and can become instruments of same. (Note, too, 'body' can reference a collective not just an individual). It might be claimed the body and embodiment occurs in the gaps or overlaps between classic dualities' extremes – subject-object, structure-agency, internal-external, biological-social, Self-Other (Barnes and Lepicki, 2007). It may also be seen as a connective link between micro and macro levels of reality, and thus connect different units of analysis. However, the range of approaches which can be taken apropos studying the (human) body, embodiment and corporeality means it is epistemologically complex and challenging even as it is ontologically necessary for human life and being (Shilling, 2003).

Social sciences have tended not to focus on the bio-social interface (Williams and Bendelow, 1998), bracketing off matter(s) like the body (e.g. Berger and Luckman, 1966) and perceiving them as important only for natural sciences. Social science has tended to consider social actors' behaviour as disembodied (non-corporeal, a-biological). However, the body/embodiment and associated issues (e.g. emotion) has regained social science attention in recent years and is now viewed as a legitimate topic in, e.g. social anthropology (Benthall and Polhemus, 1975) and sociology (Fraser and Greco, 2005; Shilling, 2003). Williams and Bendelow (1998) note social scientists have realized the body is too important a topic to allow its monopolization by natural science. (Emotion and stress directly connect to that of the body and can thus be included in interest in bodily matters.) Feminisms' interest in the female body; interest in subjectivity, subjective knowing and experience; control, coercion and conditioning of people through bodies (e.g. Foucault); and inter-discipliniarity (Howson, 2004), etc. might have influenced this increasing attention on the body in social science.

The (re)introduction of somatic issues (Fraser and Greco, 2005; Hassard *et al*., 2000) by social scientists is welcome and extends earlier efforts. The body arguably always had a social science presence, e.g. in the work of early sociologists and later social theorists; Turner (1984) cites it as featuring in Durkheim, Weber (individuals' inner restraint), Engels

(corporeal effects of work), Elias (civilized bodies) and Goffman (re: self-governing bodies in social representation). Seminal thinkers on corporeality in recent social science include those focusing on the body and embodiment (e.g. Crossley, 1995; Shilling, 2003; Turner, 1984), on performativity - which implies bodily activity and corporeal enactment (e.g. Schechner, 1993; Turner, 1987) and emotions in work (e.g. Hochschild, 1979, 1983). (Later chapters explore the body in service work and biological facets of behaviour and experience, and aim partly to (re)corporealize study of behaviour in organizations, e.g. WRH.) This shift recovers and reintroduces a matter historically present in social sciences.

Organizational research has responded (e.g. Hassard *et al*., 2000), though I posit OB/OMS has not incorporated the body in widespread fashion but should if it is to more comprehensively analyse human experiences in organizational life. As I later argue and explore, inclusion of the body is necessary for analysing service work and WRH. The body is the site of emotion and stress, and the experience of same as corporeal sensation; it is the vehicle through which interpersonal interaction occurs in the embodied performance of role; and it is the target of violence.

However, Benton (2001) believes many social science studies only ostensibly address corporeal matters re: bio-physical facets and aspects of human and social life. Social sciences may have 'socialized the natural' (e.g. in trying to create a sociology of the body and corporeal experience; see Berthelot (1995), Crossley (1995) and Davis (1971)) by not locating it in an interdisciplinary frame of reference. It remains possible social science generally and OB/OMS specifically still may ignore, bypass or only obliquely include relevant bodily and biological matters. This risks them remaining overlooked, unacknowledged and/or under-represented.

Summary

The bio-social divide has been presented as an historical, political event based on caricatured perceptions. An alternative approach can challenge the super-organic SSSM by recapitulating the pre-divide social science mentality not separating the biological and social as discretely. OB/OMS can learn from recent social science dissatisfaction with the divide in seeking to incorporate biology and evolutionary thinking. I used the body as an example of

this. The relevance of the body, e.g. as the site of experience (e.g. stress, emotion), a performative and communicative vehicle used in service work, and the target for hostility is explored in later chapters.

The next chapter presents the argument that a pluralist approach to behaviour is required. This avoids the pitfalls outlined above. The combination of TE, the biopsychological approach and ethology offers such a framework.

Chapter 5 A pluralist, trans-disciplinary conceptual framework

Introduction

Previous chapters have presented TE, emergence and the biopsychosocial approach and argued these help us understand human behaviour. This necessitates a movement against the super-organicist SSSM. Dissatisfaction with it, and its inherent biosocial divide, has motivated some social scientists to recently (re)incorporate biological issues in their work, so appetite exists for such approaches. I believe studying WRH and associated behaviours and experiences benefits from such an approach.

This chapter indicates such a mentality manifests pluralist, and indeed a tendency towards holistic, thinking. I argue TE as augmented with commensurate concepts of emergence, the biopsychosocial approach and ethology, is an example of this. In not separating the biological and social, or mankind from other life forms, this conceptual framework allows consideration of more facets of behaviour.

Benefits of TE

TE gives human behaviour a natural history, describing or explaining mankind's development in relation to his environment and other (e.g. closely-related) creatures. Evolution shows biological and social factors at work over time at phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels, and thus relates to the biopsychosocial perspective. As such, it is sympathetic to the role biological factors play in shaping us but acknowledges the influence of the environment and social interactions, and can therefore potentially draw together seemingly disparate streams in science. As Nicholson and White note (2006: 114), TE is "theoretically integrative across disciplinary boundaries… [and] passes the difficult test of providing a unitary explanatory framework" for findings regarding law-like operations of and relationships in the world which seem previously to have been separated in disciplinary silos. It is a "meta-theoretical framework within which many superficially different phenomena can be coherently integrated" (Kennick *et al*., 2006: 4). Nicholson and White (2006: 115) state - "Darwinism is… not a normative science. It provides a framework for understanding the way

our natural world is, and why it is that way. It does not tell us what our social, economic, and political world should be, other than perhaps to recognize and take into consideration our innate attributes where they exist, and to point out possible areas of misfit with contemporary environments."

TE is valuable for this thesis because it does not separate humans from the "rest of the organic universe" and "biological materiality" (Nicholson and White, 2006: 115). It acknowledges biological imperatives are involved in behaviour through function of biological systems but also that psychological and social forces influence the expression of behaviour in human life. Evolutionary thinking allows for Nature's and Nurture's interaction and mutual influence (Ingold (1988) considers this dichotomy artificially created by Western scientific thinking as the framework in which science is typically conducted). In revealing humans' evolutionary past, TE offers insight into present behaviours. It offers fruitful insights into human behaviour's historical development in complex, dynamic contexts. As I later argue, ethology (the study of animal behaviour), which is commensurate with TE, and is one science studying evolution, provides a useable lens through which to see such interactions, and I use it in analysis of WRH.

Crossing the bio-social divide – pluralism and trans-discipliniarity

The mentality preceding super-organicism, as adopted by some recent social scientists, is likely to result in less epistemological 'purism' but greater pluralism, which adherence to the bio-social division will disallow.

Flyvbjerg (2001: 219) suggests a "non-dualistic" approach promoting pluralism supporting a "both-and" rather than an 'either-or' approach will help with such efforts. Social and natural sciences each possess valuable strengths which might add to wider efforts to deepen or extend knowledge; neither is superior *per se.* (Apropos this study's focus, I later argue the biological, psychological and social approaches to, understandings of and aspects of hostility, stress and emotion are all feasibly relevant, meaningful and important and thus require inclusion.) Limiting analysis to one or another undermines more complete comprehension and is fallacious given the evolutionary context I locate hostility (and stress and emotion) in. Bhaskar's (2010) claim pluralism enables potential disciplinary integration is

resonant here. Full synthesis may not result but the effort seems worthwhile in fostering greater understanding. Such endeavour necessitates drawing from relevant (sub)disciplines. Arguably only this type of approach "can do justice" to complex, open systems (Bhaskar and Parker, 2010: ix) such as human life, e.g. interactions in organizations.

This is serendipitous regarding this thesis and its consideration of WRH because -

> "The great divide between social and biological approaches to human behaviour is probably nowhere more evident than in the research on aggression over the last three decades." (Tremblay and Côté, 2005: 454)

The pluralist attitude is advocated by various aggression theorists (Renfrew, 1997; Scarpa and Raine, 2007), and some hostility (though not WRH) research has attempted to consider the role biological, psychological (emotional, cognitive) and social factors have in hostility (Anderson and Bushman, 2002; Dodge and Sherrill, 2007). (This effort seems equally relevant to the study of stress and emotion, and potentially other issues, and is the one I adopt in later chapters.) Scarpa and Raine (2007: 165) note -

> "Perhaps the most important research implication from biosocial findings is that they should encourage researchers to consider both biological and social variables in their work."

Some see this perspective and approach as not just desirable but essential; Holt (1970: 10) notes re: social science that any "complete theory must take into account" biological issues. It is moot if OB/OMS has incorporated biological aspects of being and behaviour in organizations to the extent that other social sciences have incorporated them as legitimate subjects for study in recent years. A pluralistic approach rather than one specializing in a single domain, and thus which acknowledges complexity, is particularly apposite, timely and potentially resonant apropos WRH. Such a mentality and effort has the benefit of being potentially able to reframe issues often conceptualized in dichotomies, e.g. internal and external domains/worlds; physico-material reality (e.g. biological beings), with (personal) mental processes (psychological domain) and social (interpersonal interactive) behaviours, and structure and agency. More comprehensive understanding may follow.

Pluralism basically leads to locating research between or across disciplines (Miller, 1982; Mitchell *et al*., 1997) and/or drawing from diverse disciplines and approaches. Some scientists propelled by the misleading notion domains are disconnected might baulk at this but the apparent extreme positions historically adopted by each in the science wars (and largely retained since, though countered by some current research) may be unprofitable and propagates misunderstandings and missed opportunities. Pluralism might avoid fighting further science wars and instead foster interaction, even integration, on some level. TE (and associated concepts and theories outlined below) help overcome these challenges by offering a meta-theoretical context in which multiple paradigms can be accommodated without prejudice or unnecessary value judgements subordinating one to another.

To successfully incorporate biological and bodily matters into OB/OMS, and specifically to the study of WRH and associated issues (and other behaviours) does not require wholesale uncritical acceptance or use of natural science principles, methods or findings. However, intentionally or accidentally dismissing or overlooking natural sciences' findings as irrelevant to OB/OMS topics seems unhelpful when their ontological and epistemological use can be defended - not least as other social sciences and OB itself has made some effort to include corporeality, biology and TE-based ideas (e.g. Heaphy and Dutton's (2008) call to integrate physiology into OB, interest in organizational neuroscience (Becker *et al*., 2011; Becker and Cropanzano, 2010)). Segregationist attitudes unhelpfully fosters a limited view obeying questionable differentiation and contributes to sustaining the questionable bio-social divide and 'traditional' hierarchy by (from a social science perspective) propagating reification of the social, tacitly diminishing the value of the natural/biological, and failing to start to try to address where mutual interactions and influences might occur, what forms they might take and what effects they might have.

Differentiation of social and natural sciences and their referents has been and still remains more damaging than profitable. Once it occurred (or was initiated) and sustained by scientists driving in the wedge between sciences situated in the imposed hierarchy, it further distanced disciplines and policed that divide. This attitude seemingly still exist which paradoxically makes adopting a pluralistic approach such as TE all the more necessary if the complexity of humans is to be understood (Weingart *et al.*, 1997).

Summary

TE, as a meta-theory, can accommodate multiple perspectives approaches in trans-disciplinary fashion (Miller, 1982)[10]. It is an example pluralism and tends towards holism. It benefits from different disciplines' findings and offers a way to avoid the misleading super-organicism and disciplinary hierarchy. Such an outlook does not accept behaviour is either biological or social but is rather both, and thus multi-faceted and complex. This perspective allows us to bypass the questionable quasi-traditional hierarchy of domains and disciplines which has tended to (intentionally) separate biological and social domains. It better-explains links between biological and social domains and enables the adoption of pluralism which helps link relevant findings from these domains under a more integral conceptual framework. The alternative is to maintain adherence to segregation and exclusion because of partisan disciplinary and broader scientific politics. Pluralism can work through trans-discipliniarity (Miller, 1982); locating different and diverse streams under a meta-theoretical overarching concept which enables their connection. TE is one. This enables one to draw from specific disciplines which, by focusing on an aspect or facet of human behaviour or life, are relevant in helping describe or explain same. Each focuses in a field operating "under its own irreducible principles and laws" (Corning, 2002: 32) – factors, interactions, behaviours explained or described by laws, rules, theories or models, in specific scientific traditions and paradigms, and analysed by particular methods which are inadequate at others. The next chapter proposes ethology is a way to interpret humans' complex, biopsychosocial behaviour that accommodates this.

[10] Miller (1982: 15) claims multi-disciplinary efforts juxtapose disciplines, cross-disciplinary efforts connect and combine disciplines and trans-disciplinary efforts use "overarching non-discipline-bound thought models". Miller notes evolution is an example of the latter. Miller considers inter-discipliniarity is a generic term denoting all three efforts. I adopt his use of such terms in this thesis.

Chapter 6 Human Ethology

Introduction

This chapter offers a way to analyse and interpret behaviour that is commensurate with TE, emergence and the biopsychosocial approach to behaviour – human ethology. (In later analysis chapters, it is applied to analyse service-based WRH.)

I outline ethology's core tenets and briefly summarize criticisms levelled against it. I then argue human ethology has direct utility in being able to interpret complicated, multifaceted evolved biopsychosocial behaviour in complex social interactions. It can do so because it acknowledges biological aspects of behaviour, parties' agency and the social context. Human ethology can study and interpret behaviour's function, why it occurs, its form, and history. Ethology places behaviour and experience in a wide context. It neither falls victim to zoomorphising human beings nor taking a reductionist stance, as critics might assume. As such, in this thesis human ethology functions as the epistemology of the new conceptual framework presented.

Ethology

Ethology as the study of animal behaviour is committed –

> "to the synthetic theory of evolution as being the most reasonable way to organize our thinking about the historical origins and evolution of behaviour, as well as helping to structure research into the nature, function, and development of current behaviour" (Charlesworth, 1979: 507).

TE enables ethology to take into account a range of factors pertinent to behaviour, including interlocked and complex factors such as –

> "information on the animal's ancestors and living relatives and their environment, the current environmental and stimulus conditions that release and regulate the behaviour, the various maturational and experiential factors

that accounts for its ontogenesis, the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying it…" (Charlesworth, 1979: 507).

Lorenz, Tinbergen and von Frisch (Laland and Brown, 2011) organized early or proto-ethology into a discipline. Tinbergen's four fields of study (Betzig, 1989) - causation, function, ontogeny (individual development) and phylogeny (evolution) - are central, as indicated in the table below.

Table 6.1 - Tinbergen's four fields for ethological study

Tinbergen's four fields for ethological study	
Causation	The "search for physiological mechanisms underlying any given behaviour" (Betzig, 1989: 315) – 'ultimate causes'. This also concerns 'proximate causes' activating same and thus eliciting behaviour.
Function	The evolutionary 'fitness' of the behaviour enabling the animal to survive and procreate.
Ontogeny	The "development of behaviour over the individual's life" (Betzig, 1989: 315). (This may be subject to socio-cultural influences, physical malfunction, etc., as well as genetics.)
Phylogeny	The evolutionary history of the behaviour (as serving functional uses).

Behaviour

Ethology views behaviour as a complex phenomenon which has biological underpinnings but which is influenced by psychological and social factors, e.g. learning (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2012). Moreover, behaviour has biological, psychological and social consequences (Klein, 2000) for the animal. Klein (2000) suggests, for example, that culture

may be seen as a result of behaviour which acts back on behaviour. Indeed, as previously indicated, culture may effect changes which are “too sudden or strong” for natural selection to “keep pace with” (Betzig, 1989: 319). That ethology studies behaviour in natural environments shows it is attentive to social context.

Ethology is not the only discipline researching biological facets or bases of behaviour; “systematic study” into same is conducted by “physical [biological] anthropology, comparative psychology, and sociobiology” (Heyer, 1982: 138) - though sociobiology has arguably morphed into Evolutionary Psychology (EP). The interest and effort is thus spread across numerous (sub)disciplines. The reaction to efforts to “discern the innate, evolutionary basis of human social behaviour” – which has been called “reactionary, racist, fascist, sexist” Heyer, 1982: 224; see notes on anti-TE attitudes elsewhere) – is itself being reacted to as questionable (e.g. the aforementioned dissatisfaction some current social scientists have with super-organicism).

Human ethology

TE contends *Homo sapiens sapiens* is a (sub)species of *Homo sapiens* descended from apes (and in earlier era from other animals and life-forms). Accepting this means one must see humans exist in the animal kingdom. This enables the transfer of ethology to human analysis. The application of ethology to human behaviour was pioneered by Eibl-Eibesfeldt, and extended by Von Cranach *et al.*, (1979) and applied by, among others, Pliner *et al*., (1975), and in a more populist vein by Lorenz (1967) and Morris (1967/2005) (all of whom focus on or include analysis of human hostility).

Human ethology adheres to ethological approaches and intends to make relevant contributions to the analysis of human behaviour (Klein, 2000; Von Cranach *et al*., 1979). Ethology was linked with social life and behaviour in the 1960s and was a specific example of dissatisfaction with the bio-social divide accomplished in earlier science as previously outlined (Callan, 1970). Development of human ethology was arguably hampered by

Wilson's controversial sociobiology, which reactivated social scientists' perceived need for the bio-social divide (Laland and Brown, 2011). As such, human ethology was not widely adopted and remains an uncommon approach despite its relevance.

Human ethology disarms much of the criticism levelled at ethology regarding questionable comparative analysis between humans and other animals because it focuses on humans in their environment, not other species (as comparative psychology does). As different species' physiological, anatomical and biochemical systems, let alone social groupings and behaviours, differ comparative analysis and inference from one species to another is, for some, considered moot at best and irrelevant or misleading at worst (see Peterson and Somit, 1978). Difficulties do exist in extrapolating from animal studies to human functioning and behaviour (e.g. zoomorphizing humans or anthropomorphizing animals). However, careful comparative study may be relevant. Study of close genetic cousins (e.g. the genus *Pan* – chimpanzees and bonobos) seems reasonable provided care is taken to clarify and address issues such as unit of analysis used; differences as well as similarities are acknowledged; and 'similarity' is not equated to 'synonymous with'. I agree with MacLean's (1990) support of ethological and careful comparative zoological study because it helps our understanding of evolutionarily-ancestral features of anatomical and neuro-chemical systems (e.g. limbic system) evolved in earlier epochs that we share with other species. Additionally, studying *Pan*'s social lives, culture and behaviours may help elucidate our own (de Waal, 2005). Aggression, violence, and conflict management and resolution are examples of behaviours that primatology may usefully cast light on (de Waal, 1996, 2007)[11].

[11] Chimpanzees show aggression in status challenges and enact intra-species violence including killing other troops' members in 'lethal raiding' sorties (Wrangham and Peterson, 1997), which Wrangham and Peterson deem not territorial- or self-defence but active hunting behaviour tantamount to murder. Bonobos are significantly more pacific than chimpanzees yet also display aggression at times. de Waal (2005) notes humans are more aggressive than chimpanzees and more pacific than bonobos.

Ethological methods

Ethology's prime research method is observation of behaviour in its natural context or environment (it is a corollary of ethnography.) For humans, this is an open, dynamic, 'natural' environment in which interaction between people occurs.

Behaviours observed are charted and from this inferences or further studies (e.g. laboratory or field experiments) can be made. In both animal and human ethology, findings gained from laboratory studies, though an unnatural, closed and controlled environment, are potentially useful despite their conditions differing from natural habitats because such studies may allow focused attention on very specific issues to develop understanding. Behaviours, etc. can be re-considered in the natural habitat, e.g. through hypothesis testing. Field experiments also offer a way to test in the field. (This thesis draws from existing ethological findings and does not conduct empirical observations.)

Ethology as epistemology

The benefits of (human) ethology are those of TE as previously outlined. Ethology enables one to adopt what might seem like two fundamentally incommensurate positions and practices – materialism/physicalism and interpretivism. Like TE, ethology is able to tolerate biological and social accounts of behaviour, and like TE and human behaviours, it can be classed as biopsychosocial.

Moderate physicalism and materialism

Ethology maintains a materialist/physicalist position in accepting that an extant reality independent of human beings exists (Callan, 1970); it acknowledges "a real world exists outside of us" (Charlesworth, 1979: 508). Humankind is a part of this but does not comprise its entirety, and (human) knowledge of it likely incomplete and provisional. This position does not discount the necessity or value of human understanding, nor refute human understanding of reality is moderated and mediated socially (e.g. through language and scientific praxis). Neither does it equate to reductionism, determinism or biologism. Such a view does however acknowledge humans' materiality as embodied biological beings for

which biological urges, interests, etc. are motivating factors. Biological factors are involved in social behaviour, without diminishing the latter or restricting simple 'cause' to the former.

In accepting this, I draw from natural sciences associated with ethology (biology, biochemistry, physiology, anatomy) for relevant concepts, approaches and theories which are valuable in analysing activity in their specialist domains. In accordance with TE and emergence, one can reasonably claim our bodies are influenced by genetics, are subject to physical laws and material restrictions, and function in physical (e.g. bio-chemical, physiological) ways. The use of such natural science findings in no way reduces the importance and impact of socio-cultural influences on human development (phylogenetically or ontogentically). Their use simply adheres to the notion and belief that humans are biological entities subject to biological, chemical and physical rules/laws, restrictions, functions, etc. (Skene, 2009). A pragmatic materialism or physicalism is not synonymous with reductionism, which social science seems to believe and (rightly) to fear and be agonistic to. I do not advocate sole reliance on or reification of physical or biological sciences, merely posit we can reasonably accept human life can and should be seen as possessing a material, physical reality outside the observer's mind and thinking of which humans are a connected part, and that findings from such natural, human/behavioural and life sciences are worth considering and where appropriate, incorporating with those from social sciences, in order to develop deeper comprehension. Ethology offers one way to interpret complex evolved behaviour in social settings.

Interpretivism

Evolution can be researched through many (sub-)disciplines, ethology being one. TE can be approached using epistemologically relativist (but related) positions.

For example, interpretivism seeks to analyse, understand and explain subjective experience, meaning, etc. but as previously stated this does not discount a reality beyond the individual, subjective realm – because individuals are part of it and, as sentient, self-aware beings, *Homo sapiens sapiens* interpret themselves (and other creatures) in this reality. Interpreting meaning is an essential feature of (social) science research. Moreover,

interpretivism is commensurate with ethology which studies behaviour in its natural setting and thus, by definition, requires an observer interpreting events, interactions and behaviours. Ethology connects the individual observed to wider social factors involved in said behaviour, e.g. the setting, other (inter)actants, etc. It draws from biological understandings of behaviour – phylogeny (implying morphology, genetics, etc.), (proximate) causation, and adaptive benefit - but does not separate these from the actual manifest action observed. Rather, it views it as profoundly connected; the latter is enabled by the former.

As such ethology can sustain both materialist- and subjectivist perspectives on reality because it includes biological, individual (psychological-agential) and social (institutional, normative) factors and issues in the process of social interaction. Additionally, it includes the observer as an individual, agential, experiential being reflecting on what is seen and making inferences about same following a connective effort to link and explain observations to theory, past research and research designed to further investigate it. I suggest interpretivism and pragmatic materialism can co-exist in such an analytical frame.

Summary

Human ethology is the applied branch of the study of animal behaviour, and as such is attentive to behaviour in (social) context. Behaviour is seen to be biological – propelled by and affecting biological systems – with self-interest (survival) of prime concern. However, ethology is cognizant of social (and for humans, psychological) influences on behaviour. As such, it is commensurate with TE and the biopsychosocial concept used in this thesis. It is pluralist in accommodating multiple explanations of behaviour drawn from different disciplines.

I have argued for the use of human ethology as an epistemological lens through which to perceive and comprehend behaviour. (It is later used to analyse WRH, but may offer insight into many others.) I also note it offers a methodology for study (naturalistic observation, and field or laboratory experiments testing observations).

PART 1 summary

Going beyond the scientific isolationism of both reductionism and super-organicism associated with broad scientific endeavour and specific disciplines and domains seems sensible. Moving to an epistemological and methodological pluralism which tolerates complex, multi-faceted reality and can explore myriad mechanisms/systems/complexes operating therein seems requisite. This would promote understanding of multiplicity - not restricting attention, analysis and understanding to one domain or discipline or questionably privileging one level of the quasi-traditional discipline/domain hierarchy over others, but find ways to use all, each with its own benefits. This moves towards integration and holism.

The biopsychosocial approach is sympathetic to multiplicity and actively draws from numerous domains and disciplines in a trans-disciplinary manner (Miller, 1982) to conceptualize and analyse. For Brown (2007), fuller understanding of human behaviour requires an holistic approach. For me, the meta-theoretical approach of TE comprises such an holistic view. This enables one to take into account insights offered by numerous disciplines addressing various domains, including natural sciences. Incorporating findings from natural sciences seems to have been – and remain – rare in OB/OMS despite attention on topics one might associate with them, e.g. the body, embodiment, emotions. Reductionists would parse all explanation down to the lowest available domain, e.g. biological physicalism. However, one may incorporate findings from specific natural science disciplines such as anatomy or physiology addressing particular domains or aspects of behaviour without accepting reductionism. Thus, the domain/discipline hierarchy is useful in indicating which sciences might be useful to draw from. In focusing on an aspect or facet of being, each domain (and associated discipline) is thus relevant in helping describe or explain activity in it which operates “under its own… principles and laws” (Corning, 2002: 32) – factors, interactions, behaviours explained or described by laws, rules, theories or models in specific scientific traditions and paradigms, and analysed by particular methods which are inadequate at others but useful in helping build a better, more complete model.

However, such imported insights require re-framing through a different paradigm in order to avoid restricting analysis and understanding to particular domains and associated

disciplines; a bridge between levels or domains is then possible which bypasses super-organicism and reductionism as the only available options. Corning (2002: 18) advocates “a broader, multi-levelled paradigm” to make sense of the whole formed by emergent parts. TE is such a paradigm – perhaps the broadest available because of its scope and span. In such an approach, depth is not necessarily sacrificed for breadth apropos understanding. TE is a meta-theory capable of accommodating multiple paradigms and their findings. It neither valorises one in preference to another nor falls victim to reductionism or super-organicism (Callan, 1970) in accepting restricted explanations anchored to particular ‘levels’ whilst still drawing on those levels for their explanatory relevance. For Ingold (1991), human beings are both biological organisms subject to genetic and environmental influences, and beings whose personhood results from social interactions with others, not one or the other. Humans are neither solely created by genetic coding nor socialized by culture but “grow” (Ingold, 1991: 362) in, from, out, of, and through relationships and interactions between biological and social reality, both of which are powerful influences. This counters SSSM and its super-organicist anchoring of behaviour in psychological and/or social domains.

As such, in later chapters when considering specific behaviours and experiences, I approach them not as psychological or social issues (as much OB/OMS and WRH research does) but as phenomena with biological aspects also (e.g. brain activity, physiological changes to arousal, biochemical release and effects) and draw on relevant sciences to understand them. Such behaviours are treated as evolved and adaptive biopsychosocial complexes having complicated effect on parties manifesting and experiencing them. AQAL can chart the relationships of domains and behaviours associated with phases of human development; some ancestral ones will be argued to still operate in contemporary settings and the positives and negatives of this explored.

More facets can be included in analysis using the framework, e.g. what mechanisms/systems/complexes are involved in behaviour, how they operate, what effect they have and how, etc. Figure 6.1 depicts the core features of the framework –

Figure 6.1 - illustration of the new conceptual framework



PART 2

This section, comprising a single chapter, introduces WRH as the exemplum topic focused on. Later analysis chapters apply the conceptual framework to it.

An overview of academic and organizational perspectives on WRH is given. Through this, something of the complexity of WRH as an extant, harmful and challenging issue is presented.

A summary coverage of academic approaches to WRH is given, including the recent calls for alternative approaches (which my thesis is an example of). I indicate some of the models identifying contributory factors to WRH. I also note defining WRH is a challenge. I outline some of the statistics about WRH presented in a range of studies, and question them, noting that stakeholder agendas are influential. Common organizational responses to WRH – Health and Safety Management measures advised by the UK's Health and Safety Executive – are outlined and contested as being of questionable efficacy. I also note the dominant discourse about WRH locates it as a pathological or unlawful behaviour (which it may sometimes be) requiring control or eradication. I later present the counter-argument that hostility is understandable as normal behaviour, if admittedly at times negative for those facing it, and the discourse and associated response methods commonly-used may mislead attention and effort.

In later sections I contextualize WRH in terms of other, connected behaviours (stress and emotion) and in a social setting (service work).

Chapter 7 Work-related hostility

Introduction

This chapter offers an overview of WRH, contextualising it as an issue in academic research and a challenging problem organizations face and are legally required to address.

I introduce research on WRH's scope and frequency to explore its extent. I then outline streams of academic research centred on defining WRH, identifying its forms, sources and issues contributing to its appearance, and considering its effect for individuals and organizations. I describe some of the negative consequences and damage WRH inflicts. I indicate the various stakeholders interested in WRH, and posit their agenda influences research and presentation of WRH statistics. I suggest defining WRH is problematic. I then outline employer obligations regarding WRH before summarizing (and questioning) common organizational responses, suggesting organizations contribute to harm by using questionable methods based on questionable assumptions. This forms a critical assessment of organizational WRH practice.

My conclusions indicate organizational attitudes towards WRH and academic understanding of WRH are limited; useful to some extent but partial and misleading in some ways, and that a new conceptual framework is required for comprehending WRH. This echoes recent dissatisfaction with current research approaches and the call for alternative perspectives.

An extant issue

WRH exists as overviews and meta-analyses show (Hahn *et al*., 2008; Hills and Joyce, 2013; Flannery, 1996; Keashley, 1998; Piquero *et al*., 2013). Waddington *et al*. (2005) note thirty two articles on WRH appeared in 1988; in 2002, hundreds were published. (WRH research peaked in the mid-1990s.) Turnbull (1999) claims systematic study is recent and focus on interpersonal and experiential factors only developed from c. 2000 (Fredrickson and McCorkle, 2013), e.g. Aquino and Thau (2009) and Bowling and Beehr (2006) on researching victim's perspectives of WRH.

However, I suggest aggression and violence connected with work – what I term WRH – though an identified issue in OMS (from whence much research emanates (Piquero *et al*., 2013)) is one not especially well-understood.

WRH research

Research over c. fifty years (Flannery, 1996) identifies WRH as an issue in contemporary work environments that has negative impacts on workers and employers. WRH interests numerous stakeholders, e.g. official agencies (like the UK's Health and Safety Executive, hereafter HSE) and organizations such as unions and professional institutes. Numerous perspectives and voices thus contribute to WRH discourse.

National trends exist apropos WRH research. US and UK research focuses on different hostility types (collegial or intra-organizational and customer-to-staff forms, respectively) (Dupré and Barling, 2003). Fredrickson and McCorkle (2013) claim research draws from different disciplines thus rendering different analyses; US research is informed by psychology and sociology and includes targets' perceptions as key factors in analysis of specific worker groups whereas European research draws more from biological accounts of hostility and applies interpretations to workers more generally. However, I do not see a biological facet in European research and note much UK research is sector- or worker-specific, mostly centring on medical and health sectors (Turnbull and Paterson,1999) in which WRH seems endemic (e.g. Hahn *et al*., 2008). (Hospitals, especially accident and emergency departments and wards treating mentally ill patients, have been researched significantly, e.g. Ferns *et al*. (2006), Hahn *et al*. (2008), Hills and Joyce (2013) and Holmes *et al*. (2012).) Importantly, commercial sector employers seem to freely and uncritically adopt NHS-inspired 'zero tolerance' policies attitudes and approaches to WRH.

WRH definitions, concepts, and frames of reference

Defining WRH is problematic. Hahn *et al*. (2008) claim over 33% of studies surveyed in their research offered no or minimal WRH definition. It is variously defined in research and organizational practice; many terms are used for what are related but a-synonymous issues,

e.g. ‘workplace aggression’, ‘workplace violence’, ‘work-related violence’ (HSE’s term). The resulting “labelling dilemma” (Keashley, 1998) makes comparing and inferring from studies difficult because they may look at an example of WRH. Yet, definitions directly affect what behaviours and experiences are studied. WRH is a confusing, perhaps confused, and still-emerging field, not one clearly-defined and agreed upon by diverse stakeholders.

Some researchers advise revision of definitions or classifications, e.g. to include bullying and emotional abuse (Keashley, 1998). This is useful in including covert, indirect, non-physical aggressions and valuably raising awareness of WRH’s subtlety and scope. It also indicates flexible referential frames for WRH are needed. More inclusive definitions are supported by Beech and Leather (2006) and Waddington *et al*. (2005), e.g. to acknowledge targets’ perceptions not merely what ‘objectively’ happened. Studies can then include subjective experience and the perspective of targets (see Jones *et al*., 2011). (Interest in subjective experience of WRH occurs in the second phase of WRH research (Fredrickson and McCorkle, 2013); the first focused on surveying WRH’s extent.) However, Waddington *et al*. (2005) warn such expansion problematizes matters because definitions risk becoming too open. Similarly, Beech and Leather (2006) fear WRH blurs with other kinds of hostility. I think this position unhelpful because WRH is an example of hostility in a specific social context, not fundamentally unrelated to other forms.

Narrow definitions in organizational and ‘official’ (e.g. HSE) use also exist. For instance, personal correspondence with union officials (2011) shows some define WRH as bullying or harassment, others as violence. Such varying WRH definitions from official (e.g. HSE) and other stakeholders (e.g. unions) may result in organizations using questionable definitions which mislead understanding of and efforts to address WRH. HSE’s phrase ‘work-related’ is better than ‘workplace’ because not all incidents occur at the workplace but its reference to ‘violence’ risks focusing attention on physical hostility (though HSE acknowledges abuse and threat are also key features of WRH). Aggression and violence are related but are not synonymous (Holmes *et al*., 2012). Focusing on violence – the intent to physically harm a target and the physical harm subsequently incurred - fails to address other (i.e. non-physical) types of aggression like bullying and verbal abuse (though these can have physical effect, e.g. stress). The British Crime Survey (hereafter BCS), now the Crime

Survey of England and Wales (hereafter CSEW) from which HSE obtains data identifies threat has the same negative effect on targets as actual attack but is more frequent (Budd, 1999).

A tentative, and admittedly broad, definition of WRH might be - any behaviour connected to work which intentionally or otherwise results in targets feeling physically and/or psychologically aggressed, threatened and harmed or fearful of same. This would include aggressor behaviours ranging from intimidation, veiled or open threat, verbal abuse, bullying, and physical attack. It would include target perceptions, too. However, types of aggression vary, as do their impacts; target outcomes including stress, emotional upset, and injury; and targets' influenced or altered behaviour (e.g. absenteeism) (see Chang and Lyons, 2012).

Academic research – itself using a range of terms for WRH - offers typologies identifying sources and types of hostility. The California Occupational Safety and Health Commission (1998) typology (cited by Wiskow, 2003) is commonly-used and presented here as an exemplum –

Type	*Relationship to worker*
1	Stranger, non-legitimate (e.g. intruder, criminal)
2	Customer, client, patient, etc.
3	Colleague
4	Domestic (e.g. spouse/partner)

Kessler *et al*. (2008) cite Merchant and Lundell's (2001) nearly identical typology which has aggression spilling into the workplace from any external (not necessarily a familial) source as Type 4. Other typologies exist, e.g. Estrada *et al*.'s 2010 typology, cited by Jones *et al*. (2011) which calls Type 3 'relational' and includes 'structural violence' as its Type 4. Catley and Jones (2002), cited by Jones *et al*. (2011), define structural violence as institutional, noting it may be physical or symbolic. Such typologies identify hostility sources, but do not define aggression or how it links to violence; do not identify aggression's manifold forms (e.g. physical or non-physical – see Buss (1961)); do not explain why aggression

occurs (e.g. identify aggressor motivations); do not identify aggression's triggers, antecedents, or outcomes; do not identify circumstances or conditions under which aggression is likely to appear; do not indicate how one type may become another, e.g. Type 2 to 3. It also assumes Type 2 aggression emanates from a legitimate customer, ignoring the possibility a customer may be a Type 1 aggressor concealing unlawful intentions (see Harris, 2008, re: fraudulent customers).

Manifestations of WRH

Dupré and Barling (2003) note WRH behaviours range from non-physical, covert, indirect aggression (e.g. psychological bullying) to overt, direct injurious or fatal physical acts (violence). Covert WRH forms may be hard to identify or 'prove' occurred, perhaps explaining why organizational and official definitions focus on overt forms. WRH's nonphysical forms include harassment (Schat and Kelloway, 2005), bullying (Keashley, 1998) and incivility and verbal abuse (Andersson and Pearson, 1999; Cortina et al., 2001). The latter, e.g. name-calling, swearing, shouting, etc. is common and frequent across sectors (Keashley, 1998). Physical WRH - attack/assault (Barling, 1996; Flannery, 1996) – requires physical contact (though assault occurs even if a thrown projectile missies its intended target) potentially resulting in injury. The intent to effect physical harm through physical means is key. Extreme violence, e.g. shootings (Baron and Neuman, 1996; Fox and Levin, 1994; Neuman and Baron, 1998), occurs but is rare in the UK and such events may skew perception of WRH, e.g. through media attention and generation of 'disaster discourse' (Bourke, 2005) skewing risk perception (Furedi, 2006).

Much WRH seems non-physical, of minor intensity, and causes minor if any physical injury (see Keashley's meta-analysis) but can nonetheless be negatively affecting. Nonphysical WRH may be subtle and (in bullying cases) extend over time, making it difficult to identify or prove. The aggressor using non-physical hostility may not intend to physically injure the target but their behaviour may make physical impacts (e.g. through elevating the target's stress). BCS (1999) notes threat of attack is as psychologically-effecting as actual attack. A physical attack may also carry psychological trauma as well as physical injury; a psychological attack may impact targets somatically.

WRH covers hostility emanating from many sources, e.g. external to and within the organization. Differing positions of power may also exist, e.g. Innes *et al*. (2008) notes the higher relative status and power of the aggressor is a major factor apropos hostility's appearance.

WRH seems to comprise a wide range of intentions, behaviours, sources, impacts and outcomes in complex contexts and dynamic interaction. It is not simple or easily-defined but manifold and multiphrenic, and may be hard to identify.

Perspectives, thin skins and habituation

Piquero *et al*. (2013) note impacts of (especially covert) WRH are hard to track and assess. Individual differences are pertinent here. Introduction of targets' subjective experiences is relatively new in WRH research (Fredrickson and McCorkle, 2013) but Jones *et al*. (2011) note such qualitative data is necessary to develop understanding of targets' experiences, something quantitative studies overlook. One needs to remain alert to whose perspectives are considered when investigating and responding to or studying WRH, and how these can be balanced; the 'aggressors', the 'targets', the organization's[12].

Context in which hostility occurs is also important because norms influence people's behaviours. Yet even studies focused on specific sectors and work groups (e.g. nurses) have not fully explored (behaviour in) work context.

Staff might habituate to hostility (e.g. in service work) and accept it as an inevitable feature of their work, possibly resulting in under-reporting of WRH and thus organizational oversight of it.

To help frame, investigate, and understand WRH, a perspective considerate of more facets of the issue seems sensible. Though not without challenge, such a balanced approach may allow inclusion of differing perspectives and claims (stakeholder, employer, staff) can be navigated, mediated or even combined to result in fair, representative understanding of the issue.

[12] Intention seems a key factor in whether WRH occurred, but action may be misinterpreted, so it is moot if intention or outcome is the pertinent criterion in deciding if WRH happened. Additionally, personality seems linked to peoples' experience of victim-hood (Coyne *et al*., 2011), making it difficult to objectively know if hostility happened.

Factors, frames and models

Some WRH aggression studies offer descriptive models of factors influencing behaviour (e.g. Anderson *et al*., 1996; Neuman and Baron, 1998; Schat and Kelloway, 2005; Tobin, 2001). These include organizational, situational and personal factors, and indicate something of why WRH occurs and what its impacts are. Such models typically include contributory inputs, processes and outputs/outcomes.

Identified inputs - perceived as WRH 'predictors' (Schat and Kelloway, 2005) - include individual and organizational-situational factors. Personal factors, e.g. personality type (Neuman and Baron, 1998), neurosis (Jockin *et al*., 2001), state and trait anger (Chen and Spector, 1992; Dupré and Barling, 2003), and past experience and use of aggression (Geen, 1968) are identified as influential. Organizational factors like management/organization structure (Tobin, 2001) and (perceived) organizational injustice (Baron *et al*., 1999; Sharlicki *et al*.,1999; Sharlicki and Folger, 1997) are deemed important (see earlier comments on structural and symbolic violence; Jones *et al*. (2011) state BCS and HSE exclude these and the harms resulting from employers' treatment of workers). Neuman and Baron (1997, cited by Glomb, 2002) include the effects of antecedent situational events (e.g. stressors). Waddington *et al*. (2005) note situation factors are highly important. For Turnbull (1999) personal, client/customer and situational factors are key ingredients in WRH encounters and require attention.

However, studies of hostile work interactions are relatively recent and few (e.g. Hopp *et al*., 2012). Analysis of the individual, contextual, and relational factors is limited in WRH literature; models state they are present and important, but not how they interact.

Processes include affect (emotion), arousal and cognitions before and during incidents which influence decision-making and behaviour (Anderson *et al*., 1996), e.g. hostile attribution bias (Neuman and Baron, 1998) and threat assessment skill (Sinclair *et al*., 2002). Outcomes may be individual and/or organizational, and are covered in sections on impacts and effects of WRH.

These models valuably imply WRH includes context of behaviours and personal characteristics of parties, not simply aggressors' behaviours. (Some studies include this, e.g.

Rafaeli, 1989). They also imply hostility comprises multiple factors in complex array, e.g. individual, situational and/or organizational moderators or mediators. (Regarding the latter, support and coping tactics (Leather *et al*., 1998) may have positive effect (Barling, 1996; Schat and Kelloway, 2005).) However, factors may be very hard to identify in specific incidents and the descriptive models may not result in pragmatic methods to address WRH. Models cited tend to be broad, descriptive and 'black box' in type.

WRH extent

Identifying WRH's extent is difficult. Research, notably studies conducted by official agencies (e.g. UK's Home Office) commonly uses surveys (Fredrickson and McCorkle, 2013), especially from the 1990s to the mid-2000s (Piquero *et al*., 2013) though the method is still prevalent, e.g. BCS/CSEW. Surveys conducted are usually quantitative and yield interesting (if contestable) data on WRH's quasi-frequency in 'at risk' sectors. Caution is advisable when assessing such studies' figures and inferences, however; WRH statistics can be challenged regarding survey (e.g. questionnaire) design, qualitative data (e.g. personal experience) not sought, etc.

At risk sectors

The latest statistics indicate very similar WRH frequencies across surveys. For instance, 1.8% of female and 1.2% of male workers were at risk from work-related threat and violence (Upson, 2003). 2010's BCS notes figures of 1.4% and 1.5% respectively (Packham, 2010). 2013/4's CSEW cites figures of 1.2% and 1.6% respectively (Office of National Statistics, 2014).

However, differing jobs and sectors have different risk. Highest risk (e.g. in 2002/3, 2010 and 2012/3 surveys) are protective services (police and prison officers, security operatives) at c. five times the national average risk level. Second-highest are health professionals and social workers at c. three times the average risk level (annual statistics vary slightly). Other occupations deemed at average or lower-than-average risk, and which appear across surveys, include care assistants, teachers and teaching assistants, publicans/bar staff, job centre staff, bus/coach drivers, railway staff, leisure workers, catering

staff, hospitality workers, and customer service staff. Workers in any one sector are roughly at the same risk of assault as threat, though risk levels in sectors vary. Roughly the same percentage of workers experience three or more incidents annually across surveys, e.g. 24 – 30% (2012/3 and 2002/3 surveys respectively). Different surveys find some 60% of incidents are perpetrated by strangers and that males aggress much more than females (Upson (2003) notes males aggress in 77% of threats and 80% of assaults). In 2002/3, 67% of staff surveyed reported receiving no conflict management training. Feelings about WRH are noteworthy; 2002/3 BCS (Upson, 2003) noted 36% of health sector staff claimed they were worried about WRH and 22% of workers believed they were likely to be threatened in the next year (no data on training levels or concerns appear in recent surveys).

Workers in diverse sectors experience WRH; it is a common issue cutting across different sectors in which service delivery is the apparent common characteristic. I argue this allows for comparative analysis in seemingly unrelated sectors and work[13].

WRH frequency and trends

BCS figures cited by HSE (Packham, 2010), in 2012/3 CSEW survey and general social crime statistics (Beaumont, 2011) show workplace violence and threat rose (25% and 41% respectively) between 1991 and 1997, and peaked in 1995, but (combined) dropped by 46% from 1997. WRH is now roughly at its 1991 level. This suggests WRH may 'hover' around a regular frequency. British Medical Association (BMA) statistics support this; experience of violence and associated behaviours (e.g. verbal abuse) changed little between 2003 and 2008 surveys in which c. 50% of medics cited experiencing incidents, a third reporting suffering verbal abuse and/or some form of physical violence.

Fluctuations re: incidents and/or incident reporting seemingly occur in some sectors. The British Retail Consortium's Retail Crime Survey (2009) claims a 58% increase in violence and a 37% increase in abuse to retail staff since 2007, stating (in personal correspondence, 2011) violence is a top four issue. Apparent WRH increases in specific sectors contradicts BCS statistics re: annual decreases, though WRH could increase in

[13] Studies aggregating various national statistics (e.g. Hoel *et al*.'s 2001 ILO study) do not identify such trends, and subsume national and sector-specific data, rendering statistics and inferences from them questionable.

some sectors yet decrease overall. (Beech and Leather (2006) and Hahn *et al*., (2008) suggest WRH reports may increase but still be under-reported.)

Efforts to address WRH reveal interesting figures. In 1998/9, the National Health Service (NHS) aimed by 2003 to reduce 65,000 reported WRH incidents by 30% through its Zero Tolerance campaign (BBC, 1999)[14]. Reported incidents increased to 115,000 by 2003. WRH's quasi-increase may be from increased reporting (e.g. as NHS documents suggest (Department of Health, 2002, 2003)). The result was a greater challenge than NHS knew or anticipated before implementing Zero Tolerance. Ongoing efforts suggest NHS has still not addressed WRH (implied by BMA figures). Yet NHS influences many sectors and organizations, e.g. ubiquitous adoption of zero tolerance policies.

WRH might be more frequent than statistics suggest. Barling (1996) cites one (American) study's claim only 20% of WRH incidents are reported. UK rail/transport union RMT (2008a) claims two thirds of incidents go unreported. Under-reporting would skew WRH statistics and limit understanding of WRH's scope (e.g. RMT, 2008b). Applying these underreporting estimates to BCS/CSEW figures, WRH frequency would become c. 4.5 - 7.5% for UK workers. Recent research supports this. Jones *et al*.'s Workplace Behaviour Study (2011) concludes assault is c. five times more frequent than BCS/CSEW figures indicate. Jones *et al*. (*ibid*.) note other recent studies conclude similarly. Studies also state WRH can be a weekly or even daily experience for some workers, implying far higher frequency rates than most studies show. This all suggests seeing WRH as an atypical, infrequent and easily-measured experience is questionable, and that many of the statistics cited about WRH are contestable and under-represent the issue.

Stakeholders

The diversity of stakeholders interested in WRH, viz. studying it, contributing to WRH discourse and influencing organizational practice complicates identifying WRH's extent, frequency and damage. It is moot if academic research greatly impacts organizational practice; employers are likely more influenced by other stakeholders and their discourse.

[14] 1998/9 NHS figures claimed 7/1000 (0.7%) NHS workers - two thirds of whom were nurses - suffered (physical) attack monthly.

UK stakeholders include the HSE (a government-backed agency issuing advice/guidance to employers on health and safety matters), unions, professional institutes[15], and the media. This results in multiple perspectives and agenda regarding WRH information. Stakeholders' WRH statistics clash. An extreme example is Unison's (2001) traffic wardens/parking attendant survey which claimed 90% experienced a violent incident annually (20% weekly, of whom 22% suffered attack and 11% were threatened with a weapon); statistics far exceeding BCS figures.

But stakeholders' have (political) agenda regarding data representation (see Gilligan (2001) and Schinkel (2010) elsewhere re: politics and violence). BCS/CSEW focuses on violence, which steers attention from other WRH forms and in effect (not necessarily intention) disguises WRH's actual extent, as do other stakeholders' definitions, studies and statistical 'evidence'. (WRH is more frequent if a broader WRH definition like Keashley's is used.) An unfortunate result of this is could be stakeholders' (questionable) guidance influencing organizations' WRH responses.

Stakeholders subject WRH to discourse (Bishop *et al*. 2005) which may influence employers' practice, e.g. HSE's legal-based HSM discourse, itself influenced by BCS/CSEW's criminological discourse, influencing organizational practice such as methods used to address WRH (Powers, 2012) which impacts workers' experiences. Reference to discourse represents a (more) critically-inclined stream of WRH research calling for viewing and studying WRH differently to previous research (see Holmes *et al*., 2012).

Organizational discourses about WRH – and decisions, definitions and practices about WRH influenced by same - create conditions in which workers function. Organizational discourse colours WRH. It can even remove organizations from blame for HSM oversights (Tombs, 2007). Discourse extends to expectations about workers' behaviour. Organizations may negatively influence matters if differences between workers' professional identity/role and the expectations of behaviour obtain (Tobin, 2001). Service work workers lack autonomy (Goldberg and Grandey, 2007) and, as Hills and Joyce (2013) remark, risk in WRH is connected with role-ambiguity, -conflict or -overload, stress and reduced worker autonomy,

[15] Including conflict management and physical intervention (e.g. control and restraint) trainers and issuing formal qualifications in same, the number of which has increased in the last two decades.

as well as a workers' perception WRH is inevitable. This exacerbates the problem. Organizations may imply WRH is part of staff's jobs, expecting staff to manage hostile encounters according to organizational standards or exclude WRH from official discourse. All may constitute symbolic-institutional violence perpetrated against staff.

Stakeholders' agenda means unquestionably accepting WRH statistics seems unwise. Paradoxically, accepting and acting on the questionably-accurate lowest statistics (e.g. BCS/CSEW's) seems sensible. If 'only' c. 1.5% of British workers are at risk, many are susceptible to a hazard all stakeholders acknowledge exists and which is apparent across sectors. This seems reason enough to address and study WRH occurring in service-based working.

Impacts and effects of WRH

The harm WRH brings – which is identified in academic studies and stakeholder research – can damage individuals and organizations.

Harm to individuals

Studies identify various ways WRH harms health; stress, psychological harm and physical ill-health (Hoel *et al*., 2001), and physical injury, can result. (I later outline the 'hostility chain', which links stress and emotion to hostility.) Outcomes of physical WRH include injury (ranging from minor and mild, e.g. bruising, to severe, e.g. broken limbs) or (rarely in the UK) death. CSEW (2012/3) states assaults result in injury in 51% of cases. Injuries are usually minor, e.g. black eyes (28%), cuts (9%) or scratches (12%), but broken bones, concussions, etc. are suffered in c. 7% of incidents.

But workers may also experience physical outcomes from WRH-associated stress, even if hostility was not (severely) physical. Stress reactions manifest themselves in myriad temporary and/or chronic psycho-somatic symptoms[16]. (HSE connects WRH and stress.) Though stressors do not affect everyone identically common reactive systems and behavioural inclinations operate, e.g. FFF as the core stress reaction (see Chapter 11).

[16] Psycho-somatic medicine accepts psychological factors are involved in illness. My use of the term follows this, rather than the common erroneous use of the term which implies illness is all in the mind.

Winstanley and Whittingdon (2002) note emotional exhaustion occurs for staff exposed to aggression frequently; this increases their vulnerability to further aggression. Santos *et al*. (2009) note aggression is an acknowledged occupational stressor for police officers. I suggest it is an unacknowledged occupational hazard one for many other workers. Aggression can result in stress; job performance can and is negatively affected by exposure to aggression (Schat and Frone, 2011).

Though job-type matters (viz. protective service workers are at greater risk' from serious physical injury), cases exist in which workers in low(er) risk jobs have been killed[17]. However, some impacts may be hidden or hard to detect, and damage need not be physical. Harm may occur from less extreme but more frequent hostility, e.g. psychosomatic effect of chronic non-physical WRH. Moreover, such WRH may be viewed (and accepted) by staff as an inevitable, unavoidable part of the job. Psychological impacts, e.g. ('negative') emotion (fear), role conflict (between the personal and professional selves) and emotional dissonance, seemingly resulting in disinterest in continued working (e.g. de-motivation, demoralization and disaffection (Hochschild, 1983)). Negative impact may extend into workers' private lives, e.g. chronic stress. Some outcomes may be health-threatening; research identifies the following outcome of WRH - depression (LeBlanc and Kelloway, 2002), stress-related psychosomatic illness (Sinclair *et al*., 2002) and substance use (Chen and Spector, 1992), as well as negative emotion (Barling, 1996) and social withdrawal (Rogers and Kelloway, 1997). Staff may not admit to suffering stress, e.g. fearing organizational repercussions, collegial ridicule, self-perceptions of weakness. Also, personal factors obtain; not everyone has the same knowledge, experiences, skills, stress tolerance thresholds, etc.

Being aggressed seems to trigger powerful emotions (e.g. fear, anger) to the point workers feel "anger and desire for revenge" (Schat and Kelloway, 2005; 202) but little research exists regarding why such inclinations are rarely enacted, which one might expect

[17] E.g., the UK Clare Bernal case saw a retail worker killed at work by an ex-partner and –colleague; numerous US cases in which post office managers and staff have been shot by workers, starting with 1986's Sherrill incident; the US Air case in which ex-cabin crew worker David Burke hijacked a plane on which his ex-line manager and c. two hundred passengers were flying and caused the plane to crash, killing all on board.

powerful experiences to foster[18]. Emotional and behavioural suppression, as covered in the service work chapter, may explain this. Note, such suppression can itself be harmful (e.g. Gross and Levenson, 1993, 1997; Hopp *et al*., 2012). Hershcovis *et al*. (2012) note that hostility is a more likely behaviour if the target is of lower status to the aggressor. Here, I posit workers are less likely to counter-aggress a customer because of the customer's higher status and because customer satisfaction is an objective of service work (workers need a satisfied customer to avoid complaints made against them). WRH can also have effect even when workers are not aggressed personally. Vicarious WRH experience (Barling, 1996; Flannery, 1996; Ramachandran, 1996, cited by Gore, 2007) such as witnessing or even being told about WRH events, may result in negative impact. (For instance, staff can experience negative affect seeing unpleasant co-worker interaction. It is possible workers seeing hostile worker-customer interactions might be similarly affected, e.g. become emotionally exhausted (Totterdell *et al*., 2012).)

Organizational damage

Organizations suffer if staff suffers. Costs and impacts of WRH on staff may not be visible or easily calculable but exert negative affect on employers. It is evident in staff absenteeism (Barling, 1996; Barling and Philips, 1996), poor work performance, accidents and worker injury (Barling, 1996), staff disaffection (Cree and Kelloway, 1997), and worker illness (Rogers and Kelloway, 1997). These could lead to increased staff turnover. Incidents could attract scrutiny from stakeholders and media and invite official (e.g. HSE) investigation and legal action feasibly culminating in fines or criminal proceedings.

It is in organizations' own interest to address WRH, but it is moot whether organizations recognize and address their own contributory inputs (e.g. expectations of workers' behaviour) or truly try to address WRH, e.g. by training staff to deal with WRH (Beech and Leather, 2006) and support them (Cropanzano *et al*., 1997; Ford, 1985). Some

[18] Workers might fear counter-aggression – or even raising voice (Cortina and Magley, 2003) – could attract reprisals from the employer because the organization may perceive it as *mis*behaviour warranting sanction. The evolutionary position explored elsewhere explains restraint on expression in terms of evolved ritualized behaviours limiting behavioural enactment to reduce potential harm being incurred. The two views are compatible.

organizations allegedly construct WRH from workplace discourse (Bishop *et al*., 2005). If unaddressed, WRH's costs, though remaining (partially) hidden become "vast and increasing" (Rew and Ferns, 2005: 232).

Research indicates WRH has negative effects and impact for individuals and organizations. The former may suffer in physical and/or psychological ways which may harm organizations by association (e.g. disaffected staff performing less well, increased costs associated with staff absenteeism or resignation, legal attention, fines). Indeed, staff feeling unjustly treated by hostile customers could exact retaliation on the employer for exposing them to such customers, actively damaging it (Aquino *et al*., 2001). This noted, harm suffered by staff and/or the employer may be subtle, hard to identify and difficult to assess. It thus seems sensible for organizations to tackle WRH; it is in everyone's interest. Moreover, organizations are legally obligated to address WRH.

Organizational obligations

The HSE is the UK's official, government-backed agency responsible for disseminating advice to employers on (managing) health, safety and welfare issues, including WRH and stress (e.g. see HSE's Joint European Partners Agreement, 2007). (Similar organizations exist in other nations; see Wiskow, 2003.) It can investigate employers and bring legal action for negligence or breaches of statutory duty which could result in criminal prosecution as well as fines.

Employers must address WRH; numerous Health and Safety Management (hereafter, HSM) laws which focus on staff, work welfare, safety and health issues, obligate them to, as far as reasonably practicable, assess and respond to foreseeable harm to staff. HSM legislation specifically references aggression and violence and also refers to the necessity of logging/reporting incidents, ensuring safety issues are discussed and workers have a safety representative. (Common law duties of care also oblige employers to provide a safe working environment for workers (Martin and Law, 2006). Numerous laws might be thus used in WRH cases. HSM regulations and employment laws invoked by workers, unions or HSE against employers accountable for maltreatment or improper protection of staff. Criminal or common laws could be used to bring action against aggressors.)

Research indicates that a quality safety climate, including adequate provision to address violence, boosts organizations' and staff's capacity to deal with WRH, e.g. increase welfare (Kessler *et al*., 2008) but needs to be led by senior managers (Spector *et al*., 2007).

Common organizational WRH responses

HSM efforts centring on (ostensible) prediction, prevention and/or control-based interventions to reduce or eradicate WRH (the hazard) comprise typical organizational responses to WRH. Risk assessment and security provision (e.g. employing guards, installing closed-circuit television cameras (USDAW, date unknown)) are common responses. Risk assessments are legally required for work activities and facilities, and is a ubiquitous HSM method. I argue they do not necessarily actually assess risk (calculations of hazard's probability are not always done). The risk assessment method requires no training or hazard-specific expertise, meaning assessors may understanding the hazard differently, and use arbitrary definitions or allocations of 'risk'. Another common response is the public display of a zero tolerance policy, typically expressing in strong (even aggressive) terms warning of retaliatory legal action against aggressors.

HSM is attempted intervention. Gilligan (2001) referring to violence generally, suggests three levels of interventions exist – primary (to protect the population), secondary (to identify groups at risk and tackle perpetrators) and tertiary (in response to incidents). Regarding WRH, HSM seems to be a primary intervention (operating generic protection at the organizational level) but is really a secondary or tertiary intervention using specific tools to try to eradicate or limit WRH, or reacting post-event, respectively. It can therefore never fully address WRH. At best, it can only respond to WRH in limited ways and to particular aspects of WRH. Risk assessments do not necessarily enable prevention or control, and HSM approaches may not achieve what it claims, but rather encourage false organizational and managerial consciousness about HSM's relevance and efficacy. The organization may be less powerful than it thinks apropos managing WRH. HSE arguably misunderstands WRH, rendering its advice questionably-relevant, and thus rendering organizational practice questionable.

HSM dominates many contemporary organizations and is ubiquitous because HSE states HSM can address WRH. HSE does not query if HSM can address (or comprehend) WRH. HSM arguably makes little relevant, effective headway in pragmatically or effectively addressing WRH. HSM may be useful as part of provision to address WRH but arguably in its current form achieves limited results on its own. Organizations' judgements about WRH responses seem not to address the problem well and may inadvertently exacerbate it, feed false beliefs about strength of management's power (and HSM) and therefore increase the challenge faced by organizations and their staff. Organizations' managerialist approach overlooks the complexity of behaviour, and through HSM risks applying questionable counter-measures provision against the hazard and its risk. Even if organizations genuinely want to address WRH to safeguard staff rather than merely demonstrate adherence to official requirements, organizations may not be able to tackle WRH as fully as desired because of WRH's nature, characteristics and complexity. This suggests organizations need the radical thinking Gilligan (2001) claims are necessary for society's management of hostility; primary interventions requiring radical change to social systems.

Some lower level interventions seem valuable, however. Flannery (1996) advises staff's conflict management training (a secondary intervention) and stress management for use following incidents (in tertiary fashion). Grossman (2004) supports using critical incident debriefs to accelerate post-incident recovery and actively feed into provision (a tertiary intervention contributing to others). However, stress and conflict management training arguably tacitly render staff responsible for dealing with stress and other outcomes of hostile encounters rather than make it an organizational responsibility. Thus organizations could extend effort to recalibrate service work practice and assumptions; actively adjust inherent organization-customer-staff power relationships in staff's favour; provide staff training; develop workable policies and procedures, maintain accurate reporting processes, and adapt or even reject (some) HSM methods. This might be seen as discomfortingly radical but practitioner models exist which suggest a way forward.

For instance, the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) (2008) offers a structured three-tiered approach to WRH centring on organizational, team/group and personal (staff) interventions. Team and individual matters are driven by organizational action, and at this

level ‘preventing’ WRH would require a potentially radical shift in organizational perspective and practice. RCN’s advice in urging employers’ use of multiple techniques at different levels and blending intervention tactics promotes a more pragmatic approach to WRH response. A combination of techniques seems more likely to be able address the complex challenge. Unfortunately, the RCN approach seems rare, and Turnbull and Patterson (1999) claim organizations typically do little to tackle WRH.

PART 2 summary

This chapter has sought to locate WRH in academic and official research (as a topic of interest for some fifty years) and organizational practice (as a challenging and serious problem typically responded to with questionable HSM practices influenced by official guidance (in UK from HSE) and stakeholder interest).

Currently-used terms do not always adequately describe the range of behaviours seen in WRH. Terms may mislead attention and cloud understanding even to the point of presenting questionable statistics because of questionable definitions. Moreover, methods typically used to address WRH indicate assumptions underpinning attitudes to WRH are contestable. Also questionable is whether employers have responded to WRH in relevant, effective ways. Little has seemingly been accomplished apropos reducing or limiting WRH volume and impacts. Organizationally, WRH seems under-responded to and arguably mis- or poorly-understood by employers, official stakeholders and researchers. Framed as a work issue unrelated to broader understanding of hostility, WRH studies risk segregating WRH as being different to other forms of hostility and disconnected to more general hostility research. WRH has been contextualized to some extent but the complexities of the dynamics, impacts and effects of hostile encounters have not been explored. WRH research has not deeply studied work contexts, which are viewed as important factors apropos behaviour. Though work contexts are included in research, e.g. characteristics of sectors and jobs, and more recently regarding discourses influencing perception and praxis, many studies stem from a limited number of sectors (medical and health care prominent among these, though some service work studies exist, e.g. Grandey *et al*., 2004; Hopp *et al*., 2012; Knights and McCabe, 1998; Rafaeli, 1989). Potential connections between organizational, situational and personal factors – and how these may relate to broader social and cultural factors - are not seemingly studied.

Limited approaches are echoed in typical organizational praxis, i.e. HSM-based efforts, which treat WRH in managerialist ways. The result seems to be weak understanding and provision feasibly contributing to harm staff and organizations suffer, which exacerbates organizations' challenge. HSM has limited efficacy. Its underpinning managerialism assumes

WRH can be managed because it is a hazard like the others addressed by HSM. Believing HSM can or will prevent WRH's appearance, control its frequency or severity, and limit its damage is contestable; it assumes much about the nature and characteristics of hostility and its own power. Even progressive WRH thinking, e.g. RCN, fails to explore the complexity of the behaviour it issues advice on countering.

I suggest manifold, careful, and sustained responses are required to tackle WRH rather than the ubiquitous approaches in use (HSM, risk assessment, zero tolerance statements). I argue that before attempting to address WRH, we should try to understand it better. If one sees WRH as a complex human behaviour that appears in complex social (e.g. organizational) contexts - as I later argue - WRH is not easily predicted, prevented or controlled if and when it occurs.

An alternative approach – evolving understanding

In establishing WRH exists, offering definitions of WRH, identifying antecedents and consequences of WRH in descriptive models, and presenting typologies identifying sources of WRH, research and practitioner efforts to address WRH to date has made some headway in understanding and addressing it. However, it has not entertained the possibility hostility (and associated stress and emotion) might be normal human behaviour(s) occurring in specific context for a reason. This perspective helps explain why WRH remains common despite efforts to reduce it. WRH can be reframed from being seen automatically, uncritically defined as an unpalatable, criminal or pathological *mis*behaviour *per se* requiring correction through organizational measures (e.g. HSM) – the perspective dominating WRH perspectives, research and organizational praxis - to being seen as a normal human behaviour occurring and experienced in social contexts and interpersonal interactions under specific conditions. (This does not refute some WRH may be pathologic or criminal, or that WRH is unpalatable and can negatively impact its targets).

Research has also not to any great extent or in integrated fashion addressed issues raised or implied by their models, e.g. why customers aggress as they do (or why staff rarely openly counter-aggresses), nor detail how WRH's negative effects occur, or analyse

dynamics of WRH interactions. Organizations have not overcome the managerialist agenda to ‘solve’ WRH rather than first understand it better.

Recent calls for alternative approaches recognize the need to move beyond past methods and outlooks to advance understanding to improve subsequent practice. I suggest this is offered by the conceptual framework synthesized in Part 1. This perspective does see hostility, stress and emotion as ‘normal’ evolved behaviour possessing utility (promoting survival) that appears under specific conditions, e.g. challenge to the self.

The framework also enables one to study the aspects of WRH cited in the Introduction which research thus far has not considered, e.g.

- Why WRH happens
- Why it is not typically physical but still deeply-effecting
- Why hostility appears in the forms it takes
- What conditions it appears in
- Why WRH is hard to deal with
- What the function of WRH is, including what benefits (and negatives) hostility and reaction to it (stress) are and have
- What impacts and effects WRH has for parties
- What body-brain mechanisms/systems are involved in hostile behaviour and reactions to it; how they function; why and how they evolved as such;
- Why staff’s counter-aggression seems rare (one might expect potent hostility-related stress to elicit counter-aggression);

The framework allows one to attend to both the work-related and hostility facets of WRH. Context in which behaviour appears – and influences it - is important, but relevant factors are not limited to organizational ones. Divorcing WRH from a wider understanding of hostile behaviours seems naive but WRH research rarely contextualizes WRH in broader hostility theory and research. WRH researchers arguably separate WRH from other forms of hostility. I posit WRH is a work-related manifestation of hostility; it is related to other forms of hostility. By locating WRH as such, I draw from wider aggression and violence research in order to foster a fuller understanding of hostility than contemporary WRH studies have.

Some aggression research has attempted to work beyond domains and associated disciplines (Anderson and Bushman, 2002), but doing so immediately confronts one with quasi-incommensurate streams of research, i.e. from biological, psychological and social perspectives. However, the evolutionary approach can accommodate these and consider the role biological, psychological and social factors have. WRH research has not acknowledged or explored such an approach, despite it being advocated in aggression/violence research by Dodge and Sherrill (2007), nor before employed a pluralist paradigm accommodating them.

WRH research largely de-contextualizes behaviour. My thesis aims to redress this imbalance by considering context. Here, it is service work. Other contexts for WRH exist, e.g. peer-to-peer aggression in organizations. Context comprises both social setting and relations of parties in it. Interacting parties sustain the context by occupying and enacting social roles. These are supplied and inferred from the organizational setting and wider social norms, e.g. service credo, organizational culture, the socialization process. These influence behaviours. Context should not simply be seen as the social location for situated action; it connects internal personal experience (e.g. stress reaction, emotional feeling) and social/public behaviour (responses enacted for organizational and social purpose). I later present the 'hostility chain' model to help explicate this and the links hostility has with other behaviours and experiences.

As I show in later chapters, hostility, stress and emotion have been studied from numerous and diverse perspectives – biological, psychological and social traditions – but can be drawn together under the evolutionary theory framework. This can in meta-theoretical fashion accommodate or even integrate diverse and apparently incommensurate approaches previously taken. This conceptual framework also enables a way to comprehend WRH as behaviours driven by complex biopsychosocial forces and having biopsychosocial impacts and effects on parties.

This alternative approach to WRH fulfils the recent call for critical and reflexive WRH research and new approaches (Holmes *et al*., 2012; Keashley, 1998). Greater understanding of WRH might result, which I argue is required before attempts to tackle WRH are made. Responses would be based on a more complete comprehension of WRH as a complex, multi-faceted behaviour and experience, rather than comprising attempts to manage or

control it founded on contestable understandings or single disciplinary perspectives that though useful and relevant in some regards are by definition not integrative.

PART 3

The first section of this thesis argued for an evolutionary perspective on human behaviour, and has posited that human behaviour is, by definition, biopsychosocial because it is evolved. The second section introduced WRH. This section details behaviours and experiences involved in service-based WRH; hostility, stress and emotion (others may exist) and adopts the biopsychosocial-evolutionary perspective.

Stress and emotion can be seen as prefiguring hostility and as a reaction to hostility. In Chapter 8, I introduce what I call the 'hostility chain' indicating how these behaviours are linked between parties in dyadic interaction. I then argue that hostility, stress and emotion are adaptive behaviours – evolved and retained for their survival utility (in Chapter 9). Something of the function of each are outlined. In Chapters 10 and 11 I consider hostility and stress and emotion respectively, and in each briefly consider the insights offered from biological, psychological and social perspectives. (In Chapter 10 I also outline how hostility has been fallaciously presented as the defining characteristic of evolution and human nature.)

Chapter 8 The hostility-stress-emotion connection

Introduction

I have posited that hostility occurs in context. This thesis looks at service work as the context. (Service work is embedded in organizational culture, itself nested in wider social norms.) In interactions between parties in context, single behaviours are unlikely; the complexity of human interaction (and experiences generated) suggests that in WRH situations multiple behaviours and experiences associated with it are likely to happen. Though hostility is the exemplum evolved, biopsychosocial behaviour focused on, other behaviours are associated with it. Here, these are stress and emotion. The 'hostility chain' shows how they are connected in the customer-worker dyad. One can see that hostility, stress and emotion occurs for both parties; hostility is a behaviour enacted by the customer following his or her stress and/or emotion (which is not necessarily directly connected with the service encounter) and operates as the stressor prompting the worker's emotion, stress reaction and response (behaviour).

The 'hostility chain'

I propose that after a hostile person presents his- or her-self, the target of (and perhaps witnesses to) this hostility will experience reactions and responses. An automatic stress reaction (FFF - fight, flight or freeze) will occur after threat recognition and appraisal. At the same time as or preceding it strong emotion (e.g. fear, anger) also occurs. Note that behaviours parties manifest in social interactions may or may not enact the behaviours their reactions incline them toward. That is, aggression or fear is not necessarily expressed, nor fight or flight enacted. However, the emotion and stress triggered by the hostile party will be experienced.

I link these reactions and responses between interacting parties through the proposed trajectory of events and experience following stressors. This is illustrated below. Note both the customer (C) and the staff (S) experience the same trajectory. For C, stressor X creates FFF/emotion and a behavioural response (hostility - H).

Figure 8.1 - customer stress reaction and behavioural inclination

(C)

X →FFF/emotion → H

Note that X may be or may not be connected with the interaction or situation. Poor service delivery due to staff's unprofessional behaviour or some organizational policy/procedure may be the trigger for the customer's stress reaction, making it entirely understandable and reasonable. Equally, the stressor might be unrelated to the particular situation or interaction, e.g. some life or daily stressor experienced by the customer which triggers their stress reaction which then is displaced into the situation. Overlaps and influence may occur, e.g. a minor hassle may create stress which is then exacerbated by the service interaction. Note also that the order of FFF and emotion in the above and subsequent diagram(s) does not imply FFF always precedes emotion; it could be the other way round or a complex interaction between the two.

For S, the same basic structure exists but note the staff's stressor is the customer's hostility - H - prompts staff's FFF/emotion and behavioural response (B) as indicated in the figure below –

Figure 8.2 - staff stress reaction and behavioural inclination

(S)

H → FFF/emotion → B

Hostility is the link between the two. This comprises the 'hostility chain', illustrated in the following diagram –

Figure 8.3 - the 'hostility chain'

(C) (S)

X →FFF/emotion → H → FFF/emotion → B

One can see from this model how hostility occurring in a social interaction provokes reactions in biological and psychological domains and systems, which subsequently influences behaviour in the social domain. The stressor triggers a reaction for C, which results in C's response, which functions as S's stressor, which triggers reaction, and results in S's response[19].

I contend that when facing a hostile person in a social context an individual is likely to experience a stress reaction and emotion. The hostility chain model shows that a stressor prompts the customer's stress (and emotional) reaction leading to hostile behaviour which then functions as the stressor for staff's reaction (stress, emotion) and subsequent behaviour. The model shows a linear flow of reactions from stimuli. In the analysis chapter I argue that interactions creates a more complex feedback loop which effects reaction and response. As parties interact, multiple reactions and responses may occur, some in the body and psyche of each individual, and others in the social setting interactions occur in.

Summary

Stress, emotion and hostility can be seen to occur for both customers and service workers in interaction, though the customer's stress reaction and associated emotion may have been aroused in another context and displaced into the service interaction (see Zillman (1971) on excitation transfer between contexts). The customer's hostility becomes the stressor eliciting the customer's stress and emotional reaction. In later chapters focused on service work, I suggest this reaction is subject to influences which constrain emotional and behavioural expression; responses enacted by service staff are unlikely to manifest overt

[19] I use 'reaction' to mean automatic, sub-conscious biopsychological activity following a stressor's presentation, and 'response' to mean a behaviour enacted in social display or interaction fuelled by the reaction but not necessarily expressing it. Response may be influenced by (sub)conscious cognition. The analysis chapters more fully explore these issues.

hostility. However, I argue that workers are inclined to hostility through the stress reaction experienced. The stress reaction to a threat, hostility as a behaviour serving to protect the individual from harm, and emotion as a signalling system between individuals (and one alerting the individual to important environmental factors) can all be seen as adaptive behaviours, i.e. conferring survival advantage. The next chapter explores this idea.

Chapter 9 Hostility, stress and emotion as adaptive behaviours

Introduction

If one accepts TE's core tenets and *Homo sapiens sapiens* is an evolved (biopsychosocial) species, one can see behaviours are biopsychosocial complexes evolved over time to confer adaptive advantage (i.e. promote survival). This notion is commensurate with strands of thinking introduced and exposited in this thesis thus far.

In this chapter I offer a brief outline of the adaptive qualities of hostility, stress and emotion. I also challenge the erroneous view hostility is the defining feature of evolutionary struggle and human behaviour; it is important for same but is not necessarily humankind's defining characteristic.

The evolutionary value of hostility

In an evolutionary sense hostility (aggression, violence) is a natural (normal) behaviour animals display when meeting specific habitat demands (Buss and Duntley, 2006). This basically constitutes the ethological perspective on hostility (I later use ethology in my analysis of hostile interactions).

Lorenz (1967) maintained aggression has a life-preservative function for individuals and their species. However, species typically develop measures to inhibit and control physical aggression, particularly intra-species aggression, to limit unnecessary combat because it, and subsequent injury or death, is costly for individuals and the species (Harrison Matthews, 1964). Ritualized fighting is one example (Hall, 1964; Lorenz, 1964, 1967), a topic I return to in Chapter 18.

Lorenz believed humans lack this restrictive impulse. Lea (1984) supports this, contending human aggression escaped controlling restraints embodied in behavioural rituals. For Lea, technological power overrode instinct to avoid unnecessary aggression. Technology, e.g. weapons, came to enable easier aggressive expression; Grossman (1995) notes technological and other 'distancing' methods, e.g. emotional and cultural distance from targets amplified by in-out group bias, enables hostility (see Bandura, 1999; Haslam, 2006).

Perhaps the expression of aggression would occur despite technology, or technology and psychological factors (e.g. bias against out-groups; see Kelman, 1958) intensifies its effect rather than acts as its cause. However, Collins (2008) claims humans are socially constrained from violently aggressing each other in the same way other animals are. And human aggression can be seen to take ritualized form (see Marsh *et al*., 1978) as per animal interactions, implying constraint on violence between humans exists.

Arguably, Lorenz de-contextualised aggression and ignored social factors contributing to it or which support non-aggression between individuals. But an environmental 'releaser' (e.g. another person) can trigger behaviour (Hess (1962) cited by Deaux, *et al*., 1993). Tinbergen's concept of proximate and ultimate causes on behaviour is apposite here; a stressor may release behaviour (be a proximate cause for it) that has been 'programmed' over long periods of evolution (the behaviour is an ultimate cause in fostering individuals' and the species' survival).

Irrespective of whether early human life was hallmarked by aggression, as e.g. Freeman (1964) and Lorenz (1967) thought, or was more cooperative and peaceful, aggression seems to be a natural, normal behaviour when meeting needs or challenges, e.g. defence of self, young and territory; securing or defending status; securing and defending a mate, etc. (de Waal, 2005; Giligan, 1996; Moyer, 1976). Forms of hostility vary but its function remain the same – survival (including securing status and social as well as physical needs). Though our species may use physical hostility less frequently and intensely in interpersonal interactions than our ancestors, and often not in life-or-death situations, it still has this essential functional use. As such, hostility may be seen as a utility promoting capacity to maintain health and life. Hostility and systems associated with it, e.g. FFF, are retained in contemporary humans as an adaptive human behaviour should they be needed in life-or-death encounters. Habitat demands are context-specific (Buss and Duntley, 2006) and require adaptive reactions; display of aggression or use of violence may be required to secure continued life.

Hostile behaviour is not therefore dysfunctional or pathological behaviour *per se* (though some manifestations of it may be so, and be unpalatable, disturbing, and socially-disapproved of, e.g. deemed immoral or unlawful). Rather, it is a feature of an organism's

normal behaviour under particular environmental and interpersonal conditions, circumstances and pressures. Aggression (including violence) is health-promoting, functional behaviour in some cases and it is essential that, on occasion and for specific objectives, it is used.

Hostile display seems more common than violence in human social settings. Hostility is a behavioural inclination not necessarily enacted in behaviour. As noted, restraints on aggression (especially violence) exist. This is evident in ritualized behaviours; behaviours obeying social norms about when and how hostility display and enactment occurs.

One should not consider that mankind is characteristically or fundamentally aggressive. This is a mistaken belief that has adhered to Darwinism and TE generally, which are criticised for the view *Homo sapiens sapiens* is a pugnacious species, irrecoverably aggressive and violent, inevitably prone to conflict, and engaged in a Hobbesian struggle for survival and supremacy. The 'warring species' notion centralizes hostility as the major motivation in evolution (e.g. as expressed in Spencer's 'survival of the fittest' maxim)[20]. However, one should not mistake reference to the struggle for existence in hostile (e.g. competitive or scarcely-resourced, dangerous) conditions as a claim that hostility was or remains humans' *modus vivendi*. Darwin acknowledged aggression, violence and war were "important selective forces in human history" (Crook, 1994: 20) but were not the only ones. Darwin saw instinct as open, not fixed, and something that could be "softened by the conditioning of external circumstance" (Crook, *ibid*.: 23), e.g. social environment. Mankind's instincts, including aggression, were seen as mutable in environmental contexts and through (human-social) interactions.

Moreover, aggression is not the only influential human behaviour. Others that might well be classified as 'positive' and 'pro-social' can also be seen as evolved, e.g. altruism (Trivers, 1985; Van Vugt and Van Lange, 2006), cooperation (de Waal, 1996) and morality (Hauser, 2006). Darwin's optimism about mankind's sentience, social character, civility and ability to collaborate, cooperate and empathise suggests mankind could evolve away from

[20] The notion of *Homo pugnax* and the civilizing process involved in shifting attention from it to the preferable *Homo humanus*, as explained by Elias (1994), is covered in more detail in the chapter on hostility.

hostility rather than being yoked to or determined by it. For Darwin, biology was not destiny and he did not adhere to the *Homo pugnax* concept. Hostility is not necessarily our driving motivation or core characteristic, but a behaviour we can and do display under certain conditions and for particular purposes. Though hostility is often viewed pejoratively, once can see it in a neutral light - as quite understandable and defensible as reasonable or even desirable (e.g. in cases of self-defence).

One foundation of the pugnacious species notion might have been the terminology Darwin applied to species undergoing the process of evolution. Initially he called this the struggle for existence, later adopting Spencer's survival of the fittest phrase. As Skene (2009) notes, much in the theory of evolution is couched in terms of aggression and maleness, which may not have helped its case, e.g. in social science circles. However the idea humans are essentially, inherently and irrecoverably hostile gained support as Darwinism was "pressed into service of a great variety of intellectual and social interests" (Crook, 1994: 205), including Social Darwinism and eugenics (Gratzer, 2000) to support views different to Darwin's. The notion of *Homo pugnax* has adhered to Darwinism and TE generally but can be challenged as erroneous.

The evolutionary value of the stress reaction

The concept of evolution directly relates to reactions to threats (stressors) appearing in the animal's environment, threats which may be social or psychological, not just physical (Flinn, 2007). Christopher (2004) notes the stress reaction fosters survival (and can be best viewed in a biopsychosocial frame) and that the potent experience that occurs as the stress reaction fires is normal and valuable.

The later chapter on stress indicates that when facing a stressor, an organism reacts in ways fostering self-protection. In humans, FFF (detailed elsewhere) is seen as being the core stress reaction that occurs irrespective of the nature of the stressor, e.g. whether it is social, psychological or physical, or potentially lethal or not, and which has a potent bio-psychological affect for the individual.

In this sense, stress/FFF fosters individual, and thus by association species, survival. It can be seen as the vehicle promoting life and through which we, when under threat of

harm or (potential) death, function to safeguard life. The basic stress reaction, in the form of FFF, is adaptivity in manifest action at the ontogenetic (individual) level as the animal seeks to survive danger, and is thus the expression of phylogenetic inheritance and selection that over many thousands of millennia have evolved body and brain mechanisms, systems and complexes geared toward sustaining life. FFF is requisite for survival, and its value from an evolutionary perspective cannot be underestimated. FFF directs the individual to action – behaviour. However, chronic or over-arousal of FFF in non-lethal threat situations elevates stress which can result in illness.

The evolutionary value of emotion

As indicated in the chapter on emotion, some theorists believe emotions are closely bound to evolution. Darwin (1999/1872) believed animals as well as humans express emotion (one might prefer to consider these behavioural displays of drives), and thus emotions are not necessarily unique to *Homo sapiens sapiens*, something Turner and Stets (2006) state social theories often do not acknowledge.

Zajonc (1984) separates cognition and emotion, believing emotion is a function of an ancient (evolutionary) past preceding cognitive development, perhaps relating to survival mechanisms or functions, and still dominates behaviour. Baudy (1980, cited by Segal, 1998) supports this, claiming some human emotions are psychic echoes of primates' fears of predators[21]. Thus, some of our ('human') emotions seem potentially closely-linked to our ancestors' expressions of fear of danger, potential harm and possible death when facing an aggressor or challenge of some type.

Ekman claims a core of six emotions – anger, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise and disgust - are recognisable from facial expression (e.g. in performance arts, psychological experiment) by people from differing cultures (Schechner, 1977), which lends credence to the notion emotion has a shared basis rooted in deep evolutionary history despite cultural and societal differences and changes. Theorists vary regarding the number of basic or core emotions they believe exists (Izard, 1991; Plutchik, 1994) but all may be seen as

[21] We share a LCA with *Pan* (see Appendix 2). One might extend Baudy's notion to include earlier mammalian ancestors.

motivational and functionally serving survival needs (Lewis, 2000). Indeed, the core emotions considered in this thesis (fear, anger) might be better termed 'drives' or 'fundamental emotions' (Cosmides and Tooby, 2000; Izard, 1991). Emotion alerts individuals to their state/feeling following some stimulus, e.g. a stressor, and is essential in threat assessment (Gross and Thompson, 2007). But emotion also signals feeling, state or intent. As such, it allows communication between individuals (Frijda, 1980 cited by Plutchik, 1994; Keltner and Ekman, 2000). Emotion thus seems to have adaptive function (Cosmides and Tooby, 2000; Izard and Ackerman, 2000; Plutchik, 1980).

Interim summary

The evolutionary benefit of hostility, stress and emotion have been outlined, and their connection shown in the hostility chain. One can also see this connection in the limbic system, which is involved in these behaviours.

The limbic system

It is generally accepted the limbic system (LS) is involved in hostility, stress and emotion. It is responsible for threat assessment, formation of emotion and triggering the core stress reaction (FFF – see below). Other brain systems, notably the cortex, are also linked to behaviour. As such, the brain and its function requires some analysis, especially as the LS and cortex are considered examples of the brain at different evolutionary phases.

MacLean's triune brain theory offers a model for the brain's structure, activity and associated behaviours. Though criticized for being too neat, and for not mapping neuroanatomy (though MacLean (1990) notes identification, labelling and definition of brain structures and function is historically-contingent), it potentially gives insights into individuals' behaviour. MacLean's theory is useful as a way to visualize and conceptualize brain systems (clusters of mechanisms) and in an evolutionary frame of reference[22]. It has been applied in OMS as a metaphor for organizational complexity (Broakskta, 1996) and to explain

[22] Wilber's AQAL references the triune brain in the It/organic quadrant.

decision-making (Buchanan and O'Connell, 2006; Morse, 2006) but has not been used in OB/OMS to explain the very behaviours it is associated with.

MacLean's concept contends that the LS is the 'mammalian' brain (in previous era it was called the 'emotional' or 'visceral' brain (MacLean, 1990)). It sits physically and evolutionarily mid-way between older- and newer-evolved brain areas. The cortex is thought an evolutionarily-newer brain region housing 'higher' processes/functions, e.g. logic, reason, language, and sits over LS. Beneath LS lies the evolutionarily-older brain area (what MacLean calls the paleomammalian or 'reptilian' brain, or 'R-complex') which controls basic life systems

> "regulating emotional and sexual behaviour; in vertebrates it is also involved in fight and flight ('emergency') responses" (Gross, 1992: 447).

FFF thus influences R-complex activity regarding movement, heart and respiration rates.

Broadly, these brain systems (clusters of structures) and functions can be seen as being physically arranged and functionally related as summarily outlined in the table below.

Table 9.1 – Triune brain features and functions

Brain	Common to	Location	Function(s)
R-complex	Reptilia, birds & mammals	Base of the brain – top of the brain stem; possibly also the cerebellum (‘little brain’)	• Daily (sub)routines of the animal, e.g. control of respiration, heart-rate, etc. • Non-verbal behaviour, notably re: assertion, mating, etc. • Survival promotion
LS	Mammals	Between R-complex and cortex Comprises numerous brain parts, e.g. hypothalamus (central in aggression), amygdala (playing a modulatory role)	• Role in emotion • Coordinate interplay between interior and exterior domains • Self-protection (e.g. threat assessment)
(neo) cortex	Primates (& possibly other ‘higher’ mammals)	Outer ‘layer’ of brain	• Links visual, auditory and somatic systems • Attends to external world • Mentation, e.g. problem-solving, language, etc.

For MacLean, evolutionarily-complex animals’ brains retain features of earlier era and ancestors, e.g. mammals retaining reptilian formations. As such, mammals, primates and humans, for instance, are linked to a (pre-)mammalian past.

The human brain is interconnected through neural channels allowing communication; LS is connected to the cortex and R-complex (Le Doux, 1996; MacLean, 1990). It does not comprise discrete parts, though a large degree of independence regarding functioning exists. Le Doux and Phelps (2000) comment LS-to-cortex channels/connections are stronger than the reverse, implying LS is involved in cortical function more than *vice versa*. The cortex possibly has an executive role when needed but LS seemingly dominates operations when dangers appear and behaviour apparently 'downshifts' into more 'basic' conduct focused on survival needs operated by more 'primitive' (in evolutionary terms) systems. (This is important apropos stress and emotion reactions and aggressive behavioural tendencies as covered in later chapters.) Zajonc (1984) found sensory data routes to LS and cortex but arrives in LS faster, which acts on data rapidly, helping account for suspension of 'higher' cortical (i.e. rational, logical) functioning in extreme conditions (e.g. hostile encounters). Evans (2008: 255) reviews Dual-Processing theories which propose a "distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those which are slow, deliberative, and conscious", i.e. R-complex/LS and cortical processing respectively. The latter is not greatly involved when danger presents itself or is perceived; older, 'primitive' brain mechanisms and activity dominates (though cognition may occur during or follow incidents, and play a part in decision-making and emotion).

Koestler claims evolution resulted in superimposition of new brain structures and functions on older ones without providing the former with "clear-cut, hierarchic control over the old" (1967: 281-2). However, because the older brains were successful evolution seemingly did not need to alter them; the later-developed cortex could augment them. Note, too (as MacLean states), the triune brain is not three separate brains but a complex of systems in which components intermesh and mutually communicate. For MacLean, interactions between R-complex, LS and cortex are synergistic; the three brains are not separate entities but an inter-related complex - three-in-one. However, the schizophysiology Koestler (1967) believes occurred through superimposition implies mankind's instinct (e.g. FFF) and intellect (e.g. conscious decision-making) are out of step. Different data processing speeds following stimuli would seemingly serve to exacerbate this, viz. suspended cortical functioning as LS activates and the organism 'downshifts' to more 'primitive' survival-based

functioning. This might help explain why dissonance or conflict between behavioural inclinations and intellect or socially-approved behavioural expectations occurs.

MacLean's concept has received renewed interest in recent years (e.g. Le Doux, 1996). I see it as useful because it offers an heuristic for considering behaviour relevant on individual and species levels, and places behaviour in the evolutionary frame of reference. I think it enables one to consider how (human) behaviour may be propelled (not necessarily fully-controlled) by deep, ancestral mechanisms/systems/complexes evolved in earlier historical era which operate on emotional and subconscious levels (i.e. not conscious cognitive ones) to serve essential survival needs. It allows a focus on both brain structure and function (the biochemical activity of its mechanisms/systems/complexes) and (social) behavioural tendencies. The concept offers a way to see how, for individual humans, (social) behaviour is connected with psychological factors (e.g. perception, attention, emotion, decision-making etc.) and the anatomical, neuro-chemical and physiological factors involved in generating or mediating and perhaps principally driving them. As such, the triune brain concept helps explain the links between an individual's interiority (the internal needs and operation of the single organism) and the external world (e.g. stimuli) impinging on it and in which it enacts its behaviour. It aids exploration of that interiority and the multiple factors involved (here, the various evolved brain functions contributing to automatic reaction and behavioural response). It also indicates the route data takes as it moves from the external world into the brain. Regarding this data flow and processing, MacLean's notion helps us understand that reactions to stimuli and subsequent behaviour displayed socially is partially subconscious and appears evolutionarily-programmed. In this, the triune brain concept allows one to see behaviour on ontogenetic (individual) and phylogenetic (species) 'levels'. This can be illustrated with FFF - the core stress reaction - as triggered in LS and prompting action tendencies geared for survival.

Summary

Hostility, stress and emotion can all be seen as adaptive behaviours conferring survival advantage for humans. Hostility enables the animal to display or enact behaviours serving its interests. Stress is the mechanism triggering bio-psychological reaction and action

tendencies (fight, flight) useful in pursuing those interests. Emotion allows an animal to signal to others its intent or feeling, and as part of its self-awareness, represents the feeling component of inner state the organism acts on. The ‘hostility chain’ suggests hostility can result from stress and emotional arousal and also be the stimulus for it. They are linked and function for the organism in interactions. The triune brain concept claims that the limbic system is involved in stress, emotion and hostility. The R-complex and cortex respectively relating to pre-mammalian and primate/human reactions and responses (behaviours) may be involved too but are coordinated through the mammalian brain.

The next chapters more fully explore hostility, and stress and emotion as the behaviours elicited in WRH. As evolved human behaviours, I suggest they necessarily possess biological, psychological and social facets and should thus be seen as biopsychosocial complexes.

Chapter 10 Hostility

Introduction

WRH is an example of hostility. Thus an understanding of hostility may offer useful insights into WRH. Hostility has been studied from perspectives which can be grouped under the broad headings of 'biological', 'psychological' and 'social' (categories relating to the 'traditional' domain/disciplinary hierarchy (see chapter 4)). (These are also applicable to emotion and stress, as explored in subsequent chapters.) Some aggression research has attempted to move beyond domain and associated disciplinary boundaries (Anderson and Bushman, 2002) in considering more fully the role all these factors have (Dodge and Sherrill, 2007); WRH research has not. The evolutionary perspective allows them to be accommodated and connected without dismissing the importance of each.

I summarily overview some of the core theories about aggression and violence from biological, psychological and social research streams. Though far from exhaustive, this aims to help identify key issues and outline important concepts. The reader should remain attentive to the idea all are relevant for a biopsychosocial understanding of hostility.

Definition

Definitions vary. One may claim violence is the actual physical harming of another being, whereas aggression may not be as severe and could take a non-physical form. Moreover, aggressiveness, as an inclination, state, feeling, etc. is not necessarily enacted, e.g. aggressive feelings may not be shown or acted on yet still felt. Hostility may be manifested in many ways (in aggression, violence), from mild behaviours of a non-physical character (e.g. a stare) to physical violence (e.g. killing) but often takes a ritualized form intended to avoid actual fighting. Its effects on targets may range from discomfort to stress and upset to injury or death. Harm can be occasioned on another person intentionally (hostile aggression) or accidentally whilst pursuing a different goal (instrumental aggression), such as self-defence (Buss, 1961).

Hostility is an elusive issue that evades easy definition (Imbusch, 2003). Schinkel

(2010) implies it is difficult to address, study, or even define with authority because it appears in so many aspects of human life. Archaeology's findings suggests it has occurred over the course of human history (Freeman, 1964). Because hostility is seen as having adaptive use, and is evolved, I see it as a biopsychosocial issue. It has been studied from broadly biological, psychological and social perspectives.

The biological perspective

It is considered "the neural circuitry" and "the fundamental biochemistry underlying aggression is universal across the human species" (Sternberg, 1995: 548). Paus (2005) states chemicals, e.g. testosterone, serotonin and dopamine, underpin aggression. Even the non-physical challenge of chess elevates testosterone (Mazur *et al*., 1992). Pihl and Benkeflat (2005: 261) state it is "a given" hormones and neuro-chemicals are involved in (hostile) behaviour, e.g. children exposed *in utero* to testosterone display more aggression than siblings not (Reinisch *et al*., 1991). But though "the hormonal environment may affect behaviour by biasing the neural system in such a way as to create behavioural dispositions" (van Goozen, 2005: 298) biochemistry does not determine behaviour but can influence it. Other factors (e.g. social norms, learning) also have influence. van Goozen (*ibid*.) comments "environment and culture add their influence" (*ibid*.) through familial and wider social reinforcement.

Bio-chemical activity is involved in brain-body reaction to challenge/stressors, but other chemicals seem related to hostility, specifically regarding the individual's development and function. Chemicals are involved in shaping the development (maturation) and functioning of human brain and body mechanisms/systems and their processes; these can be affected by hypo- or hyper-activity of chemicals and result in brain systems' malfunction, malformation and damage (Patrick and Verona, 2007; Scarpa and Raine, 2007), e.g. via *in utero* and perinatal malnutrition and nicotine exposure, damage to and dysfunction of the cortex and malformed (LS) fear-related mechanisms [23], impaired mental (cognitive)

[23] E.g. imbalancing the brain's capacity to process information; the cortex seemingly plays an executive role regarding guiding behaviour once LS has fired.

functioning (showing reduced information processing, appropriate decision-making, behaviour, and low emotional (self) control), chronic autonomic nervous system under-arousal and low resting heart-rate associated with lack of emotion, fearlessness and sensation-seeking behaviours (Patrick and Verona, 2007)[24].

Biological factors arguably combine with social ones resulting in lowered FFF thresholds which seems to feed a downward spiral; hostility is fed by and feeds a higher readiness to react with FFF; FFF seems more-easily triggered and by more stimuli through lowered thresholds, contributing to HPA hyperactivity (covered elsewhere) and possibly resulting in more likely hostile reactions to ambiguous physiologically-arousing stimuli.

Some biological activity occurs in hostility, e.g. biochemical release, physiological change, brain-body systems' activity when a person behaves with or reacts to hostility. Humans are biological beings; anatomy, physiology and bio-chemical systems operate corporeally, if subconsciously. Because humans are physical, material, embodied beings, biological factors require consideration. Acknowledging this does not lead to reductionistic, mechanistic and over-simplified physicalism, but ignoring it seems questionable.

The psychological perspective

Important because individuals occupy an intersection of biological and social influences, and are agential beings, psychology's theories range from biological to social approaches. Its diversity and many perspectives on aggression's character, sources, prompts/triggers, etc., means no single, generally-accepted explanation for aggression exists.

'Depth' psychologists perceive aggression is innate (hence 'natural') behaviour; the "tendency to aggression is an innate, independent, instinctual disposition" (Deaux *et al*., 1993: 102, citing Freud) resulting from the accumulation of somatic energy which must find release or harm the individual (paralleling hydraulic stress models). But aggression need not be enacted following aggressiveness; urges can be sublimated.

[24] Associated with a-social people of all ages.

Comparative psychology and its cognate discipline ethology (Cartwright, 2000) also view hostility as innate, specifically as instinctive behaviour shown by all animals. Studies in laboratories and natural habitats (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2012; Peterson and Somit, 1978) reveal hostility exists in many forms but has specific functions under particular conditions (see earlier notes on ethology). Such theories imply hostility is inevitable in human life, but control over behavioural inclinations is possible through learning and social conditions might be changed to foster reduced need for hostility.

Social factors seem important apropos hostility as developmental and social psychology indicate. Developmental and social learning psychologists consider behaviour, including aggression, is learned. Learning has been called a “major determinant” of aggressive behaviours (Sternberg, 1995). (Note, ethology acknowledges learning is important; see Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 2012). Bandura (1973) demonstrated unpunished aggressive adult models influence children’s behaviour; punished models are not copied. It is questionable if children ‘learned’ or copied aggression or how many repetitions are required for ‘learning’ to occur but Bandura’s work shows models influence behaviour, so parental, familial, educational, peer group and media (Grossman and DeGaetano, 1999) provide influential models. Models (especially attractive ones) and their impact seem to desensitize witnesses to enactment of aggression.

Social learning theories imply socio-environmental manipulation can limit exposure to, ‘training’ in and reinforcement of aggression, e.g. changing contexts for its occurrence, decreasing releasers, and altering models’ number and attractiveness. Berkowitz’s (1989) cognitive neo-associationist concept suggests reducing negative stimuli, poor role models and frustrations (not only psychological but also socio-economic; see Gilligan, 1996) will decrease aggressiveness and aggression. Sapolsky (1998) makes a similar claim regarding stress.

But learning occurs in cultural context; cultural differences influence what is socially-acceptable regarding expression of aggression (Elias, 1939). It seems reasonable to suggest that though humans experience common automatic chemical reactions when perceiving dangers and inclining to behaviour (e.g. hostility), socialization and cultural ‘programming’

leads to norms on expressing that inclination. Experiencing automatic reaction to threat and feeling attendant emotion (fear, anger) does not necessarily result in hostility; behaviour, often conducted under others' scrutiny, is seemingly constrained by (perceived) display norms/rules learned over time by watching and being influenced by social models.

Dollard *et al*. (1939) proposed the frustration-aggression model which states aggressiveness follows a frustrated goal. Aggressiveness - as inner state/feeling/behavioural inclination - may occur, but as Berkowitz (1969) shows, though a frustration-aggression link exists, aggressiveness is not always or necessarily enacted. Many things may elicit aggression, e.g. need for pain relief (this might cast light on WRH in medical contexts). Seligman (1975) showed learned helplessness and depression can follow interrupted and unfulfilled goals, implying aggression is not an inevitable outcome of frustration.

It seems people in social groups show affiliation to (perceived) group identity and (perceived expected) behaviours associated with it. Sherif *et al*. (1961), cited by Gross (1992), and Zimbardo and Leippe (1991) show affiliation to allocated groups based on arbitrary criteria and random selection is fast (albeit it in immersive 'total' environments) and can result in out-group antipathy, abuse and aggression. In-group and out-group biases exist. Out-group homogeneity bias occurs based on stereotypical generalizations about others, achieved through seeking information conforming to existing views (e.g. 'they are different to us'), which is common in individual's behaviour ('confirmation bias'). Kelman (1958) suggested degrees of affiliation exist – compliance (outward show of affiliation, obedience), identification (need to belong, connection to the group), and internalization (full affiliation, manifestation of group norms in behaviour). The deeper affiliation extends, the more de-individuated members become. Studies in trust, obedience and conformity (e.g. Milgram, 1974) show social (e.g. authority) pressure to behave particular ways is powerful enough to suppress individual's volition, even harm others (through indirect means). Combining these strands of research one can see group affiliation may occur rapidly, bias members against others, and lead to obedience to group norms and deeper affiliation even to the point of members enacting harm against members of out-groups. Loss/suspension of personal identity as the individual becomes a group member seemingly reduces the importance and effect of normal social forces prohibiting some behaviour, e.g. hostility.

Group members feel less restricted regarding behaving in otherwise socially disapproved of manner (Diener, 1979); behaviour deemed acceptable by the group outweighs external (e.g. social) and personal forces normally operating to regulate behaviour. Moreover, loss/suspension of personal identity appears to alleviate responsibility for actions. It is possible that loss of personal identity might be potent enough to enable a lone group member to manifest the group identity against an outsider[25].

The social perspective

Isolating individuals from the social environments they live and interact in is naïve. Biological approaches cited acknowledge social context has impact. But cultural differences obtain apropos how, when, where and why aggression can be legitimately socially, legally and morally expressed and displayed by its members (Averill, 1993).

Elias (1994) provides a usefully historical view of norms relating to expressions of bodily impulses, including hostility. The 'civilizing process' in Western European Humanism socialized members of society into civil(ized) behaviour. Elias's theory focuses on the late Medieval and early Renaissance era which recapitulated the earlier Classical turn from *Homo pugnax* (pugnacious Man) and *Homo romanus* (military Man) to *Homo humanus* (humane Man) extolled in preference and as an ideal (Schinkel, 2010). *Homo humanus* was a more positive view of mankind, actively turning attention from hostility towards civility. Tellingly, we still call hostile behaviour barbaric, animalistic or 'inhuman' – locating it 'beneath' civilization.

Society develops rules and systems of behavioural practice apropos when, where, how and why it is acceptable to enact particular behaviours. People are socialised into these and thus sustain the normative behaviours operating (see Baxter and Margavio, 2000; see also notes below on body hexis). Elias (1939, 1994) mentions aggression specifically, addressing how societies deal with the urge to express it (and associated emotions). He claims rulers and governments guided aggression into officially-sponsored and –permitted

[25] It is possible customers and service workers might become affiliated with respective identities and status. This could perhaps help explain customers' hostility and why staff retain membership of an aggressed group.

events to contain or manage an urge that might be turned against them, might spread discord and engender social unrest, and waste energy otherwise better-used elsewhere. Elias shows 'primitive' and 'negative' urges can be channelled into socially-oriented activities (albeit under power elites' influence or control). This process generates and sustains normative social rules about appropriate 'civilized' behaviour. Elias traces this historical movement and impact on social behaviour as the population' became socialized into conduct appropriate for civilized society (Schinkel, 2010). However, Elias notes that sometimes, the process fails; reversals (or reversion to 'earlier', less-inhibited behaviour) breaks out in society (e.g. rioting). (Parallels with Turner's social drama concept introduced later can be seen.) Mankind's hostility has historically reappeared, implying the civilizing project is not always efficacious, is contingent and subject to reversal.

Social institutions (e.g. the State) emerged and assumed power (Debreuil, 2010), including defining what constitutes hostility and what sanctions to impose against it. For Schinkel (2010), this represents 'structural violence' in institutions' use of force or violence to check 'unlawful' behaviour; social institutions 'civilized' mankind partly through using (threat of) hostility to enforce conformity and compliance. (Imbusch (2003) and Schinkel (2010) note the shared etymology of 'power' and 'violence', implying that analysing one always reveals the other.) The State locates aggressors 'outside' society, empowering itself to respond to such anti-social or unlawful behaviours, but may not acknowledge its role in defining the (il)legitimacy and (un)lawful use of hostility, question its own use of violence or admit the power structures behind such processes (Schinkel, 2010). Service credo, as an example of organizational culture, may be seen as an example of this process because it decides definitions and exercises power over behaviours. (This can be seen in common responses to WRH, e.g. applying threatening zero tolerance statements to WRH, using Health and Safety Management techniques to try to control WRH, in conceiving aggressors as 'the other', determining appropriate (worker) behaviour and colonizing workers through limiting their expressions of emotion/aggression[26].) As outlined in the WRH chapter, organizations do not

[26] Organizations may also (mis)perceive some behaviours (e.g. staff's counter-aggression) as misbehaviour rather than as a potentially reasonable response to unreasonable provocation.

necessarily acknowledge their possible contribution in sustaining hostility they appear to want to address)

Bourdieu (1977) contends social institutions/structures (e.g. law, ethics) generated though socialization, e.g. the civilizing process, become internalized by individuals. The body is one site/vehicle for this translation; structures are literally incorporated and duly embodied in individuals and manifested in habitual behaviours adhering to socially-determined and -approved standards. Bourdieu contends postures, gestures, etc. are influenced by social factors, e.g. class, milieu, role. In a physical way, the presentation of the body - its motion, its comportment in stasis, the owner's use or control of same, etc. – and its management in interpersonal interactions (i.e. in displayed emotion and behaviour), is heavily socialized by the literal and metaphorical position we occupy relative to others and the social roles we play. Social structure becomes coded in psychological schema mimetic of external structure. This enables their operation through peoples' embodied actions once internalized. Structures become schema people steer by and adhere to re: navigating social roles and interactions.

One sees this in relations between people organized and maintained by social order. Relationships include and incorporate how roles (manifesting social structure in interpersonal interactions) are to be fulfilled. People accept the effect of this process, and become naturalized to the external order represented internally (mentally), accepting the impression of the order on and in them through their enacted behaviours. I suggest people therefore act as agents of their own hexis, abetting the process.

Bourdieu's concept is relevant to hostility because hostility may be inherent in how we are socialized into roles deemed normal and socially acceptable. The dominant social system establishes power over people and is propagated through them because of its capacity to exert influence on/in them through the socialization-internalization (e.g. hexis) process. Hexis can be interpreted as symbolic and socially-structured aggression occasioned upon people. Its potential violence may go unrecognized because hexis appears as conforming to norms, obeying rules and normative behaviour rather than coercion subtly co-opting people into compliance. It can be read as the latter because dimensions of power

in structures are directly translated into recipients' psyches and behaviours[27]. The 'legitimate' structure powering the process continues to violate those it socializes from the inside through them. We, as subjects, 'allow' it because it is powerful, we see little alternative, and/or are influenced by it without noticing its effect.

This process (and WRH) can be seen in Marxist terms, e.g. conditions of work and employment. Apart from the notion people become representations of roles dictated by the capitalist system, Marxism sees inherent conflict in the capital-labour relationship. This ongoing force establishing work order, work relations, production, profit-making and broad economic systems also affects social norms by influencing and organizing class division. This cycle continues, with power enabling capital to structure work relations with workers, who continue to work to help create wealth, buying more power and dominance for capital over workers, and so on. However, capital's and labour's (omnipresent) conflict of interests is not always manifest. Should disparities of status, power, etc. manifest, labour's aggressiveness may elevate, resulting in acts of aggression aimed at effecting change. This may not be a serious threat likely to change the social, political and economic structure, but it feasibly could. Even symbolic threats might lead to revisions or reversions of order and such challenge (itself implying power) could potentially reconfigure the system. Alternatively, labour threats might invoke capital's aggressive response to control threat and suppress potential rebellion.

Thus, the capital-labour structure contains (limits) and fosters conflict by virtue of its organization and parties' relations and interests. For Marx, conflict is embedded in capitalism and embodied in parties' daily enactments; managers managing, workers working and capitalists capitalizing. This obviously relates to the work and organizational topics studied in this thesis. (I later argue customers also exert power, but as they are a commercial necessity for organizations, they thus occupy another role in the social network.)

Marx saw conflict as inherent in work relationships; Simmel (1995) believed conflict (by implication, hostility) is not necessarily or always negative and has a positive facet. Simmel viewed it is a natural feature of human social interaction and interpersonal relations

[27] Hexis is highly applicable to (service) work organizations, e.g. servers and served (see analysis chapter). One sees why Marx commented people are not workers or managers but representations of roles in/of the capitalist order; symbols of the system influenced to behave as the system wants.

and thought conflict can help foster positive change, i.e. be a constructive force for social and relational integration, claiming conflict can solve divergent perspectives to arrive at consensus and unity (Simmel, 1995).

Conflict can be defined as a state of opposition and the process parties undergo when angling for leverage, advantage and dominance. Conflict sets one party against another. The outcome may result in a winner and a loser rather than a mutually-beneficial resolution. If parties in conflict can establish some compromise or agreement, accommodation is possible. Simmel comments accommodation occurs when/if "a *modus vivendi* is worked out" as a way to engage parties (*ibid*.: 103) but admits this is not resolution, can be fragile and "almost always involves a power differential" (*ibid*.), e.g. one party's subordination to another. As Simmel notes, latent conflict (and power imbalance) remains, implying conflict resolution is always a compromise for at least one party.

If conflict does not alter social order relationships do not change and the previous structures, relationships and processes obtain. This may be especially true of work relationships, which occur in the context of organizational culture, and are like class-conflicts - "class conflicts are never resolved; they are only regulated" (Dahrendorf, 1968:105), presumably by those already in and able to maintain power. Conflict (fuelled by hostility) is not necessarily a catalyst for compromise, accommodation, change, or (comm)unity, though it could be. It could lead to the continued dominance of one group or individual and thus damage and loss incurred by another. (I later explore this regarding service work interactions outcomes apropos status and dominance and associated losses and harm.)

Hostility is positive and negative

Commonly, hostility is seen as negative and dysfunctional. However, hostility may actually be positive (e.g. functionally useful) under some conditions (e.g. self-defence). Hostility could be qualified as necessary, beneficial and valuable, and legally and morally defensible under particular circumstances. One can see hostility as reasonable behaviour. For instance 'hostile aggression' - the urge to cause harm without justification - is not synonymous with 'instrumental aggression' wherein harm is incidental to action, as in self-defence (Buss, 1961; cf. Bushman and Anderson (2001) regarding contesting the hostile and

instrumental aggression taxonomy). Few would argue self-defence is pathological (indeed, failure to defend oneself might be seen as such).

Yet hostility has been viewed as humanity's 'dark side' rather than an integral feature of human experience and behaviour, e.g. as adaptive behaviour conferring survival advantage. Circumstance may define its status as 'good' or 'bad' but hostility seems 'natural' - part of our psychological, social and biological selves - not atypical or pathological *per se* (though some examples of it may be). It is thus not easily outgrown or suppressed by those fearing it or deeming it unpalatable.

The civilizing process implies mankind is not destined to forever aggress, which matches evolutionists' (including Darwin's) belief about development (maturation, learning) offering the possibility humans may evolve away from the need for aggression. Darwin and other evolutionists have been seen by some as believing aggression is a, or the, central characteristic of mankind's nature and development and of evolution in general, but this view is inaccurate. However, hostility is retained as a behaviour because of its functional value for specific circumstances despite social factors largely prohibiting it and hostility not being used as frequently as it once may have been. Natural evolution from hostility could occur but social effort to reduce or remove conditions triggering or requiring aggressive responses (Gilligan, 1996) implies social engineering and thus perhaps structural violence itself.

The civilizing process may have led to us misunderstand hostility's complexity, underestimate its power, depth and even value, overestimate the power of social inclinations and cultural factors to address it, and overlook official if covert uses of hostility to restrain hostility. Hostility may have been glossed over by socio-cultural attempts to control it. This could have covered the truth about hostility with a veneer of civility provided by political and social power - ironically through subtle use of aggression or violence. This veneer cannot always or completely contain what lies 'beneath' but may seem preferable to facing unpalatable truths about our nature, our capacities, and the fragility of that veneer (which admittedly does keeps hostility, for most of us most of the time, in check). However, I advocate understanding the issue is critically important; this requires us to explore it and move beyond surficial levels and single disciplinary approaches.

Eradicating hostility is a hard if not impossible project, though we could feasibly evolve (even nurture such a development) away from hostility. Hostility seems to have multiple sources, facets and manifestations. This implies predicting when and where hostility may occur is difficult because it could feasibly erupt at any time and in any circumstance (the brittle veneer might crack). Our species is sometimes but not always hostile.

Apropos WRH, common Health and Safety Management approach to predict hostility, prevent it, or control it when and where it cannot be prevented, seems a questionable understanding of hostility, its contexts, sources or contributory factors, complexity, etc., and an hubristic trust in its own power to address the problem. Ironically, and tellingly, HSM rhetoric and other managerial approaches to tackle WRH is often hostile itself, e.g. zero tolerance statements and policies to combat violence.

Summary

An evolutionary and biopsychosocial perspective offers an understanding of WRH that looks beyond work contexts to the natural history of human behaviour. The workplace is one social setting in which hostility appears, and service interactions one context for WRH.

Insights from numerous disciplines studying hostility from a range of perspectives (biological, psychological and social) may help one comprehend WRH. Biological research has helped understand physiological (mal- and dys-)function, and anatomical and biochemical systems relating to hostility, and the potent, automatic effect they have apropos behaviour. Interestingly, such studies often acknowledge social influences on the body and brain's function and seemingly accept behaviour is not isolated from social contexts in which it occurs, and is thus a complex nexus of interactions.

Psychology, too, identifies both influence of social factors (e.g. learning) and operation of brain/mind systems regarding hostility. The former overlaps with social theories, the latter with biological sciences. Tension exists in psychology regarding whether hostility is innate or learned (e.g. Freud versus Bandura) - seemingly irreconcilable positions - but both may offer value and help show hostility's complexity (as partially innate and partially learned behaviour). Innate systems enable learning but do not determine behaviour.

Social theories focus on social factors influencing, framing and affecting hostility, and show hostility in macro power relations (e.g. labour-capital), micro interpersonal interactions (e.g. models' effects on behaviour), and as manifesting itself in social processes themselves. They are useful in showing how 'natural' behaviour can be shaped by cultural forces. However, they largely ignore biological factors (cf. Elias, 1994, 2005).

Overlap between domains exists and is evident in biopsychological approaches (e.g. Moyer, 1976; Patrick and Verona, 2007; Siegel, 2005), psychosocial perspectives (e.g. Krahé, 2001) and biopsychosocial perspectives (Renfrew, 1997; Scarpa and Raine, 2007) and evolutionary approaches (Buss, 2004; Buss and Duntley, 2006; Buss and Shackleford, 1997; Carter Wood, 2007).

As part of the effort to understand WRH, I argue an understanding of reactions and responses to hostility is needed. The following chapters explore this.

Chapter 11 Stress and emotion

Introduction

The proposed hostility chain indicates a stress reaction (experienced as FFF) and emotion is linked to hostility; customers' hostility is displayed following a stressor (not necessarily connected to the service incident) eliciting this reaction and their hostility becomes the stressor eliciting staff's stress and emotion reactions. (As previously noted, emotion, stress and hostility are linked because they are all stirred in the brain's limbic system, previously called the 'emotional brain'.)

In this chapter I summarily overview stress and emotion. Limited space disallows an exhaustive or particularly detailed review of each. However, my main objectives are to show the connections between hostility and stress and emotion, give an overview of core concepts associated with each and present the argument each is biopsychosocial, and thus research from different disciplines offers insight into them.

Stress

Stress[28] has received significant attention in organizational research and wider research. It concerns numerous parties - those who experience it and those who have obligations to those individuals, e.g. organizations legally obligated to design and maintain systems of work which safeguard staff's welfare and health. Whether organizations have fully engaged with stress remains moot, though (inter)national agencies such as HSE and ILO urge for such engagement and offer attendant resources. It would appear that failing to address stress adds to challenges organizations face because stress and associated issues (e.g. physical illness, psychological alienation) has negative impact on workers and thus, by extension, on the employing organization.

[28] Technically the term for stress is 'strain' but I use stress because of its common usage.

Defining stress

Defining stress is challenging; it is elusive, ostensive, but subject to changing approaches and discourse (Jackson, 2013).

Stress is the experience of being subject to a stressor. In this thesis, stress refers to a reaction to a stressor (a stimulus), and is a feeling or experience which may or may not be enacted, e.g. presented or displayed in behaviour (response). For Wheaton (1996: 32) a stressor comprises -

> "conditions of threat, demands, or structural constraints that by the very fact of their occurrence or existence, call into question the operating integrity of the organism."

Stress is the experience when a stressor puts an organism under pressure regarding its capacity to function.

Stress is positive and negative

It should be noted that, like emotional labour (see chapter 13) or hostility (see chapter 10), stress is not negative *per se*. Negative stress - *dis*tress - occurs when an organism is under intolerable pressure. However, the negative effect of stressors may remain invisible. Paradoxically, the stress reaction itself - apparently evolved to protect the organism - can inflict harm on it. But as the Yerkes-Dodson theory suggests, stress can be positive in encouraging an organism to meet challenge. This concept strongly relates to arousal and performance. The Yerkes-Dodson theory (cited in Grossman, 2004) contends some arousal (created by the stressor) - eustress - enables optimal performance. Importantly, this is subject to individual and situational variations, and perhaps varies over time in the same person. Under-arousal equals boredom; over-arousal equals tension. A balance between arousal level, challenge and resources available to meet demands results in better performance. The 'inverted U' hypothesis broadly contends the same (Kottler and Chen, 2011). Task difficulty is relevant in this, as are conditions for task-fulfilment; too hard a task in too short a time, or with low autonomy, may elevate negative arousal and hamper completion, and hard tasks may require lower arousal. Grossman (2004) notes collapse

rather than gradual erosion of skills can occur after an individual's tolerance level is reached. Stress elevates physiological (and psychological) arousal, useful provided it remains within personal thresholds (see Grossman (2004) regarding facing an aggressor) but stress-based over-arousal suggests ability to successfully complete tasks will be hampered to the point of collapse. (I later argue that service interactions with hostile customers is an example of this, and can lead to damage sustained by workers and, associatively, the employer.) Stress can benefit or hamper individuals, based on level of stress as influenced by situational, contextual and personal factors.

The biopsychosocial approach

In this thesis, stress is viewed as an evolved biopsychosocial phenomenon - a reaction occurring to promote survival which mobilizes "cognitive, metabolic, immunologic and behavioural adaptations" (Miller, Chen and Zhou, 2007). Sapolsky (1998), in a broadly biopsychosocial way, notes stress has social and psychological effects (see also Christopher, 2004). Overlap exists between the biological, psychological and social streams of research, e.g. biopsychological perspectives (e.g. Baade *et al*., 1978; Lovallo, 1997; Taylor *et al*., 2000) and psychosocial approaches (e.g. Kaplan, 1996). This suggests a shift to the biopsychosocial perspectives is reasonable and builds on extant inter-discipliniarity.

For instance, Burke (1996: 153) notes that "physiological consequences" can result from "social-psychological stressors". The stressor may be social in origin, e.g. a person behaving aggressively in a social interaction but have psychological and physiological effect on its target. The outcomes will include FFF activation, action tendencies (fight, flight, freeze), and potential excess of (unused) chemicals released in FFF damaging the body, as for a physical stressor.

Stress thus seems part of a process involving social factors (e.g. cultural influences apropos understanding and discourse) and the realm in which stressors can appear (e.g. another person's behaviour acting as stressor) and psychological factors (e.g. cognition); it is a (behavioural) response, though it has been seen in mechanistic stimulus-response terms (i.e. as a physical reaction). Because the stressor and the reaction and/or response it provokes are part of a wider context including impacts beyond the organism itself, it is an

issue relating to environment; stressors emerge from somewhere and function in that environment. Moreover, both are (partly) defined socially, which may affect how they are perceived, responded to and expressed.

Biological, psychological and social perspectives

Cox's (1978) taxonomy (cited by Gross, 1992) outlines three broad approaches to stress; engineering and physiological theories (the biological approach) and transactional approach (psychological theories). I add social theories (which Cox overlooks) – a more recent stream of thinking. All have relevance as facets of the biopsychosocial perspective.

The social approach places stress in a context of discourse and posits that definitions in use will influence perception which will in turn influence practice. Stress becomes perceptual and processual, and influenced by power, etc. and is thus subject to change. Newton (1995: 11) states a dominant discourse reflects "a pervasive ideology" which may gloss "over the inequalities of power reflected in existing social structures" (*ibid*.) because of its partisan slant. This reveals the limitations of a purely social (or psychological) perspective and account, e.g. the super-organicist mentality with its evident discomfort with or disregard of biological matters.

But stress can be social in another sense; for Kaplan (1996: 54) "the origins of stressors [are] in social location[s]". Stressors can exist in a social setting (e.g. a hostile customer's behaviour) and the circumstances leading to or influencing specific stressors' appearances can be heavily influenced by social factors (e.g. service credo; see service work chapter).

The transactional or psychological approach foregrounds the organism-environment interaction and considers the person as active and agential whose capacity to cope with the stressor is based on perceptions to respond (i.e. cope). All note stressors can damage organisms. The latter imply organisms' self-interests aim to reduce distress but that some stress (eustress) is positive in encouraging goal-resolution. Threats (dangers, stressors) can be psychological, e.g. a co-present aggressor able to physically cause physical harm may injure the psychological or 'phenomenological self' (Beaumeister and Boden, 1998; Hobföll,

1989; Semmer *et al*., 2007) through verbal abuse and threats (as BCS research shows; see also Gilligan, 2001).

Some theories propose individuals cognitively appraise capacity to meet challenge (i.e. a stressor), e.g. Lazarus's homeostatic model (Rice, 1999). Perceived lack of capacity to respond to the stressor results in (dis)stress; perception of capacity to meet the stressor's demands does not. Lazarus and Folkman (1987) propose a two-level appraisal process occurs at such times. The first appraises danger; the second decides what action is required and is informed by mental schema. But psychological activity may not be entirely rational; cognitive processes may be influenced by other factors. As previously noted, Zajonc (1984) states sensory information is routed to the cortex (conscious 'higher' level processing) and the LS (where it arrives faster and stimulates FFF). Rapid and potent LS reaction does not preclude cortical involvement but cognition may not be a central function. Lazarus and Folkman's model includes coping assessed on both cognitive and emotional levels so some non-cognitive or sub-conscious processing seems to occur in the limbic system's (threat) appraisal and decision-making (see Evans (2008) re: Dual Process models). Psychological approaches thus begin to span between domains, e.g. DeLongis, Follkman and Lazarus (1982) state social and psychological issues like available support and self-esteem factor into stress-response assessments.

The engineering and physiological (biological) approach identifies external stressors but views organisms as passive and acted on by them. This represents a mechanistic or hydraulic approach. However, one benefit they have is acknowledging stress is experienced corporeally following altered arousal levels. Biological approaches identify a stressor elicits an immediate and potent chemical release (Mazur *et al*., 2000; Miller *et al*., 2007; Siegel, 2005) coordinated by the LS. When a threat, e.g. a challenge or stressor (see later notes) presents itself, sensory data routed to LS prompts fast, automatic reaction because it is involved in identifying/responding to danger (e.g. threat). This motivates the individual to fight, flight or freeze (Grossman, 2004; Hobföll, 1989, citing Cannon, 1924, 1932; Selye, 1978; Wilson, 2000;) in "emergencies or what you think are emergencies" (Sapolsky, 1998: 22) and is seen as the core stress reaction activated irrespective of whether the stressor is physical, psychological or social. Anticipating a stressor also elicits this reaction (Wilson,

2000). FFF is an unpleasant experience for many subjects (Lovallo, 1997). Some of its effects (Davies *et al*., 2001; Mackenna and Callandar, 1997; Thibodieau and Patton, 2002; Toates, 1995) may be visible to witnesses in behaviour or signs (of somatic arousal) unintentionally projected in non-verbal communication, e.g. limb tremors, associated with emotional state (e.g. fear), but much is internal, corporeal and personal to the individual experiencing it.

FFF directly relates to the organism's ability to respond to the stressor and its experience of stress. van Goozen (2005) notes key issues in threat reaction are whether the situation's outcome matters to the organism (incidents may be life-or-death incidents and therefore matter significantly) and if the organism perceives resources are available (e.g. others' support, its own capacity to address the stressor). Reaction to perceived threat promotes a profound physiological change prompting behavioural inclinations (action tendencies) which may take various forms (e.g. escaping the threat, fighting it to remove or control it). Hostility is directly linked to the automatic survival reaction to danger, and is thus fuelled in part by potent chemical release enabling self-assertive behaviours, e.g. self-protection. Note, as detailed elsewhere, FFF is not under conscious control, though training may help people manage or successfully use it (Grossman, 2004). Hostility may occur in the form of a fight response (as a form of instrumental aggression) intended to control, injure or destroy the threat. This is one available option. Its corollary, flight, is another. (Versions of fight and flight are also available in ritualized behaviours, as explored in Chapter 18.)

The diagram below represents its trajectory re: physiological arousal (used in later chapters regarding arousal in dramatic, theatrical service interactions) –

Figure 11.1 - FFF and emotion trajectory[29]



If hostility is the stimulus, LS will identify threat and FFF will activate. Emotion (anger, fear) precedes or follows this. Behaviour (fight (counter-aggression), flight (escape/avoidance)) or freeze (data gathering preceding action)) then occurs. LS, R-complex and possibly the cortex all seem involved in behaviours/experiences identified in the hostility chain.

FFF action tendencies or behavioural inclinations have been linked to emotion (Berkowitz, 1993); fight inclination with rudimentary anger, flight inclination with rudimentary fear. Fight, flight or freeze are not the only behaviours possible, however; males and females allegedly use the FFF reaction differently. Women's 'tend and befriend' behaviour (Taylor *et al*., 2000) steers aggressors from further hostility, a concept supported by ethological studies on male and female chimpanzee peacekeeping and conflict management (de Waal, 2005), and indicating females do not engage in displays or acts of aggression as readily as males.

Though FFF serves to protect the individual for short-term emergencies, it can have negative effects. FFF-based somatic arousal dissipates slower than it releases (Zillman, 1971). Continued arousal beyond a certain point severely impairs performance. Grossman

[29] Homeostasis is the organism's balanced physiological normal (optimal) arousal state. Allostasis is a stable state that is not a single optimal arousal level but which can change according to conditions, circumstance, habituation, etc. Allostatic load is the damage sustained by an organism accommodating higher stress levels (Berg and Klarlund Pedersen, 2010; Sapolsky, 2007).

(2004) shows a relation between stress-based heart-rate, mental processing and motor skills exists. This partly relates to the notion of corporeal disappearance (outlined in chapter 15); FFF dominates the mind and body of the individual, and has powerful effect on behaviour because of the potent chemicals released in it. Impaired performance partly occurs because the body becomes exhausted if the stressor continues its effect and chemicals released in FFF damage the individual. Cortisol, one of these, can damage its own release system (McEwen, 2007). Linked to many functions, e.g. emotion, memory (Workman and Reader, 2008), learning, and the immune system's operation (Davies *et al*., 2001), an impaired cortisol system is pathogenic (Fuchs and Flűgge, 2003; Shirom *et al*., 2009) to the point of negatively effecting mental ill-health (Benson *et al*., 2010; Burke *et al*., 2005) and physical disease (Cohen *et al*., 2007). Elias (2005) notes repeat FFF arousal denied motor action becomes a chronic problem that can result in psycho-somatic illness.

Other research cited acknowledges the role of the psyche and social forces in stress (see Sapolsky, 1998), something biological approaches initially did not. Viewing humans as passive, stimulus-response organisms acted on by external forces and reacting without thought is questionable. Removing all mentation from the process, or social factors influencing behaviour, seems naïve. But the biological approach is relevant in identifying physiological facets of stress triggered by an external stressor that have potent, even damaging, internal effect. It identifies the corporeal facet of stress which operates beneath conscious awareness. This is highly relevant for our understanding of stress (and the contexts in which it occurs in work environments) because of the embodied, enacted aspects of human life and performative service work. The demands of such work can lead to potent stress-based experiences affecting workers' behaviour, bodies and minds, as research shows. It also frames stress in terms of the inclination to launch active behavioural countermeasures to cope - fight or flight.

Interim summary - stress

Locating stress in a single domain or approach seems naïve. A more comprehensive and integrative approach which takes into account manifold facets of stress seems preferable. This is evident in contemporary theorists like Sapolsky (1998) acknowledging

psychological and social factors are involved in stress, e.g. he notes socio-economic poverty and associated issues relate to ill-health and stress (as Engel believed).

The biological, psychological and social may be different facets of stress, and there is no reason to limit analysis of stress to one single model or approach. One way to locate stress is to consider it as part of a sequence of events and contributory factors, e.g. between an individual and its environment. The individual is subject to ideas about what constitutes stress and perception about its capacity to cope with the challenge presented. It also experiences elevated arousal following a stressor's effect. Stress is thus multi-faceted - biopsychosocial. This approach enables relevant findings from a range of studies and disciplines to be accommodated, and thus the multi-faceted nature or character of stress to be perceived.

It would seem that for a stress reaction to occur, a stressor (something that introduces or induces stress) is required. After this, a reaction automatically follows. Behaviour is the response. It seems reasonable therefore to view stress as comprising a force (a stressor) affecting a subject (here, a worker) which triggers rapid, automatic, internal physiological changes and (sub-)conscious psychological activity (e.g. perception, assessment, decision-making) in that subject experienced as stress as he or she tries to cope with it. (One should note a subject might create a stressor, e.g. by thinking about fears.) This introduces the notion that stress is a process (Pearlin *et al*., 1981), something my hostility chain model inherently implies. Such a view conceives of multiple components which "can be arrayed in a sequence of interdependence" (Kaplan, 1996: 53). For decades it was assumed and accepted a stressor signalled the beginning of stress; only relatively recently did the shift to studying contexts in which stressors exist happen (Kaplan (1996). This framework acknowledges stress does not start with the stressor but the factors contributing to the stressor's occurrence. Here, that would include the work context, interacting parties, etc. In the same way, stress does not finish with a reaction but the outcomes of responses driven partly by (internal, autonomous, biological) reaction, psychological factors and social influences. These outcomes may be biological, psychological and/or social.

Wheaton's definition of stress (1996) despite its questionable dismissal of biological facets is valuable. Firstly, it implies a range of stressors can elicit stress reactions (stressors

and stress may be contingent on circumstances, conditions, and individual differences). Secondly, it notes challenge to function (what Wheaton calls operating integrity) call into question the organism's capacity to operate. The organism is under threat of harm seemingly effecting its priorities and hence behaviour. The reference to integrity, which Wheaton uses apropos an organism's pressure tolerance, is serendipitous for this thesis because it can be used in a psychological, social and behavioural sense, e.g. maintaining personal or professional standards. In the service work chapter, I cite Hochschild's research showing individuals may be conflicted regarding what action to take when under stress and conflicting demands (this is further explored in analysis chapters). The sense of self, e.g. self-respect or dignity, is involved. Closely allied to this is the notion social structures (e.g. organizational standards, culture and practices which operate to guide staff's behaviour) may exert restriction on staff's behaviour (see above comments on Elias and Schinkel regarding the civilizing process). Parties' power differentials, available resources, status, etc. all limit behaviour and potentially add to inherent challenge, uncertainty and conflict. I suggest this will exacerbate stress.

One useful finding of the physiological model is that all manner of stressors – physical, psychological and social in kind can elicit the same immediate, potent, biopsychological reaction which inclines people towards action. One can reasonably posit stress is always partially physical (e.g. biological, chemical, physiological) but that psychological factors and social context are important, too.

Emotion

As previously indicated in the hostility chain model, it seems reasonable to claim that emotion (e.g. fear, anger) will occur in normally-functioning humans when facing hostility. Stress may precede (indeed 'cause') or follow emotion - it is irrelevant for this thesis which - and both seemingly impact behaviour.

The centrality of emotions in and for human life is evident in their fostering life (Gross and Thompson, 2007). Izard (1989), cited by Sternberg (1995), regards emotions function to enable communication, influence others' responses to us, and facilitate social interaction. As previously noted, emotions have survival benefit (Damasio, 1999; Plutchik,

1980), being closely-related to the capacity to adapt to important life challenges and events, possibly evolving "to help us deal swiftly with these universal situations" (Fox, 2008: 117). Emotion informs an organism of its state. Emotion, e.g. fear, anger, attends FFF and helps drive fight, flight or symbolic manifestations of same; emotion inclines the individual to action (Gross and Thompson, 2007). That action can project emotion, which others can interpret (Darwin thought animals' behaviour displays emotion (Keltner and Ekman, 2000)).

Emotions are specifically involved in service work; it comprises emotional labour (EL) - the use of workers' emotions in order to influence customers' emotions - which requires emotion regulation (ER), irrespective of whether emotion is faked or genuine. (ER and EL are later shown to sometimes result in workers' negative emotional experience.) Thus emotion is a result of facing a hostile customer and, in specific forms, what workers are expected to present for such customers' benefit.

Despite reference to emotion in organizational literature, emotion (like hostility, or stress) remains teasingly enigmatic and polysemic. I thus explore emotion drawing from biological, psychological and social approaches in order to deepen understanding of what, like hostility and stress, is presented here as a biopsychosocial issue.

Defining emotion

Because emotion is ostensive, it (like hostility) eludes attempts to define or comprehend it. Panskepp (2000: 137) notes about emotions

> "We will have to tolerate and respect many vague and successive approximations if we are ever to achieve a satisfactory level of understanding..."

Fox (2008) claims emotion is a state of short duration referring to (displays of) mood/feeling, and thus can be distinguished from temperament (a personal characteristic associated with attitude and behaviour), mood (a mental state lasting hours or longer) and feeling (internal, shorter-duration personal experience). Carlson and Hatfield (1992) define emotion as being a response tendency to specific internal or external factors operating in

physiological, experiential and behavioural spheres. Similarly, Gross (1993) claims that emotion comprises -

1. Physiological changes (uncontrollable and unconscious, e.g. nervous system and endocrine activity)
2. Subjective experience (what Fox (2008) refers to as feeling, mood, emotion)
3. Behaviour – displayed action, e.g. smiling, crying (which can be associated with a display of mood, emotion and temperament)

Similar models are cited in Fox (2008). Emotion can be considered as comprising biological, psychological and social facets, and emotion, like hostility and stress, has been studied from biological, psychological and social perspectives (see below), with numerous disciplines using different methods, and having beliefs, assumptions and foci (Cornelius, 1996; Fox, 2008). All offer relevant insights. However, Plutchik (1994) notes that classifying emotion theories is hard, and that many theories cross categories, citing as an example Lazarus' apparent 'cognitive' approach as actually being cognitive-motivational-relational.

The biopsychosocial approach

One can see overlap between biological, psychological and psychological and social streams of research, e.g. Fox (2008) and Schweder and Haidt (2000) respectively. Cacioppo *et al*., (2000: 173) note "there is little doubt that emotions are both biologically and culturally molded" (to which one might add 'psychologically-shaped'). Izard (1991) indicates the complexity of emotions in noting they have a neural basis; are expressed physically in behaviour, somatic and psychological feeling/experience; and have an evolutionary foundation and adaptive function. This thesis concurs with Gross and Thompson's (2007: 4) belief emotions are a

> "multi-faceted, whole-body phenomena that involve loosely-coupled changes in the domains of subjective experience, behaviour, and central and peripheral physiology"

which often inclines us to action (movement, activity, behaviour).

The biopsychosocial perspective which links such facets can be seen in. e.g. Averill and More (2000), Barr-Zisowitz (2000) and Schweder and Haidt (2000), and in evolutionary approaches, e.g. Keltner *et al*. (2006) and Plutchik (1980). Cacioppo *et al*. (2000: 173) note "[our] affect system [has been] sculpted over millennia by evolutionary forces."

Biological, psychological and social perspectives

Like stress and corporeality, emotion has (re)entered social science study (Lupton, 1998; Williams and Bendelow, 1998) and though I consider emotion cannot be explained by social approaches alone, it is invidious to deny the influence of social factors on emotion. For instance, emotion as displays of feeling is evident in social behaviour (Gross, 1993) and is understood in social interactions. They are an important part of social life, experience and discourse through which individuals and society connect (Lupton, 1998, citing Lyon and Barbalet, 1994) or intersect (Denzin, 1984); Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) view emotion as the 'missing link' between individuals and society. A weak social constructionism might hold that social factors, e.g. institutions, social systems and relationships between same and individuals, shape emotions (e.g. define norms about emotional expression), which seems entirely reasonable. Shame and guilt are emotions posited to have emerged and operate through social norms and behaviours defined 'acceptable', which individuals measure their behaviour against (Kemper, 1987). One can acknowledge social order is maintained through social institutions (Scheff, 1990) which have powerful influence on corporeal existence including emotion. What we come to understand (and accept) as emotions is linguistically-influenced; language is one medium through which our knowledge of emotion(s) is transmitted and shared. For Meštrović (1997), however, our society is post-emotional, with manufactured and manipulated emotions devaluing and replacing real emotions. EL is an example of this.

Cognitive (psychological) approaches locate emotion more as part of mental assessment of a situation, state or stimuli, i.e. the organism is actively involved in the formation of emotion even if it is still largely subconscious. James-Lange theory holds emotion follows body (re)action, which seems counter-intuitive but makes sense regarding labelling sensation following mental reflection on physiological arousal (Prinz, 2004;

Schachter and Singer, 1962). The Cannon-Bard theory holds the opposite is true; we label emotion mentally and then feel it.

The 'higher' human brain - the cortex - seems involved in emotion. Bi-directional pathways operate between LS and the (neo)cortex (Le Doux, 1996). It is posited that encephalization may have influenced emotional processing through cognitive development as proto- or early-mankind's anatomical features changed (Fox, 2008). Lupton (1998) notes Damasio's (1999) 'secondary' and/or 'social' emotions may rely on thought or a thought/feeling combination (Prinz, 2004). Conversely, older, 'primary' or 'basic' emotions (anger, fear - see Plutchik, 1980) may not require cognitive input but operate sub-consciously and sub-cognitively in evolutionarily-older brain systems (i.e. LS or R-complex) operating instinctually and motivating 'action readiness' (Frijda, 1988). The two-stage cognitive appraisal to threat presented by Lazarus and Folkman (1987) notes emotion is integral to assessment apropos whether the outcome is of personal importance (see also Lazarus (1993) regarding emotion in stress reactions).

Biological approaches to emotion note brain activity implies chemical reactions occur which effect physiological arousal (sensation) and behaviour (display). Plutchik (1996) believes emotion corresponds to differing Automatic Nervous System (ANS) arousal. The brain has no emotion 'centre' but certain (clusters of) mechanisms seem deeply-involved in emotion. Damasio (1999; 51) claims "devices which produce emotion occupy a fairly restricted ensemble of sub-cortical regions" up to the 'higher' brain (cortex). LS's amygdala and hypothalamus are linked to fear and rage respectively (Fox, 2008). LS triggers biochemical release (Damasio, 1999) involved in all emotions "in non-specific ways" (Fox, 2008: 99). (LS-induced physiological activity in FFF, emotion and hostility appears closely-related.) This elevates arousal dramatically and is felt in changes to physiological arousal, but occurs sub-consciously. The locus for affect seems to be corporeal sensation which supports the idea feeling is important (perhaps foundational) in emotional experience. The few brain mechanisms/systems/complexes involved implies different emotions do not have their own specific mechanisms/systems and neural structures, as contended in the 'category' perspective on emotion). The 'dimension' view maintains emotions vary according to axes they function along, e.g. valence, positive or negative affect, which leads to our recognizing

and classifying different emotions. Common biological systems operating in emotion supports this idea, e.g. amygdala and hypothalamus seem involved in different emotions. Thus, physiological state generated by a few brain features/functions may be a 'core affect' (Fox, 2008) associated with experiencing emotion.

Interim summary - emotion

Like hostility and stress, emotion is an ostensive issue – known when experienced but hard to define. Emotion is seemingly important, even central, for human life and experience.

Emotion has been defined variously and a limited definition may be unhelpful. Emotion possesses numerous facets - it is physical (i.e. related to arousal, nervous system activity), is experiential (related to feeling and subconscious inner experience) and is behavioural (related to public display). Specific disciplines focus on one (typically) or few facets in analysis.

Biological approaches view emotion as innate, reactive and subconscious. Some emotions are seen as being basic or 'primary', e.g.; fear, anger (Plutchik, 1980), and link to automatic, hard-wired systems. This outlook has identified hormonal activity as seemingly key and the limbic system as profoundly involved in emotion (as it is in hostility and stress). (Cortical activity also occurs, but slower.)

Cognitive (psychological) approaches locate emotion more as part of mental assessment of a situation, state or stimuli; that is, the organism is actively involved in the formation of emotion, even if it is still largely subconscious. Some approaches span physiological and psychological domains in noting cognitive reflection on state constitutes emotion.

Social approaches consider social forces, norms, institutions, etc. shape our understanding of emotion - so-called 'social' emotions, e.g. guilt or shame. We measure intentions or actions against these norms and control behaviour out of fear of social censure. Action and emotion is socially-embedded and as such, emotion helps sustains social order and structure institutions. For some, emotion has been simulated to the point fake emotions now dominate social life, making our interactions post-emotional.

Emotions have also been analysed according to categories and dimensions. Categories refer to distinct neural structures for each emotion but that relatively few neural systems seem involved in emotion tends to undermine this notion. Dimensions relate emotion to valence, etc. This perspective believes each emotion does not possesses a specific system but is classified by its strength (e.g. pleasurableness, painfulness).

Summary

Stress and emotion have been studied from biological, psychological and social perspectives, all of which offer potential insights into these behaviours and experiences. I suggest that being partial they do not offer a complete explanation. Bio-psychological and psycho-social approaches indicate overlap exists between domains, and this can be extended by taking the biopsychosocial approach. This accommodates multiple readings of stress and emotion by locating emotion as complex behaviour. Analysis chapters explore the biopsychosocial effects of enacting and experiencing such behaviours.

The biological facet of stress and emotion may seem emphasized in this chapter. However, because biological factors have not been extensively incorporated into OB/OMS, such an emphasis serves to redress an imbalance and offers a transition into the biopsychosocial approach which fosters a more comprehensive, pluralistic mentality.

PART 3 summary

These chapters have sought to show how hostility, stress and emotion are linked. I presented the hostility chain as a way to see how they connect in the customer-worker dyad (interaction). I also indicated how shared mechanisms/systems/complexes operate for them; the brain's limbic system, which is itself connected to 'fight, flight or freeze' (FFF) as the common stress reaction. In this, I aim to have shown that to understand WRH we need to understand hostility. This includes guarding against separating it from other forms of hostility, acknowledging it is connected to other behaviours and experiences (e.g. stress, emotion) and appears in social settings. This latter issue refers to the work-related facet of WRH. (The next section introduces and explores this in greater detail.) This section has also argued hostility, stress and emotion are biopsychosocial. I offered a summary overview of some of the findings about each from biological, psychological and social perspectives to support the notion that though they can be viewed from a single discipline, they are better viewed as comprising all these facets. Boundaries between domains are spanned in research, e.g. biopsychological and psycho-social perspectives, and expressly biopsychosocial approaches exist, too (the evolutionary approach constitutes this perspective, for instance).

PART 4

Behaviour occurs in a social context. Context is important because it influences the status, relationships, available resources and opportunities, etc. of those involved, and thus influences what behaviour is displayed. Previous WRH studies have tended to decontextualize behaviour by studying it in an abstract way. I suggest this over-simplifies matters and undermines understanding.

The specific social context considered here is service work in which Type 2 (customer-to-worker) aggression appears. (As noted, other contexts equally worthy of attention exist regarding WRH, e.g. collegial or Type 3 aggression.) This section explores this context and relationships between parties (staff, customers, the organization) to help explain the appearance of WRH, stress, emotion, action tendencies (propelled by FFF), and what factors restrain such behavioural inclinations' expression. As noted previously, context is partly the social setting (here service work, which sits in organization culture, which itself sits in wider social norms and the historical socialization process). It is also supported by parties' interactions and behaviours, which themselves are influenced by roles supplied or inferred from context, accepted and adopted, and enacted.

Chapter 12 introduces the extent, characteristics and typical features of service work. The status of parties involved in service interactions are outlined, the 'service triangle' is introduced as the location in which staff function relative to customers and the organization, and 'customer sovereignty' explicated as an important factor influencing staff's behaviour.

Chapter 13 explicates emotional labour as a key feature of service work, and introduces emotion regulation as the way it is achieved. The demands and negatives of both are explored, though positives associated with service work are also outlined. This chapter also introduces the notion the body is fundamentally involved in and can be negatively affected by service interactions.

I introduce the notion of performance in Chapter 14. I see this as a key factor for enabling successful production of (service) work roles through embodied professional

interpersonal interaction. Dramaturgical approaches in social science are outlined, definitions of drama, theatre, performativity and theatricality given and applied, and demands of roles are introduced to illustrate service work's performative and presentational character. An analysis of service work's theatricality follows this in which I specifically refer to deeply-connected behavioural issues at the heart of theatre/theatricality and performance/performativity. (Deep links between theatre, ritual and ritualized (animal) behaviours, all of which are also connected with conflict, is mentioned but explored more fully in a later analysis chapter.)

I expand on corporeality in Chapter 15. The body is presented as the vehicle for service working, the site at which emotion and stress is felt and the target for WRH. The embodied nature of service work is explored, notably the necessity of staff's obedient bodies adhering to role requirements in performance. Hexis as a process of locating bodies in a network of power and status through bodily training is cited as a way this occurs. Concepts such as 'corporeal dys-appearance' are used to illustrate bodies cannot however be fully suppressed; effects of feeling, arousal, etc. endure in workers' bodies and may be a source of tension, conflict and negative experience.

Chapter 12 Service work

Introduction

This chapter introduces core topics associated with service work which is one context in which WRH occurs. (Others worthy of study exist, e.g. collegial WRH.) However, understanding context may help identify how, when and why WRH occurs, what forms it takes and why, as well as elucidate its effects.

I consider the extent of service work and introduce its common features before exploring more fully service delivery demands on and impacts for staff. I introduce the concept of the service triangle in which customers' apparent sovereignty can be exercised. Both help identify how staff is located relative to others. I also indicate something of the paradox of service work and the added demands hostility brings for already challenged service workers.

I claim that context will influence staff's and customers' behaviours through by the organizations' service credo and by more general social influence. I also argue that staff's and customers' behaviours will also influence each other.

Service work

I consider any workers routinely facing customers are service workers. My focus is restricted to commercial and public service roles in UK work sectors, e.g. point-of-sale retail workers, receptionists, catering workers, staff manning facilities and workers coordinating customer service activity. All may face hostile customers but they are not specialists in dealing with aggression as security and law enforcement are. However, though their jobs do not centre on managing hostility, in practice such work requires it.

The UK economy has become increasingly service-based; c.75% of UK workers are employed in service sectors (McDowell, 2009). Service-related behaviours are prevalent and central to workers' duties (Morris and Feldman, 1996), including for workers not called (or perceiving themselves as) service workers. Many employ emotion work (EW) skills (McDowell, 2009; Wharton, 1999) to customers or intra-organizationally (Mann, 2010;

Steinberg and Figart, 1999). Emotional labour (EL) is "found across the occupational spectrum" (Wharton, 1999: 160), and it "implicate[s] staff more directly than other types of work" (*ibid*.: 159), making it a well-established feature of contemporary work.

Service work focuses on prioritizing customers' needs and generating positive customer experience. Emotion is central to this because through positive emotional experience, customers will (supposedly) be satisfied and continue patronizing the organization. However, it is moot whether organizations have fully considered impacts of service work on staff (see below). It is also unclear whether employers have assessed if service standards, expectations of staff's behaviour, etc. are reasonable and attainable when designing service jobs and the credo workers are expected to operate in and manifest.

Service work requires commitment to organizational 'cause', investment of energy, and adherence to conduct codes previously associated with professions (Leidner, 1999). A prominent demand on service workers is "establishment of social relationships, albeit typically transitory, with customers" (McDowell, 2009: 8). These require "embodied interactions… in everyday exchanges" (*ibid*.: 1). Moreover, the way service is delivered is as important as what is delivered; the "service encounter frequently *is* the service from the customer's point of view" (Bitner *et al*., 1990; 71: emphasis in original). The 'affect society' we live in (Greco and Stenner, 2008) may have influenced increasingly emotionally-oriented work. However, this might have de-valued genuine emotion (Meštrović, 1997) by valorizing inauthentic emotions that can be produced on demand for commercial gain, as in EL. (The following chapter explores this more fully.) Bodies, as vehicles for staff's service performance and interactive working, and the emotions which staff mines for use in interactions (emotions are embodied and manipulated in production), are central commodities used for commercial gain.

Routine service delivery necessitates workers' EW and emotion regulation (ER) in responding to others' emotional behaviours. Yet some situations service workers face (e.g. WRH) are not routine or easily-anticipated but uncertain, dynamic and potentially harmful. As such, they are not easily or fully manageable through routine procedures, despite expectation staff do so (Styrhe *et al*., 2002). Service work does not only comprise service delivery; if the customer is hostile, it also includes conflict management and service recovery

(wining back the customer) (Bell and Luddington, 2006). Working procedurally (e.g. reporting complaints through official channels, upholding official standards) and/or in a responsive, agile way to solve problems and mobilise resources in *ad hoc* fashion (i.e. work creatively in changing conditions) may be required. (Grandey and Diamond (2010) note routinization is a feature of service credo manifesting itself in behaviours expected of workers). This is a demanding cluster of tasks conforming to Campbell's (1988) definition of task complexity; it forms a potentially lengthy, involved process requiring staff's alert, cautious, (self)controlled effort to contain emotional expression whilst mining and projecting personal emotion and creatively responding to customers under limited resources of time, training, support and in adherence to (tacit) organizational (behavioural) standards. Demands on service workers are high; subtle skills are required of them despite their low status.

If EL is demanding and requires skill (Bolton and Boyd, 2003), WRH will likely increase demands on staff and EL (Boyd, 2002; Steinberg and Figart, 1999) because emotion, stress and danger increase. Staff thus operates in dynamic, emotionally-charged situations yet is typically of low status and power, has limited resources available and may not be empowered to achieve expected objectives (e.g. staff may have little authority or influence over customers but be expected to manage their behaviour). The organization's credo may tacitly dictate staff's role (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995) yet the employer may not actually train staff in service delivery skills (Bitner *et al*., 1990). Moreover, staff may not have enough work autonomy (Grandey and Diamond, 2010) or latitude (Goldberg and Grandey, 2007), which appears to reduce worker motivation (Howard and Cordes, 2010) and increases stress (Hall *et al*., 2006). (Increased autonomy increases staff's satisfaction (Boxall and Macky, 2014).)

Yet staff operates at the intersection between customers and the organization (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1995; Grandey and Diamond, 2010), representing the latter to the former (Solomon *et al*., 1985). Staff thus undertakes an important (boundary-spanning) role. That service workers do not enjoy high status, cannot operate as flexibly as they might like to (because their role is heavily-influenced by the organization; see above) or have had input into organizational policy and procedures they work to fulfil, may pressure their interactions with customers. (Boxall and Macky (2014) note staff participation in decision-making benefits

them.) Staff needs to manage its own and customers' emotions and behaviours under increasing stress which encourages the individual back to more 'primal' survival-oriented behaviours (explored in more detail later). Moreover, interactions are ones in which the customer is (physically) co-present with staff; the source of stress and hostility is proximate.

Service interactions

Interactions are important in service work because service workers' embody and represent the organization through service. However, Grandey and Diamond (2010) claim organizations have paid scant attention to service work interactions. Some research has focused on call-centre (voice-to-voice) studies, though some face-to-face interactions have been studied, e.g. Rafaeli (1989). This supports Solomon *et al*.'s (1985) criticism research has a naïve view of the complexity of interactions. Interactions are dyadic (the customer participates; see Bitner, *et al*.,1990) and dynamic (Ashforth and Humphrey 1995) with a feedback loop of mutual influence operating between interactants (Coté, 2005).

In face-to-face interactions the aggressor is co-present with staff; parties interact in the same physical and temporal space. In such encounters I suggest workers are more 'at risk' from aggressors than voice-to-voice service workers. Co-present hostile customers represent a physically proximate threat (hazard); hostility could change from e.g. verbal aggression to attack rapidly. A tit-for-tat exchange of intensifying behaviours (and emotions) could result in interactions (e.g. verbal aggression; see Andersson and Pearson, 1999). So too could physical aggression (violence) if one party loses self-control because there is less 'buffering' (e.g. time, distance, physical or psychological barriers) to insulate workers or impede aggressors. Knights and McCabe (1998) show call centre service workers experience stress and emotional upset. Verbal abuse, shouting, etc. may be offensive and may cause psychological damage to its target (see WRH chapter) who may experience considerable physical harm because of elevated stress and associated problems. However, no assault and associated injury can occur, which thus limits physical hazard. If the aggressor moves to get close to the worker the latter's sense of personal space may be

pressured. Even if physical contact is not made, movement through public and social proxemics zones (Hall, 1966) into personal space might elevate stress and emotion[30].

However, even if the aggressor is at long range or behind a barrier and incapable of making physical contact with the worker, the aggressor may still exert potent negative effect on staff. Indeed, negative psychological and physical effects may be triggered by an aggressor not actually co-present; physically absent threats can exact many of and perhaps all the same bio-psychological effects as physically-present ones. Anticipating an aggressor's appearance can elicit FFF, and thus a possible future threat not actually present or extant can release stress chemicals and attendant emotions in workers (Wilson, 2000: see also BCS findings regarding threat causing as much upset as assault).

This all contributes to workers' vulnerability to proximate hazard's effects. Interactive service workers occupy 'contact' roles because they interact with customers, clients, patients, etc. However, contact could become literal in co-present hostile situations. But threat (or perception of it) can exert its negative influence whether it is physically present or not (e.g. if anticipated by the worker or issued verbally or at a previous time), becomes physical aggression or remains as threat. That influence is felt somatically (e.g. in stress) and in emotion (e.g. fear).

Status relations

The relative status of parties in the service relationship is a significant influence regarding interactions. Customers, the organization and staff are located in what has been called the service triangle (Macdonald and Merrill, 2009).

Service culture has prioritised 'The Customer' to the point of promoting a customer cult (du Gay and Salamon, 1992) evident in cliché's like Craven's (2002) 'the customer is king'. So-called 'customer sovereignty' sees organizations focusing on customer needs and satisfaction (Steinberg and Figart, 1999), seemingly at the expense of staff's needs, welfare and health, to the point of reifying the customer into 'The Customer' - an abstract entity

[30] Hall's zones are culture-specific; North American and North European cultures are 'low contact' compared to 'high-touch' (e.g. Mediterranean) cultures. Northern European zones correspond to the following distances – public zone, c. 12ft +, social zone c. 12 ft - 4 ft, personal zone c. 4 ft - 1 ½ ft, intimate/private zone c. 1/ ½ ft – 0.

enjoying high status (Tylor and Taylor, 2001). Conversely, service workers tend to be low-paid and of low-status despite high-demands requiring capacity to perform flexibly under pressure in emotionally-challenging and -driven conditions (Bitner *et al*., 1990). Service workers are, however, skilled emotion workers and emotion managers (Bolton and Boyd, 2003). Demands and effects of service work may go largely unnoticed or unacknowledged in such work (i.e. is expected), which basically further reduces service workers' compensation (Findlay *et al*., 2009; Steinberg and Figart, 1999) and maintains their low status.

Raising customer status relative to workers' seems inherent in customer service credo. Regarding customer-to-staff relations, asymmetry occurs if customers enjoy greater status or power than staff. Customer sovereignty seemingly accomplishes this, elevating customers into figures able to exercise power over and even direct or manage staff's behaviour (Korczynski, 2001; Korczynski *et al*., 2000). Customers appear cast in a more powerful role, enabling reproduction of "social relationships that generate their dominance" (Monaghan, 2002: 424). But staff also serves its employer and is thus positioned in not merely a dyadic relationship (with customers) - which service interactions tend to comprise - but a triadic one (the service triangle), which Gabriel (2009) notes are more complex.

This relationship and service work demands creates customer sovereignty which sets up power differentials in the customer-staff dyad. This is an inherent property of the service triangle and its context (i.e. it would not necessarily ordinarily exist between two members of society in a different context). Staff is not powerless in its relationships with customers or its employer, though it seems ostensibly relatively lacking in power and resources relative to each. Staff may be able to exercise power through ploys motivated to (re)gain agency, self-respect and restore quasi-injustice (which is one outcome of WRH identified in research). In interactions, the worker may actively withdraw from providing aspects of service (e.g. not smiling). This might raise their sense of status, reduce their investment of energy in work and thus the cost it demands, lower their perception of customer status and irritate customers.

The service triangle

Organizations ceding customers apparent sovereignty might regain power ostensibly issued customers by erecting bureaucracies (e.g. formal complaints processes). Ostensibly customer-oriented bureaucracies may function against customer-oriented service by frustrating customers and/or staff, cause delays, create further problems, etc. This may subject customers (and staff) to imposed order and rules running counter to customer interests and limiting staff's capacity to personalize service delivery.

Customer sovereignty may be ostensible in organizational rhetoric but illusory in practice. Customers may not be as powerful as they appear but they still enjoy status and may be able to exercise power and influence over staff, though perhaps not on the organization itself. I suspect power enjoyed by customers is not as great as it appears and is used by organizations to attract custom. However, if customers (are led to) believe they can expect excellence, high-quality service, are of central importance, etc. but perceive they have not received same they may feel emotional expression in complaint or hostility is legitimate.

Customer-oriented service work possesses contradictions (Korczynski *et al*., 2009). Staff is placed in two difficult, challenging positions[31]; the first regarding their service behaviours (demanded or implied by the customer and/or employing organization); the second when hostility (and attendant stress and emotion) occurs. Moreover, workers are tasked with facing customer hostility and managing their own emotions whilst prioritising the customer's needs. This introduces the concepts of emotional labour (EL) and emotion regulation (ER), both important aspects of service work required for service delivery.

Summary

Service work is a demanding but widespread feature of contemporary work for many employees and involves the instrumental use of workers' bodies and emotions for customer benefit. Service workers are located in the service triangle – a relationship between

[31] 'Awkward' and 'challenging' are words commonly-used to refer to hostile customers. These euphemisms may help organizations avoid recognizing truths too unpalatable to openly or fully acknowledge.

customers and the employer. I suggest staff, though not powerless, is subject to these more powerful parties. The power relationships are complex, however, because The Customer may not enjoy quite the sovereignty (i.e. level of power) they appear to and organizations may exercise power over sovereign customers through their service bureaucracy. This indicates something of service work's paradox. Another paradox exists in status; the Customer is an abstract concept and is commonly de-personalized in service work yet is the focus of attention (one of staff's objectives is to generate positive emotion in customers). The next chapter considers staff's use of emotion in order to achieve this.

Chapter 13 Emotional labour and regulation in service work

Introduction

Emotion is one of service work's key characteristics; it is used by staff in order to promote positive emotions in customers. This is demanding for workers, and may be harmful.

In this chapter I explore 'emotional labour' (EL), the professional version of 'emotion work' (EW), which sees workers using personal emotion through which to present a professional public demeanour to customers and generate positive emotions and experiences for and in them during service. I secondly explore the emotional regulation (ER) required to enable this. I note both may damage emotion workers and consider some of the negative outcomes for service staff associated with ER-driven EL. Positives associated with such work are also included, but the artifice involved in EL is emphasized.

Emotional labour

In showing bodies are used as a commodity for commercial use, Hochschild echoes Bourdieu's notion of physical capital, i.e. bodies exploited for economic gain (see Monaghan, 2002; Shilling, 2003; Wacquant, 1995). Customer-facing and interactive service workers seemingly 'do' EL through their body (re)presentations. Hochschild's work on EL argues emotions used for commercial purposes can harm emotional labourers.

EL is professional emotion work (EW). Hochschild (1983) and Wouters (1989) note EW is a necessary social skill enabling us to inhabit social identities and roles in daily life. Hochschild draws on Goffman's earlier work apropos self-presentation as a key aspect of professional EW. Impression management in the interactions of social life (Kruml and Geddes, 2000) are characteristic of EW and EL (Gardner and Martinko, 1988). Two points are particularly noteworthy. First, staff's professionalism requires displays of emotion in interactions as a feature of customer service, e.g. being friendly, smiling, etc. Second, this aims to promote customers' (positive) emotions, e.g. happiness. The outcome of this – and what enables it – is an 'emotion system' (Howson, 2004); in this case, staff monitoring and

manipulating its emotion to meet demands, viz. displaying appropriate emotions for the customers' (and thus the employer's) benefit. The customer (and organization) is the staff's target audience for emotional display and this sets the tone and stage for interactions. Hochschild claims EL requires surface or deep acting. Both require skill (such displays rely on performance and artifice – see next chapter). Surface acting is an outward 'show' of real emotion, a presentation of faked authenticity, e.g. masking anger or fear with courtesy. Deep acting is 'method' acting as per Stanislavski and Strasberg in which the actor mines personal emotion for use, altering it through imaginative reframing to (re)present it in a new context for performative purpose.

In this, EL is the commercializing of emotion and feeling (Hochschild, 1979). It exemplifies what Meštrović (1998) calls the 'authenticity industry' which profits by commoditizing emotion. One should note however that workers' emotions are co-opted by their employers for organizational gain with staff's participation. Though the employer requiring EL can colonize workers' emotions (Rose, 1989) and bodies through its enculturation (Ray, 1986), perhaps by proxy through the customer, employees (tacitly, if unwittingly) permit this and are thus partly culpable for damage incurred (Hochschild (1979) shows staff is not ignorant of their use of emotions). Even genuine staff emotion is used in a context in which customer (and organizational) benefit is fore-grounded. EL and service work is a presentational performance not an expression of emotion under spontaneous, natural conditions. Indeed, the emotions and behaviours deemed suitable are limited and specific. This is why even genuine emotional displays in service work can alienate workers – because they occur under restricted conditions decided upon by the organization, subject to organizational regulation (Wharton, 1999) and for customers' and the organization's benefit. This can create tension or even conflict for emotional labourers. Moreover, the instrumental use of emotion in EL may create harm for workers (see below).

High stakes are associated with EL and its management. Attempts to gain staff's commitment often occurs in service sectors (Sturdy, 1998; Tyler and Taylor, 2001). Organizations are 'greedy' and colonize workers' emotions (Flam, 1993). As Fineman (1993) states, the organization's presentation of itself can subside if and when staff's emotional

management insufficiently shores it up (one reason why organizations encourage employee commitment to its aims, cultures, and adherence to the service credo).

If enculturation occurs, full staff-organization alignment seems to happen (see Kelman, 1958, 1961), girding organizational presentation through staff's behaviour. If aligned, staff seemingly produce's emotion purposefully, intentionally and with commitment, and EL would seem meaningful for workers. This maintains the image the organization wants to project to customers. As Hochschild (1983) claims, at such times work roles are not 'played' but adopted and enacted with full commitment and belief; no distance between workers as individuals and the professional role exists. Organizations would unsurprisingly prefer to have a staff fully committed to its work and the organization - and thus offer no gaps between personal and organizational planes, intentions, and behaviours. Any extant gaps risk creating problems, e.g. indicating a façade exists[32].

If successful, production of service behaviour in staff-customer interactions is seam- and seem-less; rooted in integrity, fuelled by honestly-felt emotion, and produced voluntarily, automatically and smoothly, rather than being forced or faked. It would be freely issued without an agenda, not coerced from workers, or driven by staff's fear of the employer's power (e.g. reprisals for poor production). Nor would it be mere 'role play' to satisfy professional obligations with staff's minimal investment of personal energy, care or emotion. Such staff would literally *re*present the organization faithfully in enacted behaviours; staff would be the behavioural epitome of the organization.

Apropos emotion, organizations seek staffs' ability to manage emotion for numerous reasons, e.g. to partly reduce what they might define as unreasonable emotional outbursts, to create positive emotional experience in customers. In both cases, staff needs to be able to self-manage its emotions to engender emotion in customers. But this reliance on staff's emotional self-management also enables the organization to extend influence over staff. By requiring staff manage its emotion, organizations reduce chances staff will react 'unsuitably' to customers or the organization. This sees organizations potentially extending themselves into areas of staff's lives ordinarily beyond such incursion (Leidner, 1999). The power of this

[32] For Turner (1987), this would constitute 'social drama' - here a breach of social conventions collapsing the theatre of service work. This is a meta-theatrical narrative - see below.

may be evident in the lack of common or widespread worker resistance despite such organizational encroachment and colonization, and associated damage sustained (e.g. alienation and stress; see Kruml and Geddes, 2000).

Organizational service credo may be rational in intent and aim to manage or contain emotion and conflict by constraining its appearance and effect. Organizations may seek to define and control what they consider to be suitable display(s) of emotion and conduct for staff (and customers, e.g. in zero tolerance statements). Here, that may be emotional displays or behaviours which jeopardise service standards, service delivery and maintenance of service credo. However, controlling emotions may be impossible. If emotions are integral to human life, they will appear in organizations as frequently as other social interactions (Fineman, 2000) and will be difficult to control. Organizations arguably want to manage manifestations of emotion to promote suitable service delivery but this means endeavouring to eradicate some emotional displays whilst accepting (indeed, welcoming) others. This demonstrates what may be an unrealistic managerialism and an attempted control of workers' bodies. Organizations' concerns lie not so much with emotion *per se* as with its expression; public displays of emotion are organizations' concern; staff's private feelings are perhaps not. However, Fineman notes instrumental efforts to "control the body [and emotions] for rational, productive, ends" - e.g. service delivery rules/norms - may contribute to emotional "'dysfunctions'" (2000: 9) which require additional control by the individual experiencing it and/or invite further control by the organization.

Emotion Regulation

Emotion regulation (ER) gives insight into the process required for successful EL by identifying how individuals manage (e.g. suppress, display) emotion, and thus the effort workers extend to sustain EL and hence service credo.

Leidner (1999: 83) notes (emotion) workers "often must cope with their own emotions being managed while they try to manage the emotional responses of others". EL requires staff's emotional self-management. ER helps us see what processes enable this display of some emotions and restriction or disguising of others, i.e. it helps explain how EL

is accomplished through surface or deep acting. ER also indicates something of EL's damage on emotion workers, including psycho-somatic illness (e.g. stress). Grandey (2000) states ER includes physiological matters, which EL studies mention but rarely explore. ER thus indicates something of how EL functions and the costs it exerts.

ER proposes cognitive strategies are applied to "dampen negative emotions" (Gross, 1998: 275) which enables EL through conscious suppression of 'unsuitable' emotional display. Workers' failure to do so would collapse the ideal(ized) and theatrical façade of service work (and of the organization's identity as presented to the external world; see below).

EL's 'deep acting' tacitly references ER, e.g. Hochschild (1983) noted flight attendants' suppressed emotion. Such regulation enables accessing, (imaginative) adaptation and production (performance) of emotion in customer-centric display. This fosters successful attainment of the 'authenticity' EL demands in accepting only positive emotional displays (e.g. friendliness, smiling). For successful outward positive emotion display the worker suppresses other emotions (viz. feelings associated with his or her psychological and physiological state). For instance, the service worker may show composure in the face of customer hostility and suppress genuine feelings of anger or fear (Hopp *et al.*, 2012). Other inclinations (e.g. wanting to be professional, fearing organizational repercussions for unprofessionalism) operate to impel staff's continued suitable interactions. (Though note staff may be working to meet customer needs to satisfy the employer or retention of a job rather than simply or only satisfying the customer.) Again, note that such regulation is accomplished by workers but is influenced by their (perceptions of) organizational (and wider social) norms which dictate suitable interpersonal conduct for the specific context.

Like EW, ER is an essential skill necessary for successful social life, even "central to mental health" (Gross, 1998: 280). It links directly with Goffman's conception of self-presentation (impression management) as a requisite for normal social interaction. Unregulated emotional expression would rapidly jeopardize social norms. If emotions are linked to individuals' ability to adapt and meet life challenges (Gross, 1998; Tooby and Cosmides, 1989), ER would seem important for the same reasons, e.g. choosing to act or not on emotion depending on circumstances. ER would appear essential for social skills

development, e.g. reciprocal behaviours, group activity, deferred gratification[33]. Apropos organizations and work, relevant ER issues include how far organizations expect staff to remain in interactions requiring ER, whether such expectations are reasonable (e.g. achievable, fair), and whether organizations contribute negatively to staff's challenges in meeting these expectations (e.g. by not training or supporting them).

Gross (1998) contends people regulate emotion at two points – to change perception of the situation or expression following emotional experience. This corresponds with Grandey's (2000) antecedent- and response-focused regulations. The former includes selecting which situations to participate in, modifying involvement (e.g. withdrawing), manipulating attention (focusing on particular issues/features) and cognitive alteration (changing what or how one thinks). The first two may not be choices available to service workers; the latter may be options relating to EL in requiring emotional management associated with method acting. Response-focused regulation consists of actively adjusting emotional expression (which may be discrepant to felt emotion). Research shows such surface acting occurs in service encounters (van Maanen, 1991).

ER suggests numerous techniques are used to achieve regulation (as cited above). It may be initial attempts to use antecedent-focused regulation techniques fail and response-focused ones are mobilized. (Grandey (2000) citing Gross (1998) notes people typically attempt deep acting (antecedent-response) first and move to surface acting (response-focused regulation) if necessary.) However, full regulation over emotional display may not occur; some emotion may escape containment and leak into behaviour. If not, emotion may be regulated apropos presentation for the audience but is not 'deep acting' (which changes emotion). This implies emotion triggered by the stimulus still exists and regulation only exists surficially. Emotion can exist despite not being evident in actual emotional expression or behavioural display; it can be masked by the display of a 'suitable' emotion, for instance.

[33] An individual's survival might rely on the ability to know when and how to act on emotion and when to regulate behaviour stemming from it to disguise true feelings in the interest of some goal attainment or maintenance of social norm.

However, this implies it still has impact for the individual, impact which may be physiological (e.g. arousal intensity/duration), emotional and experiential (e.g. feelings), and can be harmful.

Regulatory ability seems partly based on the influence individuals can bring to their emotions, viz. when/how they "experience and express" them (Grandey, 2000: 98). This might vary regarding the factors previously outlined for emotion itself - situation, context and individual differences like tolerance thresholds, skills sets, personality, etc.

Negatives of ER and EL

Hochschild notes EL is psychologically demanding. Hochschild's study of cabin crew showed emotions (and bodies) functioned as an integral aspect of work which psychologically and emotionally harmed staff because staff felt guilt at presenting phoney facades; were alienated from their work, employer and themselves (through acting); or else were changed by the process (of deep acting). All resulted in workers feeling inauthentic (Wharton, 1999), experiencing cynicism and negative thoughts, and emotional 'deadness' apropos their behaviour (faked emotion equated to lifelessness). This affected behaviour, health, and their relationship to the employer.

This implies management of emotional display itself creates emotion. Channelling some feelings into behaviour whilst suppressing others may create (negative) emotions about the process, which would seemingly add to staff's challenges. One potential outcome is what Freund (1990, cited by Shilling, 2003) calls 'false consciousness' - a state in which someone shows one emotion whilst experiencing another, e.g. a worker displays sympathy when really feeling anger. Suppressing anger is seen as generally having negative consequences (Holt, 1970). Such suppression in hostile service encounters is seen as negative, too (Hopp *et al*., 2012). This 'emotive dissonance' (Hochschild's term) is unhealthy (Wharton, 1999) because the real and displayed emotions are at odds. One could see how powerful organizational enculturation operating on workers and/or staff engaged in surface or deep acting might result in emotion workers becoming disconnected from their own (true) feelings and, once aware of this, dismayed at the outcome. Such negative experiences exist in addition to the general 'compassion fatigue' and 'contact overload' service workers can

experience in order to display convincing suitable emotion on a routine basis to be deemed professional. Another possible outcome is what Shilling (2003: 110) calls “corporeal conscience” – the profound, felt experience that some behaviours (e.g. acting) are wrong, harmful, unhealthy and jeopardise integrity. Staff might respond to such experience to avoid personal cognitive and emotional conflict; if not, service workers using EL risk suppressing reactions to their EW and ER which requires more emotion management. In effect, emotional management is exercised to manage the emotions that earlier emotional management creates.

Perceived mistreatment can also make negative impact for staff (Olson-Buchanan and Boswell, 2008). Staff’s sense-making seeks to understand events. Should workers believe they have been subject to unfairness, injustice, etc. (e.g. WRH), they can have a multi-faceted response (psychological, emotional and physical, e.g. upset, distress, anger), which can influence behaviours (e.g. seeking revenge). This response is itself subject to sense-making efforts. Research identifies the effects of maltreatment; long-term harm such as stress, lowered health and increased psycho-somatic illness (Cortina and Magley, 2003) and negative affect, e.g. sadness (Olson-Buchanan and Boswell, 2008).

Interim summary

Numerous ideas presented in this chapter can be connected. The production of emotional display required of staff occurs internally in response to external incidents and people. Though seemingly expected by organizations, workers personally create or mine and display this. The damage inflicted through it (which has emotional and physical aspects) is also experienced personally and privately. This privatization of feeling emanating from social norms guiding behaviour relates directly to Elias’s civilizing process. This does not contradict Bourdieu’s notion of the body as a physical capital that can be exploited (e.g. by an employer) because EL and ER effected by staff (to display emotion, to manage the emotional outcomes of display) is a commodity used by the organization for its own benefit (profits through repeat custom), albeit with staff’s help. Staff is left with costs incurred by and through the process (e.g. stress, psychological alienation from work/role and self, internal conflict, ill-health, false consciousness) and is tasked with dealing with this (management of

dissonance, conflict, health, etc. and personal recovery), whereas the organization seemingly reaps the benefits (satisfied customers), though it may also incur harm as a result of staff's suffering.

Like EL, ER incurs cost for users. ER constitutes a form of energy management according to Fritz *et al*., (2011) which enables EL. But energy is an exhaustible resource EL can deplete. Negative outcomes, like fatigue, can occur which will effect service delivery. ER helps control energy used in EL – but itself expends energy (even when successful; unsuccessful ER suggests fatigue will occur quicker).

Work stress in EL

Stress and EL have been linked through ER amplifying or suppressing emotion. Chan and Wass (2012) note though stress and fatigue can lower work performance, little research exists apropos stress reducing staff's service delivery capacity.

Service work could be an example of an acute or chronic stressor, the types of stress identified in (work) stress literature. For Kleber and van der Velden (2009) much work research focuses on chronic stress (though WRH is an acute stressor in particular incidents and a chronic stressor if a repeated experience). Cordes and Dougherty (1993: 628) argue work requiring interpersonal interactions is stressful because of "the high level of arousal from direct, frequent, and rather intense interactions with clients". As service workers are "constantly dealing with other people and their problems" (*ibid*.), their role is inherently stressful. Service workers can be seen as handlers of toxicity (Frost and Robinson, 1999) when managing customers' hostility. If "organizations have always generated distress" (*ibid*.; 98), including strong emotion, and service workers function at the customer-organization interface (forming a "human bridge" (*ibid*.: 101)), they are tasked with the management (even absorption) of toxins emanating from hostile customers triggering worker stress and emotion (Stein, 2007). Workload and high self-control expected of staff can elevate stress and negative affect (Diestel and Schmidt, 2009; Schmidt *et al*., 2007). As noted elsewhere, service workers are expected to maintain self-control in interactions.

Research directly links ER and stress; Coté (2005) argues ER can result in stress. Begley (1984) notes suppressed anger (an example of ER, and one relevant to service-

based WRH interactions) directs emotion inwards. The outcomes of this for the individual include unresolved emotion (by not dealing with its causes), and elevated physiological arousal. Consequences for work include inhibited interaction, especially for those whose work role includes "substantial interpersonal responsibilities" (Begley, 1984: 506). The suppression of emotion can "exacerbate health complaints" for such workers (*ibid*.). Thus, work stress from ER-based EL is not only an experience which makes internal impact for staff, but effects interactions between parties. The consequences are both individual and social (i.e. intra- and inter-personal).

Cordes and Dougherty (1993) indicate stress can manifest in emotional exhaustion from 'contact overload' and depersonalization; emotional and psychological effects of stress impair self-esteem, elevate anxiety, foster depression, etc. A behavioural facet of stress also exists and is manifested in e.g. absenteeism, staff turnover and substance abuse – outcomes identified in WRH research. An insidious characteristic of stress is that it targets a person's most vulnerable point (Frost and Robinson, 1999). For instance, if a worker has a tendency to heart disease, stress is likely to exert pressure on the heart. Research has identified the way stress makes such impacts. Segerstrom and Miller (2004) offer a meta-analysis of research into stress and the human immune system, noting acute (short-term), natural and chronic (well-established, long-term) stressors can all negatively affect the body and health. Acute stressors (lasting minutes) put the body into FFF – the core stress reaction which positively fosters survival but can negatively affect immunity if the energy released in the reaction goes unused (as outlined elsewhere); physiological change in the body is not utilized because the stressor which elicits the reaction cannot be addressed through its use. Natural stressors (i.e. those typically encountered in life - see Karasek and Theorell's (1990) concept of 'daily hassles') can suppress cellular activity which can impair the body. Chronic stressors, which are well-established and on-going, effect more features of the immune system, and are thus especially detrimental, specifically contributing to disease. Shirom *et al*., (2009) claim chronic stressors and strain reactions are implicated in cardio-vascular

(hereafter, CV) disease through elevated blood-pressure and cholesterol. The "prolonged and repeated activation of HPA"[34] (Shirom *et al*., 2009: 50) here becomes established as a chronic stressor, and is damaging because such arousal interferes with regulation of the FFF system; elevated cortisol and catecholamine release negatively impacts the body.

For Shirom *et al*. (2009), imbalances or lack of fit between a worker and work results in increased stress (and detrimental health outcomes as outlined). Lack of fit occurs through factors previously mentioned, e.g. high demand on staff, low staff control of work factors, and low organizational support. Thus, a connection is made between stress, contributory factors that 'cause' it, physiological outcomes of high arousal, and ill-health resulting from it in service work. As such, workers' capacity to delivery service seems effected. (They are also hazards that employers can and should address because they are foreseeable. That one can connect the health effects of stress with service work, and service work with WRH, shows the potential damage service workers face.)

A general relationship between service work and costs it exacts is apparent, but service workers' experiences are not always negative. However, if WRH appears in service encounters, I suggest demands on workers increase considerably, as does the likelihood of staff experiencing negative impacts.

WRH in service interactions

I suggest WRH is among the most challenging of service situations. Typical expectations of service workers' behaviour to customers, and the demands of EW are hard criteria to meet. I suggest when the customer is hostile demands on workers increases and the effects on them are more damaging, primarily because the regulation of very powerful emotion (such as fear or anger) is required as stress occurs. Chi *et al*. (2013) state negative customers (e.g. hostile customers) have multiple negative effects for workers, including stress. For Beattie and Griffin (2014) incivility experienced by staff elevates stress.

Another reason is in WRH staff is exposed to potential physical attack as well as psychological pressure. Moreover, EL as a means to manage customer emotions and

[34] HPA - the Hypothalamic-Pituitary Axis - is integral to FFF's chemical release.

behaviours becomes problematic because the hostile customer may trigger more emotion in staff and displays hard-to-manage emotion and behaviour, yet staff is expected to manage both simultaneously.

It may be the customer has grounds for complaint, and that his or her hostility is understandable given their experience, e.g. poor service. This is no excuse for verbal abuse, threat or violence, but might help explain it. Alternatively, customers' experience of the organization might be the releaser of stress and emotion built-up in other contexts rather than its cause. Again, this does excuse displacement of energy into unwarranted hostility targeting organizational representatives, but might explain it.

On facing a hostile customer, it is reasonable to assume workers will experience emotion and stress. Intensity of interaction elevates stress and later fatigue (Boxall and Macky, 2014) and aggression increases demands on staff's EL (Boyd, 2002). Individual differences may account for individuals' capacity to withstand greater provocation, maintain self-control, etc. Experiences, learning, genetic make-up, etc. may all influence capacity to deal with such stimuli (Geen, 1968). But aggressors tend to provoke specific emotional reactions manifested in the core/primary/basic emotions aforementioned. Common emotional reactions are likely to be fear and/or anger. The danger an aggressor presents prompts a reaction necessary from a survival perspective. Whether our bodies and/or our psyches operate as the source of this reaction is relevant but need not detain us; the reaction to hostility is the important issue. The focus here is what then happens, why and what its impacts are, e.g. what behaviours occur, whether this necessitates suppression of particular emotions in order to present the self to others, for what purpose, and what cost is incurred by the person doing so.

The automatic, bodily reaction to hostility triggered in service-based WRH prompts behavioural inclinations (action tendencies) unsuitable for display in the particular social context - expression of anger leading to fight or fear leading to flight. (Boyd (2002) cites Paule's (1996) study of waitresses to show service workers' counter-aggression can occur. However, this may not be a realistic option for all service workers, and may take particular forms, e.g. verbal aggression.) Other behaviours and emotional expressions are preferred (as more suitable). However, the actual emotion felt (e.g. anger, fear) is not regulated - it has

already occurred as a result of the stimulus. It is the expression of the feeling in public displays that is regulated -produced through EL for public view.

Managing emotion is not always easy but to do so in a context in which people's expressions are limited or in which they perceive limitation exists (and perhaps fear repercussions for openly expressing emotion) is a tougher proposition. Yet it seemingly does occur much of the time in service work, and though achievable is costly.

The upside of service work

As previously noted, service work is not necessarily or always negative for workers (Steinberg and Figart, 1999). They may display genuine emotion in interactions with customers and not act. Workers may not always feel conflict between personal feelings and organizational (or social) expectations of their conduct; feel colonized by their employer; or feel typically stressed by customers' behaviour. Service work may bring workers a sense of personal and professional pleasure; they may generally enjoy their work, and voluntarily extend efforts to serve customers borne from genuine desire to help them. Service workers may view drawbacks and associated negative experiences of such work manageable or worth tolerating. Lilius (2012) argues service work interactions can function as a way for staff to recover energy normally seen as being depleted by service work interactions: for Lilius, such work can be restorative. Grandey and Diamond (2010) note valued service jobs can energize workers.

It would be invidious to claim all service workers are under constant stress or are completely colonized or harmed by organizations making (detrimental) incursions into their lives and feelings because of their work demands. It cannot be stated that all interactions in service work *per se* cause ill-health through stress as a result of EL demands staff experience or hostile customers. Negatives and positives of service work may balance for many staff. However, one should remember service interactions are potentially challenging and damaging. At times, some workers do experience conflict between the true self and expected professional role, e.g. between personal emotion and emotion required by the organization and/or customer (see Crowley *et al*., 2012, on work performance pressure and anxiety.) Additionally, though ER and EL are not necessarily involved in every service

interaction or for every worker, it does occur some of the time for workers. Moreover, even in cases when genuine emotion is produced in and for service interactions, ER - itself shown to sometimes be a source of mental, physical and/or emotional stress - seems necessary for the management of emotional display in service work. Even if a worker's personal emotions and those expected of him or her by the organization are congruent, EL still occurs because the display of emotion is not purely personal but commercial (Brook, 2009).

Summary

EW and ER are not restricted to work roles but occur in general social interactions. However, as a feature of service work, emotion is an instrument for organizational use organizations have utilized for gain through workers' behaviours. Emotion is central to service work on numerous fronts. Organizations aim to generate customers' positive emotions (to enhance their experience and lead to repeat business) and service workers' roles include trying to engender positive emotion in customers (accomplished by staff delivering 'quality service' using personal emotions). This requires ER-based EL. However, emotion is a multi-faceted phenomenon comprising biological, psychological and social facets. One can see something of this regarding professional use of emotion and how the body is deeply involved in, and effected in and by, EL (as explored more fully in later chapters).

This chapter has indicated EL can be harmful and result in stress. I have also suggested that when WRH occurs, demands on staff increases, more emotion and stress is triggered, which calls for further ER, which itself potentially elevates stress and results in ill-health.

The next chapter seeks to expand on the notion that EL is presentational and performed; it is theatrical in that staff acts its role, as noted in EL research.

Chapter 14 Theatricality and professional service work – enactment, performativity and presentation

Introduction

In the last chapter, EL literature's references to role and acting indicate service work is connected to role performance. I argue in this chapter that service work is a theatrical enterprise requiring staff's role-taking and -playing, and implies a degree of artifice and (re)presentation of self and emotion utilizing performers' bodies, emotions and minds in enactments for an audience (or audiences). Such presentations are interactive and not only convey emotion and display behaviour but also try to influence other parties' (i.e. customers') emotion and behaviour. However, these performances can be negatively affecting for performers. Because they are embodied, I claim biopsychosocial impacts effect those playing roles. This chapter introduces concepts of theatre, drama, performance and role, and applies them to service work(ers).

'Totus Mundus Agit Histrionem' – all the world is a theatre

This inscription at Shakespeare's Globe theatre suggests the profound link between human life and theatre. Theatre and the drama enacted in it shows humans' relationship to itself and its world. Theatre potentially reveals truths about both. It thus offers opportunities to analyse "man's [*sic*] relationship to man [*sic*]" (Lyman and Scott, 1975: 2). Mangham (2001: 295) claims theatre reveals how humans mutually relate, interact, and

> "develop strategies and plans, form… alliances, conduct intrigues… cheat, favour, respect, betray, praise and attack each other."

Dramaturgical approaches have "important and deep roots in modern psychology and sociology" (Lyman and Scott, 1975: 10). I question Lyman and Scott's claim "social reality… is realized theatrically… reality is drama, life is theatre" (1975; 3) but I do see connections between them and believe social interaction can be an act in a setting like

theatre. Lyman and Scott's reference to 'realized' is important however because it refers to both the way we interact and understand interaction. Behaviour ('action') requires enactment for existence, otherwise it remains potential action (e.g. thought, dream, fantasy, feeling, emotion). And our mutual comprehension occurs through perceiving, analysing, and reflecting on our own and others' performances in dynamic social interactions. Theatre offers a useful metaphor for life and human interaction. Goffman (1959) posits a view of life as resembling a play in which we present roles to each other. (Goffman could be criticized for contending we hide our real selves by presenting fake selves to others whilst simultaneously trying to excavate their real selves from beneath their presented selves. It is also unclear how far presented selves are fake or partially real, or if we all engage in such presentation.)

Becker's (1962) reading of Goffman claims an unspoken social contract exists in life in which we all know we mutually present facades in interpersonal interaction but accept this and support impression management and self-presentation to ease friction in social intercourse. If and when individuals fail to uphold the necessary fiction they demonstrate lack of consideration and respect for others and for social norms. This creates friction and jeopardizes interaction. Hostility can achieve exactly this. The interaction/relationship is stalled, problematized and, potentially, conflict is introduced. Also, the private self of one or both parties - normally hidden through public displays of self by the social interactive fiction - may appear. The social flow breaks down at such times; uncertainty, ambiguity and hazard reign (the aforementioned 'social drama'; see below).

Thus, dramaturgical approaches offer potential insight into OB/OMS, as some scholars have begun to explore (Czarniawska-Joerges and Jacobsen, 1995; Graham-Hill and Grimes, 2001; Mangham, 2001; Mangham and Overington, 1983, 1987; Meisiek, 2004).

Setting the stage – theatre, drama, and performance[35]

Theatre is the place for performance. I define theatre as a performance art in which reality and truth about human life is presented. It is the intentional (re)presentation of human interaction played out through scripts, movement, etc., for reasons like social commentary or critique and entertainment. Though written, rehearsed and staged, the physicality, immediacy and mimetic quality of theatre is powerful. Note that theatre pertains to intentional efforts to organize (re)presentations using scripts, directed by the self and/or other, the prescribed location for interaction, the set, costumes, and traditions of acting (e.g. way roles are played).

Drama is the text used in theatrical performance (comprising dialogue, stage directions, etc.). In this thesis, drama is defined as the inherently tense human (inter)action depicted and witnessed in theatre. If theatre is the location for and the traditions of performances, drama is what is enacted. But drama appears not only in performative arts' representations of human life but in non-scripted and unrehearsed human social interaction. Drama is the tension, conflict, confusion, misunderstandings, etc. in peoples' relationships with each other and their world. As such, conflict sits at the heart of drama and is central to theatre (Hartnoll, 1985); it propels drama and is the essence of theatrical action.

I argue few situations are more dramatic than hostility; (inter)action is oppositional and primitive needs (power, status, security) drive behaviour. I suggest interaction operates through (primal) ritualized behaviours (see below notes on ethology and analysis chapters). Yet, the theatricality of service work tries to contain the drama it releases.

Presentation requires performance (of role). For Schechner (1977), performance includes not just the presentation of the drama in the theatrical location, or actors' interaction, but other factors both pre- and post-presentation, including audience effects.
Applying Schechner's idea, one can see customers, workers, and witnesses to WRH are all involved in performances. Performance can be seen as not only what is presented but who sees it and how they interpret it. For this thesis, performance means the roles played in the

[35] My use of the terms drama, theatre, and performance is based on performance theory's definitions (Schechner, 1977) but adapted and simplified.

social context, the motivation to play them, the interaction played out, and its effects on those involved and the audience. It is “the tangible manifestation of both performativity and theatricality” (Montelle, 2009:11). Performativity can be seen as the capacity and practice of ‘representing’ in behaviour. Theatricality may be seen as the frame in which performativity and individual and situated performances occur – the locale for the human urge of performativity. Paraphrasing Montelle (*ibid*.), this implies performance, performativity and theatricality occur in arena other than those we know as ‘theatre’ (which was a later institution), e.g. sport, ritual and general social life. As I discuss below and later in the analysis chapter roles, audience and direction of action in hostile service encounters is more complex than action in theatre but is just as dramatic, theatrical and performative.

Connecting service work and theatre

Theatre and service work have been connected in research, e.g. Hochschild (1983) and van Maanen (1991). Solomon *et al*., (1985) acknowledges professional service worker roles are adopted if workers identify with them. (A link between this connection and deep acting in interactions might exist.) For Solomon *et al*. (*ibid*.), intra-role problems occur if lack of clarity exists for the role-taker, and presumably also if the worker has little identification with the role. However, the notion of service work as theatrical enterprise seems underdeveloped in OB/OMS, and the connection of embodied role performance and its effects is invisible in the literature as far as I know.

Theatricality

The notion of theatricality is useful for this thesis because it indicates customer service can be seen as a presentational enterprise intentionally attempting projection of organizational identity and meaning, and creating (positive) experience for customers, through the effort of embodied, interactive workers performing roles. It helps show service workers act to create a performance (for the benefit of customers) in a social setting. Drama occurs in this and conflict may sit deep within that drama when WRH occurs.

Service workers inhabit perceived or defined service roles, e.g. the ‘Professional

Service Worker', which implies adherence to norms embodied in the production of particular behaviours, e.g. courtesy when interacting with customers. The service theatricality also often requires staff to wear a costume (uniform) identifying them as organizational representatives (players). The service space itself (e.g. reception desk, point-of-sale, and the organization's site more generally) comprises the theatrical set in which action occurs (as opposed to the backstage spaces off-limits to customers – see Goffman). (In conflict management efforts, staff may try to move action from the publicly-viewable stage to 'backstage' areas (e.g. offices) for containment and management.)

The role of the Professional Service Worker

As noted previously, EW and impression management is a social skill people develop in life. Through capacity to 'play' roles in life, service workers develop sufficient skill to enable work performances. If adopted through identification, the role may be enacted as genuine self-presentation. If not, service work theatre is jeopardized (it could collapse). But the organization has specific demands which restrict choice of action, limit behaviour, and cast people in particular roles with less room for manoeuvre than in other social contexts. There are complexities inherent in the performance of the professional service role for workers which actors or persons interacting in general social life do not face. Most theatre audiences do not participate in the play but customers actively participate in interactions. Indeed, customers might be seen as functioning as directors influencing and organizing the actor's behaviour and assessing performance (see below). This makes performance of service role more complex than role performance in theatre.

Extemporized interaction, dialogue, and direction; 'spect-actors', 'dir-actors' and multiple audiences

Another reason service role performance is more complex than those in theatre is because service interactions seem largely extemporized within organizational and wider social norms. Unlike in much theatre (extemporized theatre aside) the roles, dialogue, etc. in service work are not always or fully scripted, rehearsed or directed by the employing organization (e.g. through procedures, culture, norms). In dramatic texts, the script allots

parts, and is coordinated by the director organizing textual interpretation and steering actors' depictions. In service work, roles may not be assigned as in text and theatre, and staff may receive little or no guidance (e.g. systematic training, direction) on how to present its service roles. As a result staff may infer employer's tacit expectations of service roles, and associated behaviour and standards from experience, colleagues, and/or organizational discourse (Seymour and Sandiford, 2005)[36]. Moreover, as noted earlier, the worker in a service encounter may function as the actor undertaking the service role and the director trying to direct (inter)action, e.g. manage the customer's attention, emotion and behaviour. They are also the audience for the customer's behaviour. More complexly still, workers play to multiple audiences, e.g. the customer, colleagues, members of the public witnessing events, and the employer. This may aim to fulfil various objectives, e.g. demonstrate professionalism, gain or maintain group membership and status, etc. (Bolino (1999) notes service workers might use their impression management skills to indicate to their employer they are good workers). The service worker also functions as the playwright 'scripting' words and stage directions, probably in extemporized fashion as action unfolds in interaction (unless organizational scripts and directives such as service procedures are in use and/or applied; extemporized scripts may be influenced by perceived or stated organizational service norms governing behaviour, past successful behaviour, and adjustments in ongoing response to the other party's responses/enactments).

The customer may also take on directorial, playwright, actor and audience 'roles'. Customers are participants in interactions. Moreover, the customer is cast in a major role – and has influence over (inter)action. The customer is played to by staff (is an audience) but may try to direct (inter)action as one would expect a party in a high-status role (fuelled by customer sovereignty rights) to do.

In Boal's terminology (see Schechner, 1977), both service workers and customers are 'spect-actors' – simultaneously or periodically spectators of and actors in the play/drama itself. In my Boal-influenced neologism, they are also 'dir-actors' because they are interactive parties occupying and playing roles but who also try to direct others' behaviours during

[36] In my experience much service training comprises role play, and thus organizations (perhaps unintentionally) acknowledge the theatrical artifice of service work.

interactions. Each party is performing; each presents his- or her-self in adherence (or not) to perceived expected roles for the specific context. In the dynamic process of performing, parties may be actors, be the audience, engage in (attempted) direction of their own and other's behaviour, and write the script in *ad hoc* fashion in interaction.

Theatricality in WRH service work incidents means interacting parties may or may not play their assigned, interpreted or expected roles (I suggest they typically do). (I will return to this idea later apropos ritualized behaviours, and status and dominance hierarchies, in analysis chapters because outcomes of role play serve to maintain status positions and through biopsychosocial effects train such roles and status in subtle ways.)

Social drama

For Turner, if life is like theatre then 'social drama' is meta-theatre, a comment on life's theatricality, which occurs when the normal flow of social life is breached, resulting in crisis. Social drama "describe[s] disharmonic situations" (Turner, 1987: 2), but it also shows and offers insight into social life.

This is relevant for this thesis because if norms are disturbed, a tear occurs in the social fabric through which its nature/character can be seen. An example of disruption includes stalling or subversion of expected roles in service interactions, e.g. if a worker fails to display perceived 'appropriate' (expected) behaviour or moves out-of-character and expresses his or her personal identity. Such behaviour rends asunder the expected (service delivery) norms and a crisis occurs which reveals the contradictions, limitations, and very theatricality of those organizational norms. (This is one reason organizations attempt enculturation of service staff and ensure its adherence to service credo.) Service work seems to try to guard against social drama occurring because it would reveal the theatrical artifice of service work, the impression management used to attract custom(ers), and its failure to sustain its own intended presentation which suggests a focus on image and a lack of depth in actual service quality.

Social drama may result from inherently dramatic human interactions buckling social norms, but I suggest the theatricality of service work sets up conditions which contribute actively to the fiction failing. A hostile encounter is a prime example of how this might occur

and performative presentation fail. Social drama will occur if and when service theatricality fails by not being able to contain the dramatic action released in or by it. Real (genuine) drama (i.e. tension, conflict) between the parties would emerge and jeopardize the theatrical enterprise of the play. A hostile customer may upset the worker to the extent that he or she cannot or will not maintain the service role; personal emotion and natural behavioural inclinations may filter in to the staged presentation or collapse it.

Summary

I have argued service interactions are an example of (attempted) theatre in which behaviours based on power differentials, status and allotted, commonly accepted and adopted and enacted roles play out. These performances are inherently dramatic because of the tension between the needs, emotions and behaviours of the parties involved (see definitions below), parties who enjoy different status and thus capacity to exercise power. However, I suggest that the theatricality and performance demands of service work are similar but more complex than presentation in theatre. This is due to participants' multiple and changing roles as actors, audience and directors, the lack of script and direction, and the extemporization required in uncertain dynamic interactions in which stress, emotion and potential physical harm exist as real stressors.

As noted, service worker role performance relies on emotions and a body as the vehicle of performance. Service is delivered through embodied professional enactments. Failure to sustain the performance would result in social drama. The next chapter explores the body in service work; later analysis chapters further explore propulsion for, manifestations of and effects of ritualized behaviours in service encounters[37].

[37] The origins of that interaction (and theatre itself) has deep roots. I later outline theatre's historic and functional connection with ritual and ritualized behaviours, a history seemingly extending back into premammalian animal ancestry. The connection obtains not just apropos the performative aspect of role (re)presentation and interaction but also the psychological and somatic effects of same.

Chapter 15 Serving bodies – embodiment and corporeality

Introduction

The last chapter argued that service workers' professional interactions are (re)presentational and constitute a form of theatre. This chapter introduces and explores the issue of service workers' use of bodies in such performed interactions. I aim to deepen comprehension of service work and its effects.

Service interactions are embodied because they occur between co-present interacting parties, at least one of whom is presenting the self through behaviour and emotional expression in order to produce affect in the other, e.g. service workers' attempt to create positive customer emotion, the hostile customer's attempt to create fear in the worker in order to exercise status. Understanding this is necessary because embodied performance and activation of bodily arousal occurs in such interactions. The body as a topic is a prime example of how corporeality and biological matters are relevant to OB/OMS as previously outlined.

Understanding corporeal aspects of service work is also required because the behaviours and experiences involved - hostility, stress and emotion - all operate corporeally. Stress is felt bodily due to elevated arousal. Emotion, its presentation and regulation is important in understanding EL and ER; as indicated elsewhere, emotions are embodied. Hostility can elevate stress and emotion. The body is also a physical target for violence. The body is the medium of communication between parties; emotion and hostility are projected through gesture, posture and movement between bodies (which may affect arousal, too) to signal and/or influence others' emotion and behaviour. Such communication might move from symbolic display to actual violence. I do not want to over-emphasize corporeal facets of work-related hostility, stress and emotion, but note corporeality needs foregrounding for its more widespread incorporation into OB/OMS.

Corporeality of WRH, emotion, stress and service work

Service work is embodied through performance (enactment) through staff's adoption, absorption and displays of persona in role. This requires a body as the vehicle for emotional expression and communicative interaction. The employing organization can influence uses workers' bodies (and corporeally-expressed emotions) are put to; employers do not own workers' bodies but can define how workers are to utilize their bodies at work, influence this use and thus appropriate workers' bodies instrumentally.

Issues associated with the body and embodiment are manifold and complex. The behaviours faced by service workers in WRH and the experiences following same, i.e. hostility, stress and emotion, are all partly corporeal, viz. felt in the body through altered sensation caused by physiological arousal.

Emotion, key in EL, is not a one-dimensional issue (Gross and Levenson, 1993). Its 'feeling' facet - the subjective experience of emotion following stimulus (e.g. stress), experienced in physiological arousal and sensation - is somatic: emotions are grounded in somatic experience (Lupton, 1998).

The body is involved in behaviour, including emotion displays. Both are central to EL and ER as aforementioned through embodied interactions. The body's parts, features and movement (or stasis) can be used as an instrument for the depiction of emotion, e.g. manipulation of the face, gesture, posture, etc. in co-present interactions. Bodies as vehicles of agential interactants (Lupton, 1998) enable personal emotional expression and influence of others' emotions through social interaction. As embodied beings (Shilling, 2003) we interact with the world, including other (embodied – and emotional) beings. Bodies form a basis from which social relations occur (Shilling, 2003); they are not just a location in which emotion is experienced by an individual but also the locale from which attempted connections to other beings are launched. Bodies are part of the process through and in which interactions happen (Csordas, 1990). Thus, one's emotion display and bodily behaviour, e.g. its production, projection and expression may influence another's emotions and behaviour.

Therefore behaviour, and emotions 'beneath' (and fuelling) it in service interactions, is likely heavily-influenced by (complex) emotional and embodied interactions between

customers, organizations and workers. However, as indicated above, feeling is internal, personal and private; emotional display of feeling is visible but not necessarily a genuine, complete or accurate depiction of inner feeling or state. Behaviour may enact or disguise genuine emotion via ER-driven EL; Chan and Wass (2012), note ER regulates thought and behaviour as well as emotion. The body is a site of personal experience and a vehicle of and for social display, both of which occur in service interactions.

Service work employs the body of the worker in very profound if subtle (not always apparent) ways through instrumental body location, presentation and use. Service workers use their bodies as vehicles for interaction - as a canvass on which emotional display occurs. Their emotion is also engaged instrumentally, as a reservoir drawn on to deliver service. In this sense, instrumentalization of service workers is more extensive than Taylorist or Fordist methods in physical labour. Service employees' corporeal appearance and bodily conduct can be influenced and organized by employers' edicts (Turner, 1984) regarding types of emotion deemed suitable for display and staff's interpersonal conduct in service encounters. Enactments of same are evident in expected courtesy, friendliness, facial expression, availability for and interest in customers, etc. Service workers' bodies are subject(ed) to commodification by employers using them as instruments utilized for commercial gain.

But workers' real bodies, emotions, and psyches and the effects of their use, cannot be abstracted from the process; use of their bodies affects not only their identity and status as particular types of workers but their real selves. A hostile customer is likely to rapidly elevate a worker's emotions and somatic arousal as the worker naturally seeks to protect his- or her-self from harm. In WRH, the body should be a focus of attention because of the physiological arousal, sensation, and emotion attending exposure to a threat, as well as being the literal target of intended or possible attack.

The body is also the locus of action or inaction; when FFF occurs, behaviour is manifested in freeze, or in literal or more typically in socially- and organizationally-approved versions of fight or flight (e.g. withdrawal from interaction or non-combative aggressor engagement). The presence, sensation and activity of the body in such situations may create mental dissonance for workers; as the 'civilized' individual feels propelled by more 'primitive' urges, somatic experience may dominate feeling (and dominate cognitive attention) even as

workers may feel the influence of socialization pressurizing them not to enact their inclinations to flee or counter-aggress but maintain their professional service role.

Interestingly, the body as a focus of study is markedly absent in WRH literature. Similarly, service research has seemingly focused more attention on emotion than on the body and embodiment despite the body being deeply connected with feeling, signalling emotion and behaviour display.

Embodiment is complex, and the manifold issues associated with it can be seen in workers' use of bodies, the impacts such use has on and for them, and the position bodies (and emotions) occupy in work. For example, embodiment "enjoys the same playful materiality/discourse oscillation as the word "'performance'" because it refers both to the "'condition of being embodied'" and the "'act of embodying'" (Diamond, 1995: 154 – 155), for which a body is prerequisite: it is 'being' in at least two senses. Embodiment (here, of the work role) can achieve external presentation through performance and display. This is itself an "act of doing, and the thing done" (*ibid*.). This performance, though affecting others, can have impact on the performer because of the effort require to do it and the effect external stressors impinging on it have.

Socialized, civilized, obedient worker bodies

Embodied service work employing emotional expression to enable role performance requires civilized bodies obedient to behaviour displays defined, approved and/or expected as being 'suitable' by the customer, employer and society (the latter two reserve rights to sanction norm transgression). Behaviour and our social interactions are socialized, as Elias, Foucault, Bourdieu and others suggest, by broad social and specific organizational norms, here pertaining to behavioural expectations in service interactions.

On what might appear a mundane (though powerful) level the venting capacity emotion offers us is constrained by a cluster of dominant social norms we are socialized into and which most of us (usually) adhere to, e.g. we tend to express anger in socially-acceptable ways rather than express it in immediate acts of rage or violence. This may result in expression of (some) emotion being shown to or directed at a limited audience (e.g. family, friends, colleagues) or fully privatized (internalized). Elias contends regulation over peoples'

expressions of body needs, functions and emotional displays is transferred and privatized to peoples' self-control and interior lives. Expression of emotion or behaviour tolerated in public enactments in earlier era has been increasingly constrained and channelled into particular normative conducts. An example is physical aggression between individuals (Elias, 1939). Once tolerated publicly but seen as a private inter-party matter (Elias, 1939) violence seems less tolerated now and is displaced to other spheres of life, channelled into acceptable media, or if enacted, subject to official (e.g. State) reprisal, e.g. law (Elias, 1994). Elias' concept has been criticized as a one-dimensional Modernist perspective (Meštrović, 1998), treating humans as passive beings acted upon by social forces and subject to coercion rather than as sentient, agential beings. However, Bourdieu's concept of 'body hexis' as previously outlined in the hostility chapter offers an explanation of how manners and etiquette become established and upheld. It also helps explain how etiquette continues to exert unseen or unrecognized pressure on people's social and interpersonal positions and relations. Hexis helps explain the civilizing process in pragmatic terms because it moves attention from a purely social account to incorporate the body and thus the physical domain.

Inter-personal conflict offers an example. This often occurs verbally under social rules (see notes on ritualized behaviours elsewhere). Inter-personal physical aggression is allegedly less frequent and severe than in past centuries (Elias, 1994; Schinkel, 2010). However, the powerful urge to attack or defend remains. It is felt bodily, yet the body is not entirely (pragmatically-speaking) free to enact this because social norms impose restraint on individuals through the body's owner/inhabitant selection of apparent 'self'-restraint. (I return to this notion later apropos various conflicts in service workers' psyches following hostility.)

Corporeal dys-appearance

Body hexis is the embodiment of trained social position occurring through the literal and metaphorical positioning of the body. Situations the body experiences can have negative effect. Leder (1990, cited by Shilling, 2003) suggests our bodies remain largely latent - corporeally absent - for much of our waking lives (the body's operations occur mostly subconsciously). An example is breathing, which remains mostly unconscious; we become conscious of it during exertion. We habituate to what constitutes 'normal' bodily sensation.

This corporeal unconsciousness and subconscious habituation to bodily state means people cannot always understand their own body's state (MacRae, 1975). However, when a potent (e.g. acute) stimulus occurs, the body re-appears in consciousness via altered sensation resulting from elevated physiological arousal (e.g. stress, emotion) and attendant psychological activity. Leder (cited by Shilling, 2003) terms this 'dys-appearance'. Shilling illustrates this using pain as an example but stress or emotion (fear or anger) are better examples because like pain they have psychological, emotional, physical (physiological) and social facets and sources but can be triggered from a non-present (distal) source, e.g. thinking about a stressor. But this dys-appearance may bring with it confusion or conflict about the very experience eliciting it and confusion or conflict regarding how to behave in response.

Though socialized into particular kinds of behaviours and adherence to social and cultural norms, the body is not simply a social entity; its biological features still obtain and exert force.

Steady state

As earlier notes on stress show, health requires balanced body systems and state, e.g. blood pressure, hormone levels (Shilling, 2003). If this is denied or restricted, imbalance and impaired well-being experienced through stress result. Stress's impact in service work is covered elsewhere but one should recall that distress and its outcomes can negatively affect specific and general bodily functions, e.g. blood pressure levels, the immune system's efficacy (Shilling, 2003) and lead to ill-health. Inability to regulate the body would seem heavily influenced by a stimulus elevating physiological arousal and feeling (emotion) in a context restricting the individual's ability to escape the stressor causing it. If (re)establishing physiological stability is difficult or impossible, this itself could increase distress. Service delivery norms might achieve this, viz. limit staff's perceived available responses and thus limit actual behaviour, i.e. restricting use of FFF energy in behaviours. The worker facing the aggressive customer would want to accelerate the body's return to normal functioning (by utilizing energy released) but be or feel yoked into continued interaction with the 'cause' of their stress and negative emotion because professional service behaviour requires it. In

other words, they are obliged to interact. The role expected of service workers leads to staff experiencing stress partly by trying to fulfil its role.

However composed an individual's (e.g. worker's) body may appear in interactions, it is subject to powerful internal activity and behavioural inclinations the individual wants to stabilize and manage. If that stability is not achieved, the worker bears the price for somatic and psychological-emotional imbalance. This may not be evident in behaviour. Much of the experience is likely to be contained in the workers' bodies and psyches beyond the social gaze; ER-based EL shows staff's performance can disguise personal arousal, experience, etc. Though the performance will present behaviours driven by professional considerations very different behavioural inclinations and emotions are likely to be felt by performers which the performance requires their suppression of. As a result, some of the corporeal experiences felt by performers remain internal, unseen and publicly unknown. The outer surface of the body as displayed in behaviour is seen but the impacts of control efforts to produce that display are invisible.

Summary

I argued in this chapter that service work is embodied and involves workers' bodies. Embodiment is a complex issue, both in itself and when considered in work contexts; it has dual meanings of being and doing. Service workers enact professional roles, part of which requires using bodies to perform with and through, and control and project emotions in order to effect the other party's emotion and behaviour. Such labour can be stressful because of staff's restricted capacity to express emotion and behaviour. I suggested that when WRH appears in the service encounter (when workers are under threat of possible physical harm) stress and emotion are likely to increase in intensity, the body re-appear in consciousness and negative impact occur in workers' bodies and psyches. Like the processes of ER-based EL enabling embodied professional enactment, such impacts remain largely publicly invisible and inside workers.

PART 4 summary

This section has introduced one context in which WRH occurs. Like WRH and associated behaviours and experiences (stress, emotion), service work involves biological, psychological and social factors. This is not simply because the biopsychosocial complexes of hostility, stress and emotion occur in service interactions, but because the context is not simply 'social'. Behaving in context involves the individual's body, psyche and social self in interactions with another person. Social influences on workers' behaviours, on their psychological processing, and their use of bodies in such work indicates complex relationships exist between such factors, and that doing service work effects workers in multiple ways. The demands and effects of performing the professional service role in the service context requires particular behaviours oriented to benefit others (the employer, the customer). These behaviours are subject to workers' self- and organizationally-influenced controls which restrict natural emotional and behavioural expression. This makes negative impacts on and in staff, especially if those behaviours and emotions are evolved to foster self-interest (survival).

PART 5

In this thesis I have argued for the validity of adopting an evolutionary perspective on human behaviour (which incorporates the notion humans and their behaviours are biopsychosocial) and an epistemology based in human ethology[38]. This synthesizes, argues for, and presents for consideration a new approach for studying behaviour in OB/OMS. Service work-based WRH is one example of behaviour amenable to such analysis, and is used as an illustration of the conceptual framework's relevance and power.

The chapters in this section apply the conceptual framework and ethological lens to analyse service-based WRH behaviours and explore a raft of connected issues; the dynamics of hostile interactions; the reactions they create; the behaviours parties are inclined to in response; the enactments they publicly make; the impacts of such encounters on the body-mind of interactants; and the potent effects WRH encounters have. I aim to show more fully how the evolved biopsychosocial complexes function in and between parties in hostile service situations, and what the various effects of same are. I use Wilber's AQAL to help chart these.

This section thus refocuses attention on the exemplum behaviour by analysing WRH incidents, and attempts to draw together the numerous strands covered in earlier chapters – the organizational context for service interactions; the use of the body and emotions in service delivery; the relative status of participants; the initial, internal reactions which occur and lead to responses enacted in public behaviours; and the complexity of biopsychosocial behaviour involved. The dynamics of interactions, and the impacts and effects they have for workers, customers and the organization, are explored. This considers what is happening (including what systems operate); who is affected; and what the impacts and effects are.

In Chapter 16 I explore the dynamics of service work interactions in context. I reconfigure the service triangle as a status hierarchy in which power can be exercised. I argue the relationships of parties in the hierarchy effect their behaviours and experiences. I

[38] Both the ontological and epistemological positions adopted accept a pragmatic materialism and physicalism but also acknowledge the social meaning and interpretations of meaning for agential beings, plus social science's findings and understandings of such behaviours.

consider WRH's trajectory, the manifold reactions it provokes in involved parties' bodies, and the responses it inclines workers to. My proposed trajectory for WRH reaction and response includes FFF/stress and emotion as well as hostility, and my consideration of these includes work-related conditions and context, corporeality, and performativity of service roles.

The multiple impacts WRH service work interactions have for involved parties is the focus of Chapter 17. These are seen as being biopsychosocial and linked to roles played, e.g. role conflict and dramaturgical stress of maintaining performance under demanding conditions. The chapter shows a more complex cluster of mutually-influential reactions and responses in and between interactive parties exists than may have been appreciated.

Chapter 18 looks at the effect(s) of service interactions for workers, customers and the organization. I propose the novel suggestion that ritualized behaviours are evident in hostile service interactions. These behaviours are driven by physiological arousal of survival-based body-mind systems and inclines parties to hostility; however, evolutionary forces limiting behaviour to ordered symbolic display restrain actual violence. Ritualized behaviour itself contributes to elevated arousal (through postures and movement). I then posit the novel idea that the biopsychosocial effects of ritualized behaviour results in WRH having a ritual effect on interacting parties. As such, I locate corporeality as the link between arousal, ritualized behaviour, ritual and theatricality/performativity.

In Chapter 19 I present the novel suggestion that the outcome of this ritual effect is a dominance hierarchy in which customers' status relative to staff enables them to exercise power through hostility in future interactions. I argue that they retain their status in the allocated hierarchy through this; similarly, staff remains in its less powerful position. These positions and 'power plays' sustain the status and dominance relationships and thus the release and effect of behaviours enacted in interactions between parties in ongoing fashion.

One objective of these chapters is to show the validity of my claim about the need for biopsychosocial and evolutionary conceptions of behaviour in OB/OMS. I believe this can be supported by analysing the exemplum behaviour. Another objective is to use the conceptual framework to explore service-based WRH to gain insights into it.

If successful, the framework argued for is defended and a new way to approach understanding of WRH (and possibly work stress and emotion, too) is presented. I also

believe new insights into the dynamic operation (in context), impacts and effects of biopsychosocial complexes (i.e. WRH, stress and emotion) results from the application. Approaches such as those in extant research are unlikely to have gained such insights because an evolutionary approach has not been adopted, behaviours and experiences have not been treated as being biopsychosocial in nature or character, and an epistemological lens able to accommodate such multi-faceted and complex behaviour has not been utilized in the WRH field.

Analysis of such incidents results in insights helping to clarify issues WRH research has not asked or answered, e.g. why WRH occurs; why it is so (subtly and insidiously) damaging for workers; why the behaviours staff inclines to when experiencing hostility, stress and emotion are rarely enacted; why service-based culture continues to be supported by staff's adherence to norms despite the harm staff often realizes this does; why customers aggress despite warnings not to. In this, applying the conceptual framework to the specific exemplum topic helps investigate and even to some degree test the hypotheses and theoretical concepts suggested thus far.

Chapter 16 Context and dynamics of hostile service interactions

Introduction

In this chapter I consider the dynamics of interactions between parties in context - the hostile customer displaying aggression and the worker attempting to deliver service. This has not been fully explored and analysed in service work or EL research. (Later analysis chapters in this section will consider the impacts and effects these dynamic interactions have for parties.) The focus here is what the status of each party in the interaction is, what the experience of each is and how it effects the individual and the dyadic interaction.

I argue staff operates in a status-based social hierarchy, a concept drawn upon to show the power relationship of the customer-worker dyad in interactions. The reaction (FFF) and responses (behaviour) elicited in interactions are outlined to indicate that though parties' behaviours follow the same trajectory (stress and emotion) and are connected (in the hostility chain) they are asynchronous and in opposition some of the time. I claim this creates complex feedback within the individual and between parties; reaction and response influence each other intra- and inter-personally.

Status hierarchy

Staff operates in the 'service triangle' (Macdonald and Merrill, 2009) between customers and the employing organization. This can be refigured as a 'status hierarchy', my term for the rank of individuals in the social order (hierarchy). I argue this re-figuration more accurately describes relationships involved between parties in hostile service interactions.

Such social order functions through status. Here, it results when service workers are cast as servants to satisfy customers. This is what Shamir (1980) calls a move from service to servility that risks achieving what Hancock (1997) calls a new Medievalism in these social relations; one group is lowered relative to another. Status is ascribed, not established in parties' interactions, i.e. the status of each would not necessarily ordinarily exist (i.e. in other social contexts) but is ascribed by the imposed social order of rank.

The expansion of the service triangle into a status hierarchy including status and relationship factors is represented in the figure below. Italicised text represents the type of threat and presence apparent in the relationship between customers (C), the organization (O) and staff (S).

Figure 16.1 - status hierarchy in the triad/service triangle



I suggest staff is subject to and weaker than both other parties. Common customer service credo prioritises The Customer as the focus of attention and effort, while staff is seemingly devalued relative to them (and the employing organization) apropos status and resources. Demands of the organization and The Customer could conflict, e.g. customers demanding action prohibited by the employer, creating further tension and conflict for staff, and raising questions of who staff should prioritize.

The power vector

One can view the status hierarchy as comprising a power vector in which two more powerful entities exert pressure on staff's behaviour. I indicate the lines of influence and power parties have in the figure below. The arrows indicate two-way influence; one party's influence on the other is represented near the arrowhead, e.g. O's influence on C appears near C. Dashed lines represent influence at range (i.e. parties are not co-present). The

unbroken line represents the customer-staff dyad in (co-present) interactions. This is a representative model of the power in the status hierarchy. (I later explore the effects of this: see notes on dominance hierarchy in Chapter 19.)

Figure 16.2 - power lines in the status hierarchy



This status hierarchy and inherent power vector in the service triangle is manifest in interactions but may itself be a source of tension, stress, emotion, conflict and subsequent harm should workers perceive it. The Customer pressures staff in real-time during interactions but the organization also exerts force on staff apropos policies and procedures it expects staff to adhere to. The organizational culture, specifically its service credo, which may have enculturated staff partially or fully is another potent influence on staff. The organization's influence appears during encounters (e.g. when a procedure is used or a policy referenced) but much of the time remains distal. When staff has to enact policy or procedures it becomes aware (if not already) of its reduced status because both the powerful customer (as a co-present, physical person and an abstracted entity) and the organization (as a presence manifested in norms staff is expected to obey) exert influence on its behaviour. As stated, this exertion may operate in mutually exclusive ways; customers may want something organizational procedures deny. Staff is in limbo at such times; which

master is served? The confusion, tension and contradiction may exacerbate workers' inner conflict, stress, emotion, and complicate the existing challenge (impacts and effects of the dynamic is explored in a later chapter). As they accomplish this workers also have to navigate their own personal needs, which may not equate with the organization's and/or the customer's needs or expectations. Staff is obliged to balance various demands and pressures in a shifting, dynamic interaction in which other parties' needs, identities, behaviours, etc., are not necessarily known or fully understood, which may be in tension or conflict, and which may change.

Additionally, as service credo can be seen as a manifestation of organizational culture, and a focused form of the wider social civilizing process concerning presentation of suitable behaviour (Elias, 1994) in which courteous conduct is expected, imposition of credo could be seen as a form of hostility (Schinkel, 2010) perpetrated against workers. Workers could be aggressed by a hostile customer and/or the employer (through explicit or tacit expectations regarding staff's behaviour) through the service triangle's power vector. In both cases, power plays out.

As noted in the customer service chapter, staff is not powerless despite being positioned in this status hierarchy and power vector. Though ostensibly weak and lacking in power and resources relative to the employer and customers, staff might be able to exercise power through subversive ploys motivated to (re)gain a sense of agency, self-respect and restore perceived injustice. But I argue the power vector - because of the roles allotted parties in it and the socio-cultural expectations operating through broad social and specific organizational contexts - results in greater opportunity for the customer to influence events through emotional expression and enacted hostility.

Dynamics of interactions

The 'hostility chain'

The previously-mentioned 'hostility chain' is a useful way to conceive of and visualize the reactions (e.g. stress, emotion) and responses (e.g. hostility) which occur in service-based WRH incidents. It specifically shows the customer-staff dyad in interactions.

In this thesis, I use the terms 'reaction' and 'response' in specific ways. Reaction is used to mean automatic (i.e. non-conscious) activity following a stimulus, e.g. FFF; 'response' means behaviour, i.e. observable action. I suggest reaction precedes and influences response, and response may influence subsequent reaction and further responses for the self and others. Reaction and response are part of the dynamic, in inter- and intra-personal realms.

Reaction

My proposed hostility 'chain' model claims specific, well-researched and well-understood bio-psychological reactions occur after a stressor presents itself. The person stressed (and perhaps also witnesses to it) will undergo automatic reactions without conscious processing or conscious inputs into decision-making.

Autonomic nervous system (ANS) reaction to a stressor in the form of the core stress reaction (FFF) will occur after the limbic system (LS) recognizes and/or appraises threat[39]. At the same time as or preceding this, depending on whether one accepts the Cannon-Bard or James-Lange theory, 'primary' emotion (e.g. fear, anger) will occur. This emotion and energy FFF released influences behaviour by inclining the individual to specific action (fight, flight) or stasis pending action (freeze). However, behaviour is also influenced by social norms centring on propriety of expression. Following this reaction, targets may reflect on their state (e.g. emotion), the situation (and its context), the status and roles of participants, etc. and (sub)consciously make decisions influencing what responses are enacted in behaviour.

As noted, the hostile party's behaviour has effects on staff); automatic reactions are triggered. But one should note that the hostile person has undergone the same process; the aggressor's displayed hostility was 'caused' by event X which elicited the his or her automatic reaction (FFF/emotion) which fuelled their response (hostility).

[39] Note, as previously explored, this LS activity triggers R-complex activity which controls some of the body's FFF functioning, e.g. respiration and heart-rate. Sensory data also routes to the cortex but its activity is slower than LS's.

Response

However, though behaviour follows mind-body reactions to stimuli, behaviour is not necessarily an undisguised presentation of arousal and/or emotion stirred by the stressor/event. That is, combat or escape propelled by fear or anger is not necessarily enacted in behaviour. The behaviour displayed is influenced by social norms, including service credo. Reaction occurs automatically and subconsciously - and is experienced and felt - but inclinations are filtered through or subjected to the pressure of social (including organizational) norms in order that their expression is acceptable; their manifestation in response (behaviour) does not always correspond to fight, flight, freeze, fear or anger. Though ANS reactions to a stressor are experienced in the body and psyche, an individual is not always (pragmatically-speaking) free to enact their behavioural inclinations to fight or flee or express emotion (though, ultimately they are free to) due to social (and organizational) norms imposing limitations on behaviour.

However, one should note as previously mentioned that behavioural reactions and experiences - FFF, stress, emotions like fear or anger – and the biological, psychological and social mechanisms/structures comprising biopsychosocial complexes - have effect (by operating), even if they are 'overwritten' by others (e.g. social behavioural norms). These complexes are not necessarily or always noticeable in behaviours. Indeed, they may be actively suppressed through emotional regulation (ER) to not show. Thus, emotions, stress and the behavioural inclination to counter-aggress a hostile customer may be suppressed or disguised by staff, but fear or anger, psycho-somatic stress and the pull towards enacting counter-aggression is still experienced by workers.

The biological (e.g. physiological, bio-chemical, anatomical) and psychological (e.g. perception, decision-making) systems which affect behaviour are sometimes well-known and understood. As shown in earlier chapters, they are also subject to social framing and understanding; viz. emotion is not simply a bio-psychological issue but a social one, too, and have effect in the social realm (through interaction). These complexes/systems/mechanisms function beneath ostensible behaviour(s); they are real but can be affected by other complexes/systems/mechanisms such as social and organizational norms which people express themselves, behave and interact in. These norms become inculcated in the culture

individuals uphold, and which act as suppressants to some human expression. (I explore these more fully later.) However, response can be seen in behaviour (e.g. threat display) and thus studied empirically.

Fuller consideration of the connection between inner experience (e.g. feeling, physiological arousal) following reaction and socially-located and interactive behaviour which constitutes response, is now required.

Reaction and response for the customer and staff

As the hostility chain shows, both interacting parties experience reaction and response. Hostility (H) functions as the connection between the two; behaviour for C and stressor for S. (See below on how H also connects the cross-over between inner and external realms.)

Figure 16.3 – the 'hostility chain'

(C) (S)

X →FFF/emotion → H → FFF/emotion → B

This diagram is to be seen as a shorthand description of the event and influence between involved parties. The arrow indicates this link and influence, though is used in its mathematical sense as one thing having *material implication* on another. Here, hostility as a stressor has some physical implication or effect (FFF/stress/emotion) on, in or for the recipient. Direct connection exists between reaction and response for and between individuals despite reaction and response seemingly occupying different domains; hostility, as behaviour, existing in the social domain between individuals; FFF/emotion, as psychological and/or physical, existing in the intra-personal biological or psychological domain. (I later explore connections between inner (individual) and external (e.g. behavioural, interactive) realms.)

The event X which prompts C's LS and ANS reaction(s) may be unknown to staff

facing hostility, e.g. staff may not be aware of why it appears. Staff dealing with the hostile person may have little or no available information before the hostility occurs. Experienced staff might be able to 'guesstimate' (potential) causes for or factors contributing to the aggressor's behaviour; work and life experience may attune workers to circumstances, conditions, etc. which tend to contribute to hostility. Thus workers may be partly prepared for its possible appearance, but they will then experience a drip-feed FFF energy release in anticipation of the stressor.

Internal and external realms in the dynamic interaction

The reaction and response to a stressor appears to operate in a simple cause-and-effect manner, with X and H as a stimulus (stressor) triggering stress/FFF and associated emotion leading to some behaviour (H or B) in response. However, matters are more complex. Both parties need to be taken into account. One should also consider the potency and importance of the (survival-geared) FFF reaction and systems involved in enabling its activity. Though the models posited are useful both are too linear and one-dimensional to fully describe the relationship between parties' reactions and responses, e.g. the dynamic interaction between parties. Neither indicates any subsequent phases of chemical release in FFF, phased of stress, and/or changing emotion which may occur as a result of the initial stressor and the reactions and responses it provokes. (I later offer an expanded version of the 'hostility chain'.) The models also do not indicate the complex interaction of inner and external mechanisms and influences in operation during such phases, which I believe require analysis. One should also note internal (I) and external (E) realms are involved. These can be identified in the model thusly –

Figure 16.4 – internal and external realms in the hostility chain



A useful way to conceptualize the relation between reaction and response, and to show the relationship between internal and external factors obtaining, is to use Wilber's AQAL model which references internal and external realms. FFF and emotion occurs as reactions in the individual's mind-body, bio-psychological activity in AQAL's top quadrants. These refer to the psychological and subjective self, feeling and emotion (I) and the objective material organism - brain, empirically-observable behaviour, anatomy, neurology, biochemistry (It). These are aspects of the individual domain.

This bio-psychological reaction prompts behavioural inclinations which, after the influence of social and cultural norms, manifests itself in responses enacted in social interaction. This activity relates to AQAL's bottom two quadrants – socio-cultural realms which are aspects of the collective domain. In my example, this behaviour would relate to adherence to the organization's service standards and rules and obedience of wider social norms pertaining to expression of emotion, stress and hostility.

The reaction occurs as a result of some environmental stimulus. That stimulus – here a stressor (specifically a hostile person) – appears in a social setting (the customer is the focus of the organization's service attention). (Other stimuli could be some psychological or bio-chemical pathology or imbalance and therefore not occur in the environment but in the individual).

The trajectory of FFF and emotion in the hostility chain

FFF as the core stress reaction was presented earlier. To recap, stress elicited by a stressor, which can be physical, psychological and/or social, comprises automatic biochemical release activated by brain-body mechanisms/systems/complexes in reaction to the stimuli. Activity is immediate and potent. Elevated physiological arousal results courtesy of the limbic system instigating endocrine system activity. Function occurs without conscious cognition and is powerful. The worker will be physiologically and psychologically inclined towards protecting his- or her-self from harm, and is inclined to physical action (fight or flight) or freeze (to gather data pending action) as this rapid energy release fuels motor movement for short-duration (quasi-)emergency encounters. Behaviour is thus propelled partly by biological systems serving to protect the individual from harm.

Both FFF and associated, attendant emotion have physiological and psychological components or facets, and are survival mechanisms evolved over many millennia which are hard-wired into our brains and bodies. Stress, emotion and hostility are examples, yet this view is not included in WRH or service literature. A hostile customer who implies or states intent to inflict psychological or physical harm on a worker (e.g. through threat display behaviour, verbal aggression, verbal threat), will trigger immediate, automatic, non-conscious changes in the worker's (psycho-)physiological state, i.e. elicit stress and emotion.

Thus, potent physical reactions occur in hostile service interactions, irrespective of whether the hostility is physical or non-physical (e.g. verbal or emotional abuse (Keashley, 1998). In encounters, ritualized behaviour occurs (see analysis below) and actual attack is restrained, but the powerful urge to defend the self remains and the core stress reaction actively propels such interest and behaviour.

Emotion (itself partly somatic, as indicated elsewhere) can be added to the FFF/stress trajectory model presented earlier. Both stress and emotion can be depicted in terms of (psycho-physiological) arousal. Connecting emotion with stress enables us to more fully consider what experiences occur in service interactions. Both stress and emotional reactions in such interactions can be acknowledged and explored in greater detail than previously achieved.

Figure 16.5 – FFF/stress/emotion trajectory



The upward and downward pathways in the trajectory of arousal and emotion are not necessarily smooth. Arousal could stall or even drop before re-firing. Emotions may change (e.g. in kind and intensity), e.g. fear become anger, anger become shame or guilt (if anger is considered or enacted). The downward path takes significantly longer than the upward one because initial perturbation to the body-mind (limbic system activity, FFF reaction and emotion is immediate and potent) but the arousal's potent biochemical effects and psychological outcomes (emotion) erode a slower rate if unused.

I now suggest interaction with another person during this stressful and emotional service interaction experience (see below) creates psycho-physiological turbulence. This implies that the stress and emotion are more complex than previously presented in service work literature. This literature does acknowledge stress and its effects can result from emotional labour but does not seem to analyse the complex interactions in service working nor how staff's complicated experiences occur from arousal in interactions.

Interactive overlap and asynchronous arousals

In service work, two (or more) parties are engaged in interpersonal interaction. Both the customer (who may not be hostile at the start of the interaction) and the service worker experience FFF/stress and emotion as indicated in the 'hostility chain' model.

That customers are in a state of FFF/stress and is rarely if ever mentioned in WRH or service work literature, and may have gone unnoticed. But it is essential to note the customer is in high arousal following some challenge to the self (e.g. unrecognized status, unmet needs, treated with perceived injustice) and experiences a bio-psychological reaction as a result of stress/FFF and emotion.

The interactive worker also experiences FFF and associated emotion (e.g. fear). Anticipating a challenging situation or person, dealing with uncertainty inherent in an unfolding situation and interacting with a hostile person might all contribute to this. Other but no less potent stress-related somatic reactions may occur due to role-maintenance (see notes elsewhere on dramaturgical stress), changing emotion or inner conflict between the personal and professional selves as they interact.

Interactions are dynamic, so emotions and stress for parties occurs asynchronously. Therefore the arousal trajectory for FFF/stress/emotion obtains for staff and customers as depicted below -

Figure 16.6 – Customer and worker upward and downward arousal trajectories



Though the same general arousal trajectory obtains for C and S, their synchrony is unlikely. Synchronous arousal is admittedly possible, e.g. staff might anticipate hostility and enter FFF/emotion just as the customer does, and their trajectories match. (This anticipation could result from experience or training, e.g. of factors or circumstances likely to influence customer hostility, aiding staff's prediction and prevention efforts) (Leather *et al*., 1998)). However, synchronized arousal seems doubtful. Even if it initially happened the influence of reaction and response in interaction makes it unlikely synchrony would continue (e.g. the initial stressor may trigger secondary stress reactions for the target). (Individual differences, e.g. personal tolerance thresholds, prior training and knowledge, etc., may colour responses following the stress reaction, but regarding hostility I suggest most people will react the same.) This strongly suggests hostile customer and service workers will be out-of-step regarding arousal in reactions fuelling responses.

It seems likely that 'lag' occurs between the customer's and worker's arousals. The former begins before the latter and I suggest is likely to remain asynchronous thereafter. The diagram shows staff's reaction occurs after C's along the x axis (time). Thus, it seems

reasonable to claim that commonly parties have arousal trajectories which are asynchronous and at times oppositional (indicated by the box in the diagram which shows the cross-over of C's downward and S's upward arousals).

Turbulence and interference of overlapping or crossed-over asynchronous arousals seems likely. I suggest the reaction and/or response of one or both parties will trigger reactions and/or responses in the other in complex array (as outlined in triple loop feedback model depicted later). Mutual influence seems a credible suggestion given staff's and customers' different status, e.g. the customer prompts the worker's reaction and response, staff's focus is The Customer and its efforts include accelerating the customer's return to calm and positive emotion.

Even if staff's efforts depletes some FFF energy and accelerates its own allostasis, staff is unlikely to return to a steady physiological and/or psychological (e.g. emotional) state before or simultaneously with the customer. By focusing on trying to accelerate the customer's homeostasis/allostasis through professional responses (courtesy, placation), the worker may extend his or her own arousal beyond its normal duration or intensity. (This is explored more fully in the next chapter regarding arousal created by body use in enacted responsive behaviours.) Recovery could be hampered and take longer than normal due to staff's lack of organizational support, e.g. lack of conflict management training, time allotted to foster staff's recovery, training in stress management to promote recovery, etc. (Recall the energetic approach to service work previously outlined.) As such, recover and stress management to achieve it becomes privatized and extends into workers' personal lives. Though it is feasible staff's use of FFF energy and emotion might accelerate its allostasis before the customer's (see Lilius (2012) on recovery in service work), this seems unlikely given the complexity and intensity of interactions.

Another way to illustrate arousal trajectories is offered below in the illustration below. This shows the divergent experience of parties and thus the gulf to be bridged by staff in interactions.

Figure 16.7 – divergent arousal pathways in service interactions



The labelling system for this diagram is the same as previously used with the following additions –

- 1 is C's reaction and response in the hostility chain (X →FFF/emotion → H).
- 2 is staff's reaction and response in the hostility chain (H → FFF/emotion → B).
- 3 is the triple feedback loop outlined below, which can occur at any point in time after staff's reaction, and ends ostensibly (from the organization's perspective) once C is calm and the service situation resolved. For staff, it may only end after some de-stressing effort after the encounter and in the worker's private life (see notes below on tragic outcomes in comedic situations). 3 includes ER and EL.
- EL shows the effort made by staff to meet C's needs or desires. C may well not know the intricacies (and costs) of this but expects the result of EL.

- ER is the self-regulation necessarily extended by S to enable EL in service interaction but which is invisible to customers.
- ER and EL could occur at any point on the time axis; their positions in the illustration are arbitrary.

I shall return to this FFF/arousal trajectory when exploring connections between biopsychological state and performativity in service theatre because it is an important feature. It is enough to note at this point that –

1. The trajectory of FFF/arousal is the same for each party.
2. Arousal pathways for the parties involved in a WRH situation are initially out of synchrony and likely to remain asynchronous.
3. Arousal pathways overlap, the crossover possibly creating further FFF/arousal/emotion.
4. Return to normal/steady arousal (homeostasis/allostasis) may occur 'naturally', be accelerated through effort or be delayed through activity. (I suggest for staff allostatic load - negative effects of habituation to higher stress - is a likely result because of the effects of repeated ER-based EL which can harm health.
5. Effects of overlaps between trajectories appear complex.

Also note that the inclusion of ER and EL here recapitulates the connection to service work stress made earlier. The diagram enables visualization of (negative) impacts of service work easier than perhaps previous research has.

Multiple influences of reaction and response

The analysis of customers and staff arousal focuses on the trajectory of reaction and response for and between the customer and staff. I suggest a 'triple feedback' loop functions within and between parties occurs during interactions, illustrated in the diagram below. This expands the hostility chain model presented earlier.

Figure 16.8 - triple feedback loop



Staff's influence (on C and itself) is shown in the top array of arrows; C's influence (on itself) is depicted in the bottom array. C's influence on S is illustrated in the hostility chain as already shown.

The worker's response B (which is displayed in behaviours and is seen in the external world in situated social interaction) can feed back into their own inner state (e.g. FFF/stress/emotion), and hence effect their reactions. This is experienced psychophysiologically in their internal, (intra)personal world[40]. This may then affect their response, e.g. changing or bolstering it. The same is true of C effecting their own inner state and external behaviours. (This is explored in the next chapter regarding physiological effects of ritualized behaviours.)

Feasibly, this behaviour could act as a stressor, e.g. a worker maintaining the service role thus creating more pressure. I suggest maintaining the role would seemingly not become a stressor for C, whose behaviour is tacitly permitted by the service credo, unless it failed to achieve desired results at which time it might do so. (These possible influences are depicted as dashed lines.)

The worker seeks to influence the customer. It may effect C's inner state/reaction, e.g. function as a calm- or stress-inducing influence, which may then influence C's response

[40] The comments below apropos dramaturgical stress associated with maintaining the service role conforms to this idea, as do later suggestions about hexis, bio-psychological impact and body and character armouring re: role formation, performance and maintenance.

(behaviour) just as the customer's (external) behaviour - H - initially triggered staff's (inner) reaction. This could then feasibly effect staff's subsequent reaction and response(s) and the customer's own internal state, and so on.

Thus, I suggest each party's responses effects their own and the other party's reactions (internal states, e.g. emotion, arousal) and responses (behaviours) which has subsequent effect in a complex array of mutual influence as the model illustrates[41]. I propose this will create complicated and potentially overlapping effects as complex interaction between internal and external factors for each party occurs, perhaps with 'lag' (delay) and interruption between an individual's reaction and response (i.e. between inner and external activity) and between parties' reactions and/or responses. Interference and turbulence patterns might also ensue as biopsychosocial impacts occur, stall or exacerbate those of one or both parties, complicating what seemed like a simple chain of linear causes and effects.

Despite limitations, the expanded 'chain' model outlined has value in indicating some important matters. First, it includes the potent bio-psychological forces which partially drive behaviour. That is, socially-situated behaviour can be seen as having facets other than those seen (e.g. biopsychological factors influencing behaviour). These have not been foregrounded or (I suggest) incorporated in OB analysis of behaviour or in specific WRH or service work research.

Second, the model shows that both the aggressor and the person targeted experience stress and emotion. To my knowledge, that the customer and workers are in stress and that this can effect behaviour in interactions is rarely if at all mentioned in research to date. This is important when considering interactive behaviours because parties may well be functioning at different intensities of arousal and in different emotional states, though both may change during the interaction. Each party is also behaving according to different roles (and hence under different rules associated with what is deemed suitable or acceptable behaviour) at different times. For instance, C enters stress/FFF earlier than S but

[41] Note; not all lines of influence would necessarily operate at any single point in time; that in interactions varying intensity of arousal and kinds of behaviour could occur; and that at any point in time many factors could be operating, some immediately and others in delay, and some internal and others external to the individual. The illustration does not capture the complexity of what might actually happen at time *t*, merely illustrates the connections between factors. Note also that the model is restricted to the customer-worker dyad; other influential factors, e.g. organizational and wider social influences are not included but are operating.

has his or her emotional expression 'licensed' by the organization's service credo (i.e. high status allocation, focus of attention) whereas staff enter FFF/stress afterwards as a result of the customer's behaviour and have emotional expression suppressed by the same credo. Interactions further influence matters. The 'expanded' hostility chain shows arousals are likely to be asynchronous and at one point (possibly more) moving in opposite directions. This implies turbulence and possible interference in the form of (oppositional) arousals in interactions which complicates an already highly-complex dynamic in which multi-faceted biospsychosocial complexes have mutually-influential impacts.

This connects to the previously-suggested idea that in order to address and manage the customer's behaviour, emotion and arousal, staff must overcome and/or channel its emotion and stress-reaction to the aggressor - which may exacerbate or extend its own arousal and emotion. This implies staff is left to cope with the residual stress which research literature on work stress identified as being damaging to health.

However, the chain model does not explain why the customer behaves with hostility, nor why workers do not typically counter-aggress but generally appear to maintain roles as professional servers. I later explore this by returning to the aforementioned status hierarchy and power vector which helps show customers are able to express emotion and display aggression in enacted behaviour and how staff are in practice tacitly dissuaded from doing so.

Summary

This chapter has focused on dynamics of hostile service interactions. I have outlined and considered the interpersonal interaction between parties and the intra-personal reactions within each party. This begins to indicate the complexity of the dynamic between customer and worker that exists, e.g. in the status hierarchy and power vector influencing behaviour; overlapping, asynchronous and oppositional stress reactions; mutually-effecting feedback within and between interacting parties' reactions and responses; and how the internal domain (of personal, inner, experience) and the external realm (of public behaviour and interactions) are connected. To my knowledge, these are not recognized in WRH or service work literature to date. I have suggested the dynamic increases demand on staff who

regulate such reaction (i.e. manage its own emotion and stress) in response (behaviours) to propel EL and address and manage customer's emotion and stress-related behaviour.

The biopsychosocial approach to behaviour I have used recognizes facets of behaviour that other service work or WRH research approaches have not identified or included as relevant, meaningful or influential. These approaches risk locating and studying behaviour in the psychological or social domain. Here, the social realm in noted as important because behaviour occurs in a social setting and is influenced by social factors. The psyches of individuals, as agential beings, are also important and involved in behaviour. However, biological issues (e.g. FFF) are included in analysis because reaction to stimuli are partly physical. The following chapter explores the biopsychosocial impact interactions have on those involved which results from the roles undertaken in service work.

Chapter 17 Impacts of hostile service interactions

Introduction

Aspects of the dynamic of customer-worker interaction were shown in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I explore the multi-faceted impacts the dynamic of WRH and associated experiences have on staff. I consider those impacts I see as most damaging.

I first posit and outline various conflicts exist in service-based WRH incidents exist, and outline them. I then consider the different roles interactive parties have - particularly of workers - and introduce the idea that sustaining role is stress-inducing. I suggest impacts occur because of the role staff adopts and enacts. I then outline the impacts WRH in service settings has. In this, I argue that because stress, emotion and hostility are biopsychosocial complexes their impacts are biopsychosocial. I suggest impacts are also potent because of tension between an individual's behavioural inclinations propelled by 'primitive' survival-oriented systems (FFF) and social norms pressuring suitable public behavioural enactments. This line of thinking includes the corporeal facet of behaviour and experience more fully than in previous WRH and service work research. Managing those impacts is presented as another challenge facing workers. As such, service-based WRH, conflict and impact is refigured and analysed as being more complex than earlier WRH studies have acknowledged.

Multiple conflicts

WRH seems to comprise one conflict – customers-to-worker – but I suggest other conflicts exist in service-based WRH encounters (outlined in the table below), all but the first of which relate to the effects of negative bio-psychological impacts on staff, e.g. psychosomatic illness.

Table 17.1 - Multiple conflicts in WRH

Multiple conflicts in WRH	
1	The customer is conflicted with the organization, e.g. not having desires met. The hostility customers display following physiological arousal to a stressor and emotion (e.g. anger) exemplifies this in behaviour.
2	This hostility targets staff; the customer is in conflict with the organization's representative.
3	Staff and customers are members of society socialized into expression of 'appropriate' behaviours. Personal inclination and social norms may be in conflict when individuals feel impelled towards enactment of socially-prohibited behaviour. Customers appear less inhibited than staff regarding hostile behaviour; I argue status afforded customers in service credo relaxes wider social prohibition on displaying hostility. Conflict seems particularly acute and common for staff. As the target of hostility staff may incline to self-protect yet as the organizational representative it has professional interests to consider, not just its own. Wider social forces influencing and steering public behaviour are overlaid and intensified by organizational norms about professional conduct.
4	Staff may feel conflicted about sustaining its professional role under such conditions. The stress and emotion service workers experience is not limited to that created (or contributed to) by the hostile customer but also occurs from the professional behaviour they are expected to maintain, which is influenced by organizational and social norms.

For staff and customers, the inclination to (counter-)aggress as a means to protect the self (physically, psychologically, and/or gaining or maintaining position and status) is automatic (subconscious) and occurs following a stressor's action in and on the person and their cognitive reflection on same. Yet workers may be in conflict about whether to enact hostility inclined to (manifest *Homo pugnax*) following FFF and emotion-led experience or to obey social rules about civilized behaviour and not 'descend' into such 'primitive' behaviour (manifest *Homo humanus*).

Conflicts arise for workers on the basis of their individual needs and professional obligations. The private individual experiences an oppositional tension between social

propriety and personal inclination in the psyche. The socialized individual may believe that fight - physically assaulting another person - is ‘wrong’ (e.g. immoral), unacceptable in the broad social context (civilized society) and unsuitable in the professional context, yet at the same time feel alienated from his or her own body, instinct, feelings, etc. by not enacting the inclination to protect the self. This state is physically and psychologically unhealthy. (A further tension in mind-body feasibly occurs within this conflict. FFF and emotion generates a powerful somatic effect inclining the person to movement and expression which conscious cognition, an important influence in steering social behaviour, is slower to respond to. If and when conscious mentation exerts influence, somatic effects have potentially already damaged the individual, or at least require management to restore health (e.g. stress management, natural recovery to homeostasis). Conscious cortical cognition and decision-making will not stop LS-driven ANS reaction occurring or impacting the individual’s body-mind.)

Conversely, the hostile customer seems to have experienced little or weak internal conflict about whether to express emotion or hostile behavioural inclinations. I argue this is due to this ascribed higher (’sovereign’) status temporarily releasing them from wider social restrictions on expression. I suggest the service triangle’s status hierarchy and power vector empowers customers and seemingly (tacitly) permits customers or influences their perception of being ‘licensed’ to express emotion and display displeasure even to the point of enacting hostility. Customers and the organization may view staff is expected to serve them despite such display. Irrespective of organizations’ apparent zero tolerance to WRH, customers are granted more leeway to express such behaviours because of the status ceded them relative to staff. Organizations thus offer a way for customers to express FFF and emotion-driven *Homo pugnax* inclinations and do not prevent or limit this as zero tolerance policies on WRH might suggest (This also presents opportunities for customers’ catharsis through vented emotion - see below - and uses FFF energy. This promotes the customer’s recovery.) Therefore customers are more likely to fully use FFF energy in behaviour than staff.

The Professional Service Worker facing the hostile customer experiencing FFF and inclined to self-protection-based escape or retaliation is likely to be or feel yoked into

continued interaction with the cause or trigger of their stress, negative emotion, psychosomatic tension, conflict and confusion - because professional service behaviour requires it. Using energy released in FFF in actual fight or flight is likely to be viewed by customers and the employer as unsuitable. Responses could fully channel FFF energy into socially- and organizationally-approved versions of fight or flight, e.g. conflict management or withdrawal, but may not use all energy. Moreover, further energy may be released in the interaction. If staff is alienated from the work or organization, as Hochschild's research shows does occur, staff will find it difficult to address and resolve the experience, e.g. staff is unlikely to be able to address the impacts because of its alienation. Professional role requirements and obligations thus overlay private experience and further complicates conflict. But role conflict which exists between the private and professional selves also exerts influence.

Role conflict

For staff, role conflict constitutes some gap, tension and opposition between the professional role expected and the worker's 'real' self (as Hochschild's research (1983) revealed).

Staff functions under both organizational and social pressures to enact its role, including manifesting 'suitable' behaviours expected of a professional service worker as well as that expected of a civilized person. Organizational pressure influences role adherence and behaviour through service credo. Maintaining this introduces a more specific (if tacit and inferred) cluster of organizational norms in addition to the more general social norms pertaining to 'civilized' human behaviour. (It is related to the wider social norms and is an applied or extended and focused version of it.) The diagram below illustrates this –

Figure 17.1 - social influences on staff's and customers' behaviour



Staff may also actively suppress its own expression of emotion, stress and hostility. I posit that the result is tension concerning what behaviour is enacted – behaviour expected by the organization or desired by the individual. This implies tension exists between different selves, i.e. the individual's personal identity and the Professional Service Worker persona. I noted in an earlier chapter that stress can result from moving between roles, e.g. the genuine self and the professional self. Stress and associated ill-health can occur from role conflict between these (Beehr and Glazer, 2005). The worker may suffer false consciousness (Shilling, 2003) through feeling fake because the performed behaviour is enacted or displayed for organizational rather than personal objectives. Service workers seem prone to this (dis)stress and cognitive-emotional dissonance. The clash between a person's personal self (here, the behaviours inclined to in hostile interactions) and the behaviours and presentations expected in work contexts to fulfil the professional role would contribute to this mental conflict. A difference seemingly exists between the real self and the façade presented for public display used in social interactions, as Goffman contended, so moving between them might exacerbate this tension.

Dramaturgical stress

Despite conflict between the self and the role played, service workers do seem to fulfil expected roles. However, when 'in role' workers may suffer from 'dramaturgical stress' associated with maintaining their professional role. Stress may result from role-play or -taking in performative service work because role is subject to influence of various norms - general social, specific organizational, and personal (e.g. the aforementioned role conflict) norms. Service workers' professional and organizationally-directed role (irrespective of whether workers are fully aligned to it and act it with genuine conviction or not) may itself lead to more stress in trying to maintain said role.

Already stressful because of FFF and emotion reactions and role conflict, role maintenance in WRH incidents increases stress. This connects directly to the emotional and corporeal regulation necessary in EL, which takes effort to accomplish but risks alienating the personal self. The outcome may be further conflict, i.e. in the worker or between the worker and the organization. The above indicates service-based hostility, stress and emotion can be re-examined as more being complex than previously presented in the literature.

Stress experienced in an interactive social context is not one-dimensional but manifold, dynamic and creates complex experiences in those exposed to it. It is not just created or exacerbated by one source (e.g. an aggressor) but multiple sources including tension between differing identities/selves and between the other parties interacted with. This implies that not only might an external stressor (e.g. a hostile customer) 'cause' stress for and in a service worker but that enacting the expected role (to courteously serve the customer) could also create stress reactions in the worker. Stress associated with role conflict and dramaturgical stress will manifest itself in the psycho-physiological reactions outlined elsewhere, thus extending stress, emotion and associated harms.

As noted, maintaining the role includes workers managing stress and emotion to avoid service delivery failure. This means as the worker faces an external stressor triggering their inner stress they also try to manage the external situation and interaction with the customer (i.e. use impression management to manage personal behaviour and influence customer reactions and behaviours, e.g. to calm them). More stress may accrue through this

because of the dramaturgical stress created by role maintenance itself requires management, which might create more stress requiring management, and so on.

I suggest in trying to manage the service encounter and its attendant stress and emotion through ER, workers may behave in ways which inadvertently increase stress and negative emotion. This echoes Aneshensel's (1996) belief that mediators and moderators of stress can themselves damage psychological and physical health. In trying to limit stress created by the hostile customer, workers' ER-based EL paradoxically fosters further emotion, stress and conflict because it enables workers to continue to act in the official service role that initially exposes – and continues to expose – them to (hostile) customers. These interactions release initial and subsequent stress necessitating further or more intensified use of the professional role to manage it. Even if staff sustains the service role with loosened commitment, e.g. moving from deep to surface acting, or even implying to customers its lack of genuine care whilst still maintaining the outward semblance of service delivery theatre (e.g. processing customers efficiently but emotionlessly), staff still occupies the service role. As such, staff does not act on FFF or express emotion 'naturally', which could constitute the collapse of service delivery theatre (a social drama). Though continued or strengthened use of the professional role may resolve the customer's 'problem' and foster their calm (e.g. by accelerating return to a stable arousal level and emotionally satisfying the customer), this effort may protract or elevate workers' arousal and serve to stall their own recovery to a stable state necessary for health[42].

I suggest it is a challenge to continue service delivery through appropriate service role enactments, e.g. disguise the acting involved to conceal the inclinations to counter-aggress or flee and the emotion (anger, fear) released in interactions, when interactions create stress. If workers do manage to they may still experience confusion and conflict about the situation they are in, and question their continued service work. This is another potential 'level' of confusion or conflict felt internally by staff. Workers may feel pulled in two more directions; continue to serve or resign. If the former is chosen, the tension could result in

[42] Social factors influencing perception and understanding of stress and emotion may well have effect here; individuals may not recognize they are stressed, habituate to (dis)stress and then develop attitudes, behaviours and practices which de-emphasize stress (e.g. accept norms about accepting stress or emotional upset as part of one's job).

weakened service delivery as it simultaneously and paradoxically encourages staff's use of ER for EL to adhere to service roles. This could erode genuine service by making professional role adherence and service performativity harder to achieve by inclining the worker from deep to surface acting to fulfil job requirements. (For staff, this would necessitate less investment in performance than that requiring genuine emotion.)

Some staff may perceive such costs and recognize conflicts. This may encourage workers to query why they continue to expose themselves to the experience. (Until workers actively address this situation they will continue to be impacted negatively through the stress and emotion such multiple conflicts and dissonances create or contribute to.) Workers do experience alienation from their employing organization and/or work (Hochschild, 1979), which is linked to alienation from the self, but workers are also self-alienated and perceive they alienate or betray themselves by continuing in such work.

It seems odd that service workers do not resign or counter-aggress the direct source of their stress (customers) and/or the indirect source (the employer) for exposing them to such negatively-affecting experiences. Staff may find ways to ostensibly cope with these conflicts and impacts (e.g. rationalization, acceptance of the situation). As previously noted, service work is not all negative, so staff might balance negatives against positives. Some staff might resign; others might enact forms of resistance or retaliation aimed at the customer and/or employer in order to restore perceived injustice[43]. This author's previous (unpublished) empirical research shows many workers continue in service work without such enactments, seemingly habituating to the experiences they have in and from WRH encounters and service work generally (Cooper, 2010). One risk of this is that over time distress elevates and damages the individual and his or her capacity to interpret body signals and/or respond to stress malfunctions (see MacRae, 1975). I argue this is partly because the effects of service-based WRH are biopsychosocial.

[43] Such counter-hostility may be explicable as being justified or a moral imperative and not pathological *per se*. It might be as understandable as customer hostility, and more defensible.

Interim summary

I have indicated WRH incidents are complex. This complexity is due to multiple conflicts that exist for customers and staff, e.g. the various social influences effecting behaviour and emotional expression (especially for staff who are limited through service credo which paradoxically appears to permit customers' expression); staff's maintenance of professionalism; and the role conflict and dramaturgical stress staff experiences. All of these factors can release, exacerbate or add to staff's stress, which requires further ER/management if the Professional Service Worker Role is to be sustained. One should remember stress and emotion are natural reactions in the hostility chain, but the restriction on staff's expression/enactment of same can be damaging.

Biopsychosocial impacts

I have claimed the effect of stress and emotion in WRH incidents is damaging if such arousal is not used in behaviour or vented appropriately. I suggest this is partly the case because instrumental(ized), commercial, professional use of workers' bodies and emotions affects workers' bodies, emotions and psyches.

Hostile interactions have psychological and physiological effects. I posit that service workers who are already expected to manage their own emotion(s) and influence customers' emotions are further pressured by (dys)appearance of more (and powerful) emotions and stress in their body-minds as a result of this expectation and interaction. Impact is felt on or in the 'inner body' (viz., emotions' feeling facet) and in the psyche. Both are private experiences but may leak into behaviours.

The corporeal reaction experienced in social context is one reason why WRH studies (and organization studies more generally) should incorporate the body in analysis. It must be included because physiological arousal, sensation, and emotion all attend exposure to threat and are potent experiences for targets of hostility (in addition to the obvious reason workers' bodies may be the targets of intended or possible physical harm). As previous analysis on stress shows, physiological arousal that goes unused may have a detrimental psycho-somatic effect on the individual (see Elias (2005) on unexpressed fight or flight): the body becomes exhausted and this can lead to potent protective chemicals eroding the organism

producing them (e.g. impairment through unregulated cortisol). Service encounters seem not to allow full venting in behaviour, and organizations may not have developed provision for staff to de-stress following service interactions. The arousal thus has corrosive effect for workers (and by association, negative effect for customers and the employer).

The presence, sensation and activity of the body and psyche in service work and hostile interactions can create mental or emotional dissonance because of service work demands and the tendency of hostility to trigger 'uncivilized' urges, e.g. to (counter-)aggress. The contemporary 'civilized' individual feels propelled by what they may perceive as (and are socially-defined as) 'primitive' urges. At such times, somatic experience may dominate feeling (and consciousness, and possibly also cognition) because of its potency, even though workers feel the powerful influence of socialization pressurizing them not to enact inclinations to maintain their professional service role and remain 'civilized'.

Psychological and somatic tension can be seen as tension between different phases of human evolution at a single point in time - the weight of phylogeny on the ontogenetic individual in a specific situation. It is the instant, compelling reversion to an earlier body-mind state and behavioural inclination in the contemporary context and time-frame which effectively disallows enactment of the behaviour it triggers. (I argue elsewhere these find expression instead in ritualized behaviours which are evolved to limit injury from violence but still allow expression of hostility, and are driven by the same mechanism/systems/complexes as actual hostility. However, as explored below, negative outcomes can still result.)

Summary

This chapter indicates something of the complexity inherent in doing service work and the effects doing it have. I have claimed negative biopsychosocial impacts (i.e. stress, emotion) occurs for staff who adopt the Professional Service Worker persona. Dramaturgical stress inherent in maintaining service role and role conflict between an individual's natural expressive behavioural inclinations propelled by evolved mechanisms/systems/complexes (i.e. FFF) and adherence to socially- and organizationally-approved norms regarding behaviour are ways this occurs. These impacts require management if service is to be delivered, which itself may create more negative effects. Thus, multiple conflicts exist

between and within parties in service-based WRH encounters. Moreover, staff realizing these tensions and conflicts exist (as Hochschild (1983) suggests staff does) and have effect may be conflicted about its continued service working.

One might query why staff continues to work under such conditions on realising what the negative impacts this work have. In the next chapter I introduce an explanation of this by looking at the results of impacts. I do so in a way that has not before been used in WRH or service work literatures to my knowledge; I argue the effects of service work-based hostility and associated stress and emotion have the function and effect of ritual through the biopsychosocial impacts they make.

Chapter 18 WRH's ritual effect

Introduction

In this chapter I consider what the effects of the previously-mentioned impacts of service-based WRH are.

I posit the theatricality of service work (previously outlined) helps create opportunities for WRH to appear because it allocates status enabling customers' expression of emotion and behaviour in hostility whilst simultaneously restricting staff's. I also argue hostility in service-based WRH is ritualized behaviour. This is evident in customer threat display and staff's appeasement or submission displays in response. These are behaviours propelled by LS-based hostility, stress and emotion, but evolved to limit effects of actual violence. I then propose parties are biopsychosocially effected through experience of single and repeated WRH encounters. I further argue that the combined and cumulative effect of biopsychosocial complexes activated in interactions has the effect of ritual. I propose that ritual constrains behaviours by affecting participants' inner/personal experience and public enactments through the inscription of biopsychosocial impacts. Ritual then serves to sustain the theatricality of service work through the maintenance of status-based roles performed in later interactions.

Service theatre

I previously outlined the performative character and theatricality of service work. I have argued service work requires staff to adopt the role of Professional Service Worker and perform it through embodied enactments. Staff's role is presentational in character and attempts a projection of identity to customers. Staff literally and metaphorically re*presents* the organization in service interactions, and is seemingly expected to be the epitome of the organization and its service excellence[44]. For staff, service work is a corporeal, presentational and performative activity.

[44] The organization may have unrealistic expectations of service staff. Staff's 'failure' to enact service standards ironically means genuine standards are actually shown.

Huxley (1977) drew attention to the body in dramatic action to explicate how corporeality relates to theatrical enactments. I extend this idea in two ways. First, I note the trajectories of theatrical action in tragedy as identified by Freytag (Cuddon, 1979) and FFF and emotional arousal are identical in shape. I suggest Freytag's concept can be used to represent general dramatic action in social life not only theatre or tragedy[45]. Second, I note the body is central to and requisite for enactments; here, it is driven by FFF and emotion manifesting itself in ritualized behaviours (see below). If ritualized behaviour is triggered in performative service interactions, systems driving it are triggered and exert effect. Thus, the body and psychosomatic experience fundamentally and literally requires incorporation into study. To my knowledge this has not been done to any noticeable degree in research into emotional labour, service work or WRH.

Stress/emotion and dramatic action trajectories

Freytag's pyramid (illustrated below) shows the general trajectory of dramatic action, as depicted in the illustration below -

Figure 18.1 - Freytag's pyramid



[45] Tragedy is a theatrical genre in which the downfall of a high-ranking protagonist due to some flaw of character of error of judgement is depicted. One of its aims is to arouse the audience's fear and pity and achieve catharsis of these emotions. Cuddon (1980) remarks its origins are possibly rooted in sacrificial ritual.

Aristotle identified similar features of tragedy (Cuddon, 1979) and his nomenclature appears in italics in the table below.

Table 18.1 – Phases of dramatic action

Phase	Action
Exposition	Dramatic action starts to unfold. Background information, setting, characters involved, etc. is given.
Rising Action (*complication*)	An 'inciting' incident to prompt events marks a change; action emerges, complicates (through a crisis or crises) and builds to the point of climax
Crisis or multiple crises	Rising action continues
Climax	The turning point for action, when the main character's fortune or fate changes
Falling Action	Depicts change (quick or slow, a single change or multiple changes), e.g. reversal of fortune (*peripeteia*), commonly occurring as a result of some discovery by, revelation to or recognition (*anagnorisis*) by the main character.
Resolution or denouement (*catastrophe*)	Stability occurs, e.g. restoration of order or new order, but at cost, e.g. loss, injury, death.

The hostility chain contends FFF and emotion are triggered for the hostile customer and responsive service professional as per FFF/stress and emotion trajectory in hostile interactions (which are inherently dramatic encounters) –

Figure 18.2 - FFF/stress and emotion pathway following a stressor



I suggest Freytag's and Aristotle's concepts for dramatic action are useful in helping explicate participants' bio-psychological arousal in performative social interaction; it bridges between biological/intrapersonal and social/interpersonal realms. One can 'map' arousal and dramatic action. Essentially, the same points or phases of activity correspond for customers and staff in interactions[46] -

- stressor - inciting action
- stress and emotion reaction - complication
- peak arousal - climax
- use of energy or (stress-based) exhaustion - falling action
- homeostasis/allostasis – resolution

Further points to note are -

1. The general service context in which action and activity occurs and the specifics of the particular incident can be seen to comprise exposition though the unfolding of action may not be as clear as in a dramatic text.
2. Interaction between parties occurs throughout.

[46] One should note theatrical action is designed to achieve some resolution; arousal and action in life, including service work, is not and is not necessarily as easily manipulated to accomplish this result.

3. Action utilizes but does not necessarily fully use energy released in interaction.
4. The above trajectory applies to both parties but as earlier illustrated, lag may occur between the customer's and the worker's arousals/emotions.
5. In interactions, the worker's arousal level may be in cross-over with the customer's. Staff promotes customer satisfaction through fostering the latter's emotional and behavioural stability while still in high-arousal state itself. The customer's reversal of state from stress/upset to satisfaction marks successful service delivery/recovery.
6. The incident might not be resolved fully for the customer, e.g. he or she may remain dissatisfied.
7. Regarding resolution for staff, allostatic load, loss (e.g. of self-esteem, motivation, integrity) or harm incurred (e.g. stress, upset) may be the cost of the stability achieved.
8. Even if the incident is resolved to the customer's (and organization's) satisfaction, resolution may not occur within the span of the interaction for the worker. A worker's body, arousal level, emotion and/or psyche may be perturbed afterwards and continue to have effect beyond the incident's duration. Resolution may not occur for considerable time if at all. In extreme cases, serious stress and illness may stall resolution, e.g. post-traumatic stress disorder.

Despite Huxley's concept of the body in the play and the historical connections between performance genres like theatre, ritual and ritualized behaviour are known (as explored below), the association of FFF/stress/emotion (in WRH or other settings) and dramatic-theatrical action has to my knowledge not been explored. The similarity of physiological arousal and dramatic action may not have been mentioned before. WRH is inherently dramatic because of conflict. Interaction occurs in a setting in which staff (and customers) perform a role, and in which an audience is (or audiences are) played to and action is directed. Behaviour in (inter)action is propelled by body-mind systems evolved for

survival, FFF and emotion. This means that once such behaviour is released it has potent biopsychosocial effect on those involved. Before exploring this, I consider the behaviours appearing in WRH interactions.

Interim summary

I suggest the phases of dramatic action and arousal (FFF/emotion reaction to a stressor) correspond. This makes sense because the body is used in performative enactments in interactions that here are inherently dramatic (WRH). However, the previously-mentioned crossover arousal trajectories and feedback loop within and between parties complicates matters, adding to tension in and between interactants in the dramatic (inter)action.

Ritualized behaviour

Arousal released in hostile service interactions - automatic physiological reaction and associated (primary) emotions - inclines parties to fight or flight but this seems rarely enacted as such (literature shows much WRH is not violence and though some workers counter-aggress colleagues, I know of no study researching worker-to-customer aggression). Hostile customers' and responding staff's displays can be understood in ethological terms as ritualized behaviours restricted through the evolutionary process to limit violence and the harm it makes.

Schechner (1993) charts the evolutionary path of ritualized behaviours from 'primitive' animals (e.g. reptilia) through mammalian and primate species to *Homo sapiens*, suggesting a direct line can be traced through them.

As outlined elsewhere, ethologists view aggression as a natural behaviour animals display when meeting environmental needs/challenges, e.g. predation; defence of self, young and territory; securing or defending status (Moyer, 1976). Such situations are common to many animals and aggression is displayed by most if not all species. All animals have vested interest in survival. Aggression has a functional role promoting an animal's ability to survive; on occasion and for specific objectives, aggression and the function of systems connected with it (viz. FFF) are essential. Aggression is therefore not dysfunctional,

pathological behaviour *per se* but normal, health-promoting behaviour in many specific cases, and though its form varies (i.e. because of species-specific behaviour patterns), aggression's function remains the same. (Of course, some manifestations of hostility may be pathological, e.g. due to brain-body system malfunction, and in human cases be anti-social and criminal. Hostility's effects can also be negative.)

Hostility has been retained as an adaptive human behaviour should a life-or-death threat occur. However, threats for animals or contemporary humans (including hostile service interactions) are not necessarily physical or a lethal threat to life and do not require physical aggression/violence. But the FFF systems operates anyway and does trigger inclination to self-defence. For humans, challenges can be psychological or social. Pride and shame are involved; threats to ego, sense of self, social position, etc. elicit FFF and attendant emotions (e.g. fear, anger) because they jeopardize the individual's sense of safety, status or self, as previously noted.

As noted earlier, mechanisms/systems/complexes underpinning threat reaction and leading to hostility-related behaviour are the same as in earlier era despite a different context and (social, organizational) factors operating. However, that context seemingly prohibits the behaviour that reaction to threat inclines the individual to. Behaviour does not always manifest fight or flight in animals or humans. Often, hostility is expressed in ritualized behaviour indicating hostility (or appeasement) which channels fight/flight energy. Evolution has restrained physical hostility in many situations to foster survival, though perhaps not to the extent always believed (Callan, 1970). (Threat display could become physical violence; the 'bluff charge' (an intention movement) could become a real charge (into combat) should projected intimidation fail.) The aggressor and target typically behave in ways to avoid physical, psychological and social costs associated with actual combat (i.e. injury, death, loss of status/social position).

Ritualized hostile behaviour functions symbolically as communication signalling status, intent, emotion, etc., and is understood as such because it is manifested in ordered, even predictable, forms. It is enacted publicly and so is a social act(ivity) serving numerous functions, as shown in the table below –

Table 18.2 – some functions of ritualized hostile behaviour

	Ritualized hostile behaviour functions to…
1	Deal with challenges/changes to social order/status of group members and as a means to maintain social order through intimidation and threat of harm being presented.
2	(Re)establish social order by signalling every party's place in the social (status-based) hierarchy, and show what the (new or continued) order is following the interaction.
3	Educate and sustain normative rules about what constitutes appropriate behaviour apropos (open, interpersonal) conflict by training others in the processes for establishing or changing individual status or position. Animals learn how to make challenges and how to behave once challenges are launched by witnessing contests. It establishes the rules concerning the status hierarchy and how dominance can be achieved to secure or safeguard status and social position.

It restricts fighting and its outcomes whilst enabling contest, power plays and status challenges to occur and be resolved through expression of hostility. Postures, gestures, motion and verbal expressions (not necessarily language) used in reaction to human hostility are ritualized (and at root, animal) behaviours. As such, actual or ritualized hostility is one behaviour ethology has studied in a range of animals including humans. WRH as an example of hostility is amenable to such an approach. The ritualized behaviour associated with hostility - threat display and its antithesis, appeasement and submission display - is now explored.

Threat, appeasement and submission displays

Threat display projects power to intimidate the opponent into submission. Its antithesis, appeasement display, signals non-threat. Associated submission display unambiguously signals weakness and accepted loss in order to end the conflict encounter.

Threat display is used when one creature puts another's status, health or territory in jeopardy, e.g. when β challenges α's position[47]. (Other situations such as the jeopardized safety of young or the life of the threatened party elicits immediate (counter-)attack rather than threat display, or faster acceleration from threat display to combat.) It is hostility and is propelled by the same systems.

In such face-to-face oppositional interactions one or both parties presents (possibly exaggerating) capacity to intimidate the other into capitulation and enforced compliance (Marsh *et al*. 1978; Pliner *et al*. 1975). Threat can be defined as indicated preparedness to do harm. By presenting this, a party aims to elicit fear in the opponent so it submits. Such posturing is a key feature of aggression (Grossman, 2004).

Usually, hostility stops short of combat because of risks associated with fighting. Displays are species-specific (Hall, 1964), though common characteristics are evident through comparative analysis (de Waal, 2005; Pliner *et al*., 1975). Once one party secures dominance, the other submits; α does not attack the appeasing/submitting β but accepts β's capitulation.

Common threat display behaviours are included in the table below –

[47] Social rank within a group is indicated thusly; alpha (α) – the highest-ranked individual; beta (β) – the second highest; gamma (γ) – third highest, etc. (See previous comments apropos the customer-organization-worker status hierarchy.)

Table 18.3 - threat display

Threat display behaviour	Animal example	Human example
Size increase	Extension to full height Extension of limbs	Arm-spreading
Eye contact	Gaze, stare	Gaze, stare
Noise	Roaring Snarling Hooting	Shouting Swearing
Weapon display	Baring teeth or claws	Balling fists Picking up actual/fashioned weapon
Movement and terrain control	'Intention motion' towards the opposition, e.g. 'bluff charge'	Moving into a target's proxemic zones Twitching to trigger opposition's 'startle reaction'

Appeasement or submission behaviours intended to placate the opposition, signal non-threat, weakness or acceptance of the other party's higher status are the antithesis of threat display. The table below includes examples –

Table 18.4 - Appeasement and submission display

Appeasement & submission display behaviour	Animal example	Human example
Size decrease	Shrinking from full height	Shrinking from full height
Eye contact	Lowering gaze, gazing less frequently, gaze avoidance	Lowering gaze, gazing less frequently, gaze avoidance
Sounds to imply weakness/non-threat	Silence Whimpering	Apology Soft voice tone Silence
Weapon retraction	Concealing teeth or claws	Opening fist Lowering a weapon
Movement, terrain yielding	'Intention motion' away from the opposition	Moving away through proxemic zones
Appeasement or submission gestures	Exposure of a vulnerable body part	Showing the palms Pleading gestures

Note that physical position is also important but not detailed here; see Argyle (1975) and Machotka and Spiegel (1982) on such issues.

I suggest in service-based WRH interactions, both hostile customers and responsive staff usually display ritualized behaviour. I argue the status hierarchy and power vector inherent in service work influences parties towards ritualized behaviours; customers to threat display and staff towards appeasement and submission. (Staff may still experience the

aforementioned role conflict despite enacting ritualized behaviour.) As noted, customer hostility is not usually violent (as WRH research acknowledges) but instead manifests in verbal aggression, intimidation, etc. Staff seems to rarely respond to customers with open aggression or violence.

I suspect the behaviours enacted are more likely to be unconscious and automatic than conscious impression management (cf. Felson (1978) on WRH as impression management and Harris (2008) on fraudulent customers), though some conscious thought and deliberate decision on propriety of expression and behaviour may occur. Staff is arguably more conscious of its impression management (Bolino, 1999) than customers would need to be. I would argue, however, that postures, gestures, and motions appearing in ritualized behaviours are subconsciously enacted. One does not need to work out how to gesture in placatory fashion; it is a natural (evolved) action (e.g. backing off, showing palms).

Note, threat display manifests fight and appeasement/submission manifests flight. As stated, threat, appeasement and submission display behaviours are driven by the same motivations and complexes/systems/mechanisms as hostility and threat response; they are versions of same. Turner links autonomic nervous system (ANS) responses with (pre)mammalian brain systems – specifically MacLean's (mammalian) limbic system (LS) and (reptilian) R-complex. WRH provokes powerful reactions evolved over millions of years and activated in evolutionarily-older brain structures and body mechanisms/systems/complexes. When facing (potential) harm, these systems automatically activate and propel ritualized behaviours manifesting in body postures, motion, playing out between parties.

However, threat, appeasement and submission displays are not just fuelled by physiological arousal stemming from LS-driven ANS activity (i.e. FFF), but add to it. Schechner (1993), citing Turner, and Zarilli (2007) indicate taking up a physical position and using postures, gestures, motion or stasis can trigger further physiological arousal. Goodman (1990) and Grotowski, cited by Schechner (1993), researched posture and movement respectively. Goodman records specific positions relating to altered psychic/experiential states accompanied by marked, scientifically-observed physiological changes. Recent OMS research (Carney *et al*., 2010) supports the notion posture influences physiological arousal.

Intentional adoption and use of dominant postures in work settings elevated specific chemicals effecting subjects' psychological state (i.e. increased confidence and well-being) and improved (work) performance. Adoption of corollary postures had the opposite effect, e.g. lowered testosterone (Carney *et al*., 2010). Body comportment in stasis and motion thus appears to have direct effect on physiological state which is seen to be correlated with mental state and social performance. Moreover, people interpret status from such postures in work settings (Carney *et al*., 2005).

Interim summary

Behaviours in WRH can be seen as ritualized behaviours (e.g. threat display, appeasement/submission display), an ethological concept denoting behaviour propelled by the same mechanisms/systems/complexes as actual hostility and threat response because it *is* hostility and threat response but restricted by evolution into symbolical presentations to enable communication and power-plays without harms associated with actual physical aggression. Ritualized behaviours may be subconsciously adopted because of allocated (and accepted) status/role, consciously used (as impression management) or a blend of the two. Whichever is the case, negative outcomes seem to result through FFF-related chemicals not fully used in behaviour and the arousal created by body-use in ritualized behaviours. This damages the non-dominant individual (a return to stable state may not occur easily or at all for workers) (Elias, 2005). I now suggest as such ritualized behaviour enacted in such interactions has the effect of ritual on both parties.

Ritual

Rituals function as markers of transition as community members move from one position or role to "the incumbency of new status" (Turner, 1969: 106). In this, ritual "reaffirm[s] the order of structure" in and of the particular society (Turner, 1969: 177) and has consequences regarding "changed social relationships" (Argyle, 1975: 152). As such, it is an example of Bourdieu's body hexis (and perhaps the establishment of habitus through biopsychosocial influences (see Pickel, 2005)). A culture organizes and mediates its rituals as vehicles for the transmission or imposition of socio-cultural norms and order. Ritual is

used to initiate participants into new roles and thus position them in society. Ritual (re)integrates members temporarily displaced to a literal or symbolic liminal (marginal) place or state through some corporeal event.

Ritual also contains – i.e. incorporates and restricts - drama inherent in human interaction because it uses such interactions to maintain social order. It can be seen as a way to ward off what Turner termed 'social drama'. This happens when social order breaks down which provides an opportunity for commentary on social life. Social drama is meta-theatre revealing theatricality inherent in social life, e.g. if the theatre of service work fails, its artifice is revealed.

Crossley notes -

> "rituals… are 'embodied'… we do them and this 'doing'" is important to understanding their relevance. If we are to make sense of rituals… we need to engage with their corporeality." (2004: 31)

This seems obvious but ritual's corporeality is "biologically observable" (Burkert, 1983, in Segal, 1998: 343) - an event that can be witnessed – and a bodily experience for participants. It derives some of its potency from such impact. In this regard, ritual is a performative genre embedded in culture and used for specific socio-cultural purposes by employing the body as a vehicle through which meaning can be accomplished, enacted and understood. I do not believe organizations intend service credo to result in hostile work interactions that have ritual effect, but I argue this is an outcome nevertheless.

Rituals are symbolic and enacted behaviours often relating to "the physiological processes of death and birth, anabolism and katabolism" (Turner, 1982: 107) contextualized in terms of generative (constructive) and destructive powers as inscribed in and by participants' bodies. Turner implies participants' route through ritual connects their bodies (and psyches) with such forces in experiential (hence comprehensible) ways for participants (and witnesses) through the "orchestration of symbolic actions and objects in all sensory codes" (Turner, 1982: 109). Ritual thus functions partly through inner and personal somatic manifestations of external public symbols; corporeality realizes ritual to make it meaningful even as it retains its symbolic and abstract quality. Sensation, feeling, motion, etc. inscribes

experience onto, into and through participants' socially- and self-directed use of active, cooperatively and corporately obedient bodies and psyches. Hence, ritual is never just symbolic or abstract. To remain an effective, relevant, resonant practice retained by a society and adhered to by members, participants have to feel ritual through their participation in (or as witnesses to) it otherwise its impact is reduced. (If this occurred, ritual could be accomplished through language; it would become narrative. However, ritual emerged in pre-language epochs and even in era when language is developed I argue rituals are still used because of their non-linguistic effect.)

Ritual achieves and exercises its power partially through physically- and psychologically-impactful ordeals, changes or activity. Physical impact occurs because symptoms of stress, pain, emotion, etc. and associated physiological arousal arise in and are used by ritual; psychological-emotional impact occurs through somatic impression of experience impacting on the psyche. (I explore this impact below and later suggest it feeds hexis and socialization).

Moreover, the bodies, emotions and psyches, and social position, roles and behaviours, of people supporting ritual and witnessing it also seem to be impacted, albeit in arguably reduced intensity. Ritual "unlike theatre, does not distinguish between audience and performer" (Turner, 1982: 112). Ritual is potent not just because of its power to influence individual participants but also because it can exert the same influence to a wider circle (e.g. officials in facilitating roles, witnesses) affected, e.g. via emotional contagion or synchronic arousal (see Konvalinka *et al*., 2011).

Theatre, ritual and ritualized behaviour

I aim to have shown ritualized behaviours are released in performative service interactions and that the effect of such interactions has a ritual effect on staff and customers. One might question the connection between these apparently unrelated topics, but performance (genre), ritual and ritualized behaviour are connected.

Turner (1987) argues performance arts (dance, theatre, etc.) can ultimately be traced back to human ritual practice from which they became dismembered resulting in "the genesis and elaboration of esthetic [*sic*] media" (1977: 73). Montelle (2009) concurs, arguing

theatre's origins lie in Upper Palaeolithic rituals c. 30,000 years ago. Schechner (1977) claims theatre was not necessarily born in ritual but notes they are closely connected and perhaps emerged as parallel performative activities sharing historical, stylistic and functional links. Whether we accept theatre stemmed from or is just a closely-related parallel to ritual is irrelevant; they are linked through theatricality and performativity.

Ritual itself seemingly possesses a corporeal root pre-dating humanity. Burkert contends ritual is ancient "in the history of evolution, since it goes back even to animals" (1983, in Segal, 1998: 343). That link is visible in similar ritualized behavioural displays enacted by animals and humans[48]. Moreover, ritual and ritualized behaviour is closely related to hostility, and even arguably rooted in it. Girard (1986) and Burkert independently believed ritual was rooted "in sacrifice and… sacrifice in aggression" (Segal, 1998: 11). Thus, ritual seems to be fed by ritualized behaviour and possibly by ritualized forms of hostility[49].

Some postures, motions and automatic physiological reactions used in (viz. organized by) ritual as ways to effect enculturation may have stemmed from ritualized behaviours. Schechner (1993: 255) states Turner thought a connection existed between (ritual) postures and "autonomic nervous system responses". Turner (1987) explicitly linked specific brain mechanisms and (pre-mammalian) ritualized animal behaviours with behavioural and psycho-physiological activity in human ritual. I suggest FFF/emotion-driven displays of threat, appeasement or submission is an example. Ritual practices feasibly then incorporated postures, motion patterns, etc. because of their effects or symbolic power. These may have transferred from ritual into performative arts, viz. specific postures, gestures or motions used to symbolize particular states, emotions, intent, etc. because they were automatic and already understood by people. It seems reasonable to consider as Turner (1987) noted that instinctive, automatic body actions operative in ritualized behaviours propelled by brain systems' activities fed into human ritual and then into later-developing

[48] Schechner (1993) and Turner (1987) both refer to such links and cite Lorenz and Huxley who both believed ritual is biogenetically based.
[49] The social use of ritual to order, initiate, etc. could be seen as symbolic or socio-institutional violence, as noted previously.

'higher' level human symbolic knowledge and communication systems (e.g. performance arts) through the evolutionary process.

Interim summary

I have suggested ritual is the effect made by the release of survival-based and protection-oriented biopsychosocial behaviours (hostility, stress and emotion) propelling ritualized behaviours (which further extend arousal) in performative service work. This constrains 'natural' emotional and behavioural expression and is thus negative in some ways as previously explored. An approach attentive to the body and biological factors as integral to human behaviour (i.e. the evolutionary-biopsychosocial ontology and ethological epistemology adopted) can identify and analyse such matters; ones inattentive to same - like those dominating WRH and service work research - would fail to notice such matters, how they function or are connected.

Exploring how this ritual effect occurs might help elucidate the claim further and show why the effect is so powerful. I suggest this ritual occurs through the processes of biopsychological impacts, hexis, and associated 'body armouring' and 'character armouring'[50]. These combine to position service workers in the context they function in. This explains what is happening in the ritual process, how it occurs and why service-based WRH is so potent and affecting.

Processes in ritual effect

Bio-psychological impact

Huxley (1977: 32) notes Freudians believe a person's psyche can be effected through "enthronement of [a] dramatic event as a memory upon… the physical economy that experienced it". There is no reason to limit this to the body sites and sexual maturation process Freud identified, and it could be more generally psychologically relevant and obtain for many somatic experiences.

[50] I apply these concepts from Reich's work as a useful way to indicate processes of bio-psychological and psycho-social effect on the individual; I transfer them from their original psychodynamic context to a more general one.

As workers' bodies are the vehicles for service performance, I suggest they must be affected in some way through the role enacted (see earlier notes on dramaturgical stress); the worker cannot remove the effects of stress or emotional experience resulting from WRH as easily as he or she can stop speaking service rhetoric or remove the work uniform. I posit bio-psychological impact does not impact on the 'Professional Service Worker' persona staff portrays in role (when surface acting) or is (when deep acting), but impacts on the performer's 'real' self (i.e. body, psyche) in some way, as Huxley (1977) contends. The worker absorbs stress and emotion generated in the performance because the individual's body and emotions are used to accomplish the performance; the actor's body and/or emotions are affected during performative (inter)action[51].

Impact may occur through physiological arousal imposed on/in the body by ritualized behaviours in interaction, e.g. when staff face a threat displaying customer. The psychological and physiological components of potent (primary) emotions might well impact on and in staff's bodies and psyches before, during and after interaction. Such interaction occurs in a social context (here, service work), and relationally (between parties of differing power) in which behaviours are influenced by (socio-cultural, organization and service) norms. Thus, impact may be partly influenced by and achieved as a result of the aggressing and target parties' arousal, adoption of specific behaviours (displays, postures, gestures, motion or stasis) and subsequent associated arousal (see the hostility chain, which illustrates lines of influence between reaction and response and internal and external realms in and between parties, and notes on the trajectories of emotion/stress in interactions). This would thus effect workers' interactions, e.g. when and how to speak and move and seemingly bolster behaviour (here, the roles adopted and presented).

Body armour

Bio-psychological impact can be seen in Reich's concept of body armouring. This occurs as muscular tension creates energy 'blocks' in the body when the individual reacts to

[51] Service workers may not be as able to guard against personal absorption of impacts as professionally-trained actors. This does not refute people learn performance techniques through social experience, merely that they may not be as skilled at this process as trained professionals.

physical and/or psychological danger (Daniels, 2008).

The effect is that others are distanced but the person maintains their internal state, emotion, etc. The individual will experience their inner state and muscular rigidity but will not necessarily understand its negative effects, i.e. restriction of natural expression/action and development of habituated tension (the individual becomes accustomed to it over time because it serves a defensive function; see previous notes on allostatic load and acceptance of WRH as part of the job). This makes the physical tension and psychological effect hard to resolve.

In effect, the body armour process is one of "damming-up of biological energy" (Reich, 1973: 270)[52]. Reich notes the concept applies to inhibition of any 'natural' inclination; "Anger and anxiety can… be blocked by muscular tensions" (*ibid*.). This negative tension (dystonus) builds over the individual's life and aids character armouring (see below), though presumably adequate tension-release could avoid this. The suppression of 'natural' expression of emotion and behaviour through muscular tension seems to be one mechanism through which the civilizing process happens.

Apropos WRH, workers reacting to threat - and even perhaps anticipating potential harm - experience FFF. This may aid the body armouring process over time through –

- the freeze reaction encouraging stasis ('tonic immobility')
- triggering workers' automatic ritualized behaviours (e.g. appeasement displays)
- workers' conscious overriding of fight or flight (as behaviour unsuitable for the context) and channelling energy into professional customer-oriented behaviours.

All require the worker to remain co-present to respond to customer needs. Muscle tension controlling movement is involved in this. (The worker may also 'tense' psychologically, e.g. use ER in EL.) Through repetitions, I argue such tensing helps create 'body armour' which maintains physical position and movement patterns adopted relative to

[52] For Reich (1973: 6) this becomes "the source of irrational actions" and illness.

an aggressor by restricting or channelling FFF energy. I contend this then helps 'character armouring' happen because it "immobilizes the greatest part of the aggressive [or flight] energies, blocks them off from motor expression and thus creates the inhibiting aspect of the character." (Reich, 1948: 147). There is no reason to suppose this does not happen in ritualized behaviour when status is ascribed and energy is channelled but not necessarily fully expressed or used. Indeed, as noted, energy may be increased through body-use.

The outcomes of interactions may be positive in one sense (the individual usually suffers no injury from WRH) but be negative in another (the worker retains allotted lower status). The psychosomatic impact from lower status is also negative, e.g. the effect of unused or damaging stress chemicals, the chemical effect of loss in interactions. Over time, body armouring strengthens staff's tendency to appeasement and submission displays associated with its ascribed lower status because threat display, fight or flight are not practical options available to them.

Character armour

Character armouring is the assemblage of character or persona[53] and occurs through the aforementioned suppression: "Muscular attitudes and character attitudes have the same function in the psychic mechanism" (Reich, 1948: 270). Inhibition of energy and its expression in 'natural' activity can be harmful physically and psychologically through overlaying behavioural inclination with restrictions. Reich termed this "neurosis… due to the conflict between instinctual demands… and the repressing focus of the ego" (1948: 3), or psyche, which has been influenced by social factors. It manifests what Reich (*ibid*.; 7) called "authoritarian culture…typified in characterological armouring against… inner nature".

Character becomes a "psychic protection mechanism. The individual is 'characterologically armoured' against the outer world and against his unconscious drives" (*ibid*.: 48). To avoid harm, pain, etc., character emerges to distance the outer world (from harming it). This also absorbs repressed energies, paradoxically meaning harm does occur.

[53] Persona literally means 'mask', as worn in Classical Greek theatre.

Character armour is the development of a persona to fulfil the role expected in social interactions. It is manifested corporeally (e.g. in gesture, posture), I suggest it is a version of body hexis. Like hexis, this occurs by sustaining norms about roles. This enables them to play social roles and influences role embodiments. Here, the character developed and persona played in role is that of Professional Service Worker which service credo requires workers embody in performances (to be the epitome of the organization and its service standards). Fulfilling the role means e.g. not answering back, not showing negative emotion (e.g. anger), sustaining interactions for the customer's benefit, smiling and remaining courteous and customer-oriented in interactions. Position, posture, gesture, turn-taking in verbal interactions, etc. will all be influenced by body armour restricting some and permitting other channelled energy for use in performative display. (As noted previously, the role played is not simply or exclusively organizationally-supplied (e.g. scripted, directed) but is inferred by staff from perceptions about expectations and 'lived' up to using staff's performance skills acquired in life and work.)

Body armour tension literally continues to hold staff in physical position relative to hostile customers even as biological and psychological reactions incline (or urge) staff to move (flee/withdraw, or fight/threat display), perhaps following an initial freeze reaction. This enables workers to enact their service role. It also enables customers to enact theirs as ostensibly powerful, high(er)-status individuals who are the focus of staff's efforts and interactions. A customer can intentionally or subconsciously use this or her power and influence to express status through ritualized behaviour displays. Body armour seems requisite for such interactions to happen because this ensures staff's co-presence. However, this body armour formed over time in interactions through the stress reaction and 'losing' interactions (see below). This exacerbates negative biopsychosocial effect on workers, e.g. stress, unexpressed emotion, suppressed behavioural inclination, low(er) social position, and maintenance of the status hierarchy, and would also appear to galvanize character armouring.

Paradoxically, workers may perceive such body- and character- armouring as inuring them against harm. It enables continued service but exposes workers to more harm (by remaining in interactions with the aggressor) and sustaining WRH impacts. It may

deaden them to the effect of inner drives and states as well as providing some “insulation against stimuli from outside” (Reich, 1948: 148). This corresponds with findings about emotion workers developing a hardened attitude to customers (e.g. through stressful situations developing their hardiness; see Britt *et al*., 2001) but feeling alienated from themselves. This increases chances workers will go on playing service roles, increasing likelihood of and fostering the effects of bio-psychological impact, body and character armouring, and hexis in service situations they continue to face. Paradoxically, the high emotional intelligence of emotion workers may help them do so (Giardini and Frese, 2006; Ogińska-Bulik, 2005). It also arguably risks reducing service quality through workers’ disengagement with customers and/or the employer and rendering service surficial - a display lacking conviction or real emotional feeling but played to meet requirements.

Hexis

Character armouring enables hexis to occur. As outlined in the hostility chapter, hexis is the embodiment of literal and metaphorical training of position, i.e. social status, through direct, subtle corporeal socialization in the individual’s world (habitus). The use of the body in service work in role is one example of such positioning and subsequent training. Hexis helps explain why service workers maintain expected professional emotional and behavioural displays despite provocation and potent biological (physiological), emotional and psychological inclinations influencing them to behave differently and take action in their own interest rather than the aggressor’s or organization’s.

Ritual, as a way to impose order on members of society, achieves exactly such positioning; the use of the body for specific roles inculcates such order and status. Enactments - partial and faked (surface acting) or full and real (deep acting, worker alignment with the organization’s credo) - have biopsychosocial impact in and through staff’s bodies in role, through arousal experienced in dramatic (inter)action. Body armour is an example of this biopsychosocial impact. I contend this feeds character armouring, which enables further enactments. I posit this aids (perhaps comprises) the hexis process which occurs in literal and metaphorical ways; viz., it effects status and the way the body is used both physically and socially. Corporeal presentation and use echoes social standing which I

suggest in turn affects body-use and –presentation in mutually-influential fashion. The figure below illustrates these connections (the brackets indicate overlap or transitions between processes).

Figure 18.3 – the connection of bio-psychosocial impact, body armour, character armour and hexis



Summary

In this chapter I considered what behaviours occur in WRH interactions, why they appear as they do, what their impacts are and presented a plausible account of how those impacts have effect.

I argued biopsychosocial complexes underpinning behaviours (hostility, stress and emotion) and experience release ritualized behaviours, propelled by potent 'primitive' energy and geared to survival, in the social (performative) service setting. These are linked to allotted and adopted status. Ritualized behaviour adds to arousal, too. As evolved behaviours, ritualized behaviour serves to limit actual violence. But it does however make deep (biopsychosocial) impacts – and I argue this has the effect of ritual on participants' bodies and minds. I contend this ritual effects workers through the processes of psychosomatic impact, body and character armouring, and hexis. Biopsychological impact sees the psyche impacted through the body in role. Body armour (internal energy blocks through muscular tension) is an example. This feeds character armour, which helps form the persona to be presented to the world. Hexis is the embodiment of such training of the body in

social life through role enactments, and can be seen to be abetted by the aforementioned processes.

As noted, ritual operates in corporeal and psychological ways to inculcate social norms and locate and maintain subjects in social positions (Turner, 1987); it is biopsychosocial. In terms of service work, I propose it trains service workers with their active if unintentional cooperation to sustain their status relative to the customer (and the employer) and the roles played. I also propose this ritual effect basically trains customers to continue to enjoy privilege, status and power relative to staff.

However, the ritual effect is not limited to parties directly involved in the WRH; it may spread to witnesses. Other customers and other staff may be 'trained' into roles accordingly. The expected behaviour and social order connected with service credo and roles is sustained more broadly through this. This is one reason allotted status, roles and contexts appear unchanged even for workers who acknowledge the process negatively effects them (Hochschild, 1983); the service credo is supported through continued worker enactments of role. This localizes and privatizes incidents' impacts, individuating experience as it drives it into participants' bodies and psyches. This individuation-privatization may help explain why workers may not challenge work conditions, practices and expectations through direct action or official channels (e.g. union-backed pressure); the effect is personal, hidden and subtle.

Ritual does not just explain how negative impacts of WRH encounters have effect, but also why and how workers not negatively affected by service work, are positioned. Some service workers may not be alienated, stressed, or experience emotional dissonance. They may experience mostly positive experiences from their work, e.g. positive chemical arousal from success (endorphins) in interactions, behaving professionally (customers 'winning' encounters also experience such arousal), self-esteem from doing a good job, a sense of professional identity and group belonging, etc. These function biopsychosocially and have biopsychosocial effect.

I do not believe organizations' attitude to WRH (e.g. policy, procedures), service credo (and assumptions underpinning same), and organizational culture generally are deliberately designed to function as ritual on workers. However, I suggest this is the outcome nevertheless. The concept of ritual enables one to link many of the strands in this thesis, e.g.

role and status involved in power relationships, the status hierarchy and ritualized behaviour; biopsychosocial behaviour and experience such as FFF, emotion and stress which fuel such interactions; and the theatrical social context obtaining. It also locates these in the evolutionary frame. Moreover, the ritual explanation helps us understand why many workers continue in service work roles and do not seem to counter-aggress either hostile customers or the organization employing them. Ritual may not be the only explanation for the outcome of service-based WRH or an exhaustive description of what happens, but I suggest it is a powerful explanation.

This chapter has indicated what happens in WRH interactions, how and why it so deeply-effecting. The next chapter draws on an ethological concept to propose the result of this ritual is a dominance hierarchy.

Chapter 19 Outcome of the ritual

Introduction

In this chapter, I argue that the outcome of the ritual outlined in the previous chapter is what ethology calls a 'dominance hierarchy'. A dominance hierarchy is not synonymous with rank order and social (status) hierarchy (which are synonyms). Social hierarchies do not always function through hostility (though they do through some form of power); dominance hierarchies do operate through hostility as one party subordinates others to achieve or maintain its status.

I claim a dominance hierarchy occurs over time. The ritual functions through repetition to train 'winners' and 'losers' in interactions, which I argue galvanizes the status allocated and used by parties in behaviour, and feeds the process and its effects. It also enables the organization to sustain its credo and dominance over staff.

I claim the service credo influencing staff behaviour is an example of the civilizing process and operates to restrain the behaviours it paradoxically releases. Therefore, even if it does restrain action, staff experiences internal tension and conflict between behavioural inclinations and social pressures not to enact behaviour, which can be harmful. Thus, successful service delivery (as perceived by the organization) will carry negatives for workers, and by association, the organization. I propose that these outcomes can be explained using the theatrical concepts of comedy and tragedy. Given the theatricality in service work, this seems appropriate.

Dominance hierarchy

The hostile customer is cast as the party more easily able to enact threat display through higher status (α); the worker is cast to enact the responsive appeasing, submissive (β) role[54]. Though workers are ultimately (theoretically) 'free' to behave as they want, e.g. counter-aggress a hostile customer, flee the interaction, resign from their jobs, etc. (and

[54] Staff is β in (dyadic) customer-staff interactions but γ in the (triadic) customer-organizations-staff status hierarchy and power vector.

some may do), I suggest that most of the time workers do not do so but rather extend effort to maintain their professionalism and service roles.

In WRH, workers seem less able to behave freely or with as much freedom as they might do in other (i.e. non-work) social situations because organizational constraint on behaviour exists in allotted status and expected roles. In service interactions, parties know each other's status; in general social interactions, status may need to be identified, established or tested, though general social codes pertaining to behaviour obtain. Ritualized behaviour in service interactions therefore occurs in situated social interaction between parties already cast in roles by the organization. Ascribed status and attendant power disparities are evident in these, i.e. ostensibly more powerful and prioritized customers and weaker customer-focused workers attending to them.

As outlined, this status can be enacted in behaviour. Interactions between parties of differing status and power in service settings releases ritualized behaviours fuelled by FFF and emotion similar to those appearing in 'natural' contests[55], e.g. displays of threat, appeasement and submission.

Wins and losses in such service interactions may be seen in terms of who can express emotion and manifest preferred action (through use of FFF and emotional energy) to gain their desired outcomes. Because of quasi-sovereignty, customers can emotionally express themselves and behave accordingly. Through repeated interactions and repeat effects of the ritual process the customer is more likely to 'win' interactions; they can use energy in expression more fully and the resulting ritual effect confirms their status.

Conversely, because of customer service credo, staff cannot realistically express themselves in the same way customers can without incurring considerable cost (e.g. being sanctioned). Staff works for the customer's benefit; workers' focus is the customer's wellbeing. The effect of reactions seems to have negative psycho-somatic impact on workers at least some of the time. Workers' arousal elevated by interactions but not utilized in them fully or well-managed (e.g. by stress management) is driven into them (see notes on biopsychological impacts). As previously noted, FFF-based chemicals can corrode health.

[55] 'Natural' here refers to human encounters in social contexts without an enforced artificial status hierarchy.

This implies that the ritualized behaviour fuelled by FFF-based activity may well damage staff rather than customers. In this sense, staff 'loses' in interactions.

I noted previously that the initial stressor and ritualized behaviours elevate arousal. However, biochemical arousal also occurs from interactions' result. Winners experience positive biochemical arousal from 'winning' encounters; losers experience negative biochemical arousal from losing interactions (Wilson, 2000). The same may be said of psychological and social outcomes; allotted high and low status respectively of winners and losers are maintained. This sustains the customer-staff power and status differential because winners are more likely to behave aggressively in future, creating negative experiences and arousal for opponents (de Vries *et al*., 2003). As customers win and staff loses in interactions, these impacts and effects cumulate and prime each party respectively towards future wins or losses (Wilson, 2000).

Over time these wins and losses contribute to the establishment of a dominance hierarchy from the status hierarchy. The Customer habituates to higher status through wins and associated biopsychosocial dividends, e .g. use of stress chemicals in behaviour, emotional venting, positive additional biochemical experience of 'winning', psychological wellbeing from success, and continued (higher) social status. Workers habituate to lower status through biopsychosocial harms from losses. Service work sets up greater chances of WRH occurring through customers' hostility associated with their perceived high status and power.

Customers as α therefore accepts and assumes the dominant role and associated rights, which in turn influences its behaviours, e.g. body use (threat display; more gaze and talk; adopting open, confident and power-projecting and power-inducing postures, gestures and movements; see Carney *et al*. 2010), which serves to provide positive impacts and strengthen status, and so on. I argue that this behaviour will influence workers to automatically and subconsciously (or consciously) adopt antithetical ritualized behaviours (appeasement and submission) in response to such dominance and threat display. Workers' counter-threat display is possible but it is more likely placation or submission displays will be enacted. I propose that workers maintain the subservient role not just because service credo expects this or workers want to retain their jobs, but because biopsychosocial impacts of

encounters has ritual effect in influencing their adoption and embodiment of appeasing or submitting gestures as customer-oriented responses.

Of course, a customer may lose a particular interaction, e.g. be denied his or her wishes, have a complaint protracted by organizational bureaucracy, etc. Similarly, a worker may win if and when the customer loses, or by effecting some form of resistance or retaliation. Situations in which both parties win or lose are possible, too, e.g. if customer wishes can be met and staff's self-esteem not impaired and/or staff's sense of professionalism boosted by accomplishing service delivery/recovery, or if the customer fails to get what he or she wants and complains about staff's behaviour. However, over time, I contend the trend is that customers' wins outweigh staffs'; service credo helps achieve this, and thus establish a dominance hierarchy in customers' favour. Because higher-ranked individuals tend to aggress (de Vries *et al*., 2003) WRH is more likely to occur again as customers use their status. This feeds the cycle.

Organizational service credo may largely restrain individual's 'natural' expression of stress/FFF and emotion (e.g. anger) and restrict behaviours into defined or inferred roles/conduct. As such, organizations' service credo functions as an extension or example of the civilizing process, and thus hexis, because it tries to influence workers' behaviours, embodied actions and (use of) emotions into presentations officially-defined as desirable for professional conduct. However, it paradoxically sets up conditions for the appearance of such behaviour. It exposes workers to powerful customers who may vent emotion and behave with aggression because of their (perceived) status and importance. Service work credo functions as a trigger of biological activity and 'primal' self-interested behaviours in customers and staff and to restrain staff's (social) expressions of its natural reactions.

Tensions and conflicts between (visible) social behaviour of the individual and the motivating factors for behaviour can be seen if the AQAL map is used to 'plot' them (see chapter 3). The upper (individual) and lower (collective) quadrants may be in tension following hostility which triggers the worker's stress reaction and emotion influencing the worker's behaviour. The individual's (bio-psychological) inclinations may be in tension with the (socio-cultural) behaviours expected of them (i.e. fight or flight may be contextually inappropriate). Even if ritualized behaviour is enacted, the person may still feel inclination to

fight or flee rather than display a channelled form of FFF energy. Additionally, ‘lag’ may occur between physiological and cognitive, and then behavioural, experience and action.

Opposing forces creates tension. Here, this exists between natural (i.e. evolved, survival-oriented behavioural) inclination to fight, flee or express emotion and the social conformity to work role and suitable and civil social behaviour. The individual feels restricted from acting as inclined to by social forces which would appraise them as being ‘primitive’ (uncivilized). Society may sanction them for enacting such inclinations publicly. Alternative behaviours (e.g. ritualized behaviours) are available, but allocated roles and outcomes of interactions over time influence who can enact which behaviours (i.e. staff is less likely to threat display than customers). Staff may be stranded between inclinations and conformity, buckle under social pressure (yet feel discomforted by this) or enact behavioural inclinations (and feel subsequent guilt and/or attract social censure for it). Even if balance between inclination and behaviour occurs, the psycho-somatic effects of the experience may negatively impact staff (and organizations).

Tension and conflict are apparent at different ‘levels’ of the quadrants associated with evolution in Wilber’s AQAL model, e.g. between activity in and at level 12 and the ‘lower’ levels it provokes activity in. Earlier evolutionary phases are incorporated in later ones. Within the box formed by connecting any level in AQAL, ‘lower’ levels are nested. Hence, though the limbic system is active at level 8 (and above), the R-complex and simpler systems and mechanisms are also active because they are part of the evolved, complex organism.

Both a customer behaving in a hostile manner and a worker tasked with serving them are living in an era associated with industrial society and rationality - level 12. This level corresponds to the formal level of the psyche/individuality and higher cognitive processes in the organism/brain and behaviour one might associate with contemporary mankind. (Recall that biological, psychological, socio-cultural complexes connect at the different levels across quadrants.)

But, as shown in the hostility chain model, the aggressor (who experiences stress) triggers staff’s reaction at level 8 (in the limbic system) and lower. When threatened or aggressed, an individual will naturally react with an automatic body-mind reaction driven by

'animal' instinct in order to defend his or her interests not with conscious and deliberative cognition (a considered, thought-out response). This may be enacted as fight or flight, or as a symbolic version (ritualized behaviour). The aggressor has already 'downshifted' to this level when experiencing stress. (Recall that LS was evolved in an earlier (mammalian) epoch.) Psychologically, this corresponds to being emotionally-ruled. FFF/stress reaction is also seemingly partially-controlled by level 7 mechanisms/systems - MacLean's R-complex - following LS activation. (This itself is associated with impulse-driven (stimulus-response) behaviour of earlier (pre-)human era.) Bodily activity is also occurring at 'lower' levels, e.g. hormonal and other biochemical activity, as part of reaction and response.

In earlier human epochs one might expect less tension or conflict between behavioural inclination and social action; ritualized behaviours may well have occurred in many hostile encounters but humans used FFF to fight or flee when necessary. In an age when *Homo sapiens* had no differentiated mind-bodies, lived in small tribal social groups, and whose behaviour was emotional and LS-driven, little social censure - or emotional guilt/shame as the emotional reaction to it - would likely follow combat or escape behaviours - because they were still requisite for survival in that environment (viz. normal) and society had yet to develop sanction systems to control such behaviour. But as society advanced (and it has accelerated in complexity while the body has remained relatively unchanged morphologically; Klein, 1995), ritualized behaviour seemingly increasingly became the common (standard) response, e.g. through the civilizing process. But even in cases when ritualized behaviour is enacted, tension between systems evolved in earlier ages and contemporary social contexts might still occur and be felt internally (psycho-somatically) when those systems activate, e.g. in emergency encounters like hostile situations. Fight or flight prompted by these systems seems (usually) unsuitable for current social conditions; but the pull towards them, which I believe is inevitable because the systems are phylogenetically hard-wired in our anatomy, physiology and bio-chemistry, will create some tension between and conflict with 'advanced', 'civilized' society and culture which expects us to typically behave as *Homo humanus* not *Homo pugnax*. Society's structures (e.g. institutions, and the norms and culture they promote, which we are socialized into and uphold through socially-approved actions) has ostensibly civilized us, and has largely constrained the expression of

violence (unless it is routed into acceptable, official socially-licenced arena)[56]. As service credo can be seen as an example of organizational culture, itself an example of wider social forces, ritualized behaviours represent the only real option workers have; they have fewer alternatives because the context they work in enforces relationships between them and customers. But the 'inner animal' still exists and under particular circumstances re-appears.

Tension and conflict between the 'civilized' and 'animal' realms is not merely semantic, nor just evident in binary conceptions in common use (e.g. nature or nurture) which tend to erect distinctions or categories (and which cannot be 'solved' or side-stepped by using other terms but necessitate other conceptual frameworks[57]) but seems inherent in the interaction between various features, characteristics, complexes/systems/mechanisms we as human beings have inherited through evolution, are subject to and comprise. As MacLean noted, in addition to a cortex enabling 'higher' level mentation (enabling level 12 activity), humans still also possess a limbic system and R-complex. Our mammalian and reptilian brains are integral to and in our human brain, and therefore integral to us as a species and individuals. The same may be said of the behaviours associated with these systems.

Successful service would seem to restrict workers' behaviour so 'primitive' inclinations are steered from and suitable, civilized behaviours enacted. Organizations reserve power to place restrictions on its employees' ('natural') emotional and behavioural expression. They also appear to permit the very source of staff's stress (the hostile customer) some power over staff (e.g. to influence workers' behaviours). However, by exposing workers to (hostile) customers without applying robust, pragmatic WRH countermeasures to address such customer behaviours and/or help staff navigate through, cope with and recover from such experiences, organizations increase likelihood workers will experience emotions and stress. Organizations thus also suffer because staff are negatively affected, though organizations may not realize this.

[56] Historically these have been under the influence or control of social and political forces and institutions, activity itself possibly constituting a form of aggression (see Schinkel 2010).
[57] These binaries seem impossible to avoid even when attempting to; using 'body-mind' or 'biopsychosocial' to refer to integrated, evolved complexes inherently refers to dualities and trichotomies, though such terms may reframe them.

However, I think the issue of restricted expression of behavioural inclination is more complex still because I posit staff actively routes stress- and emotion-based arousal and behavioural inclinations into ER-based EL. Staff seem to conform to social and organizational norms through self-regulation (e.g. ER). As such, workers contribute to their own plight. Organizations may tacitly (perhaps unintentionally) expect workers to adhere to norms and absorb the negative effects of hostile encounters and experiences but workers do so. They need not; they could resign or behave differently in interactions. (As previously noted, staff may realize this and feel the tensions and conflicts between personal and organizational forces, an experience itself requiring increased use of personal effort to overcome.) In doing so, staff experiences tension or conflict, and organizations sustain damage by extension. Organizations operating customer-oriented service credo not counterbalanced with staff welfare provision can be seen as self-harming and pathological, if subconsciously so. But one can also see service workers as self-harming.

Outcome of the dominance hierarchy

Maintenance of service roles in which workers display appropriate (courteous, deferential) behaviours towards customers is achieved through a combination of biopsychosocial impact and hexis (which closely corresponds to body and character armouring). Over time this trains them through combined interactions and the effects of social, psychological and biological influences, to stay literally and metaphorically in place in unequal, weaker and losing positions against dominant others. Though ‘social’ factors (e.g. the civilizing process, hexis, organizational culture in the form of service credo) influence biological mechanisms by defining them and partially containing their expression through individualizing and privatizing them (i.e. localizing them in the body/psyche of subjects), they do not eradicate biological factors. Indeed social forces partly work through them; the civilizing process and hexis works through the body.

This helps explain why so few staff openly counter-aggress, retaliate, etc. It seems teasing why acts of violence in response to hostile customers are not more common given the stress, emotional and organizational pressure staff functions under. It appears social, organizational and/or personal factors exert sufficient influence to typically keep staff’s

behaviour it in check. I contend that staff is trained to remain in dominated roles and absorb the physical, psychological and social damage this brings. Workers stay ‘down’ (Wilson, 2000). This has negative impact(s). These tensions and conflicts have impact in the body and psyche of the individual - and tension and conflict between the individual and social environment he or she operates in. It also helps explain the negatives and damage associated with WRH experience as identified by research, e.g. illness, substance use, absenteeism. It shows staff internalizes and absorbs impacts because organizations tacitly localize these effects in workers’ bodies and psyches. This helps show how damaging WRH can be even when workers do not experience assault or serious injury.

This also helps explain why most WRH is not violent. Customers appear to be restrained by social forces, as staff is. This seemingly contradicts my earlier point that status ceded customers suspends or replaces wider social prohibition on expressing hostility. However, I suggest organizations permit customers to display hostility in ritualized behaviour rather than actual violence. (Wider social prohibition still limits violence though not always successfully; some WRH is violent). Customer sovereignty may be mythic but customer power enables expression enough to satisfy the customer’s retention of status.

Comedic and tragic outcomes

One can use the theatrical genres of tragedy and comedy (Cuddon, 1979) to help explain these outcomes. As service work is performative and theatrical, this seems fitting.

As Huxley (1977: 33) notes, both tragedy and hostility function on axes of “power [and] hierarchy”. Threat display and the hostility it is fuelled by has an arc terminating in symbolic death. Hostility and threat display can instil fear in those exposed to or targeted by it, as does tragedy. For theatre audiences, this has cathartic (purgative) benefit (Meisiek, 2004). The same catharsis may occur for customers whose status and circumstances enable emotional expression and ritualized enactment of behavioural inclinations; hostility offers opportunity for cathartic expression (Kahn Mallick and McCandless, 1969).

However, if customers are dissatisfied with the organization and/or staff following an incident, a tragic outcome occurs. This may be tragic for the customer because the negative effect of stress and emotion would be inscribed in their bodies and psyches ritually. It will

likely be tragic for the organization, because the customer could discontinue patronage of it. Staff involved are likely to also be negatively affected through the experience (unless staff has deliberately caused the customer's negative experience and can be seen to 'win' at such times.) Recall that tragedy is costly. If the high-ranking customer loses, he or she can inflict damage on others (here, staff and/or the organization) in the process.

Conversely, when customers are placated, and a resolution to their problem occurs, or they have expressed themselves and a resolution is pending, they are likely to be satisfied. They and the organization will view the outcome as positive (irrespective of the harm staff might have incurred in the interaction). This, in very broad theatrical terms, is comedy – basically a happy ending following confused action that looked as if it would not be resolved. (Staff's task is to accomplish a comedic outcome for The Customer and organization.)

For staff, I claim the experience of WRH is more likely to result in biopsychological impacts - stress, ill-health, psychological dissonance, (self-)alienation, and exposure to more WRH, stress and emotion. I see this as a tragic outcome even if the customer is placated; service workers can incur harm by accomplishing service delivery/recovery. It is often harmful, and the suffering is internal and personal, largely unseen, unrecognized and insidious, making impact in subtle but potent biopsychosocial ways.

A mixed tragic and comedic outcome may occur for those workers; despite harm incurred they retain their posts, and continued work has benefits. However, it also has some cost. (Workers may not fully realize the extent of this cost. Those who do and continue such work have a particularly tragic experience because they realize the effects and outcomes but accept it and continue in role, exposing themselves knowingly to more harm.)

However, comedic outcomes are also possible for staff. Some workers may receive mostly positive experiences from their work which outweighs the potential or actual negatives. Their dividend may be physiological, psychological and/or social in kind.

For service organizations, the result is paradoxical. The effects of staff's experience may not always be visible, and hence be unrecognized by the organization, but I infer organizations do not benefit from having absent, disaffected or ill workers. I infer this damages delivery of service thus harming customers in some form. Although comedic

outcomes in the form of satisfied customers may appear positive, tragic impacts may run beneath this and taint matters.

If comedic outcomes seem to outweigh tragic ones, or tragic results are largely invisible, one can understand why organizations perceive little reason to address WRH (WRH would not be seen as a significant hazard or even to exist, or else be managed by extant HSM provision). This helps explain why relatively little headway has seemingly been made by organizations in addressing WRH or altering staff's service work experiences.

Summary

In this chapter I argued that the status hierarchy and power vector in the service triangle results in a dominance hierarchy through the wins and losses typically experienced by customers and workers respectively.

I have argued these wins and losses have biopsychosocial impacts from numerous sources - the arousal released in reaction to the stressor, the ritualized behaviour it fuels in response, the arousal generated from enacting ritualized behaviour and the outcomes of encounters. All prompt biochemical release as well as achieve psychological and social positioning of parties.)

I argued both staff and customers are positioned through bio-psychological impact, body and character armouring, and hexis. I suggest this bolsters the cycle of interactions between parties enjoying different levels of status which favour those with higher status. It 'licences' customers' behaviours. I have also noted that for staff, service work credo and practice restrains the behavioural inclination it releases. Therefore, even in service interactions in which staff successfully manage customers' hostility and deliver adequate service (e.g. solve the customer's problem, rescue delivery) the effects are partly negative for staff regarding personally-absorbed stress and emotion, internal dissonances, and ongoing β status in dyadic interactions likely to promote more of the same experiences.

I claim organizations appear to hold staff responsible for managing these impacts. Moreover, the tensions and conflicts inherent in the experience – between personal inclination and social expectation, and in individuals between the urge to enact 'primitive' behaviour or adhere to 'civilized' behaviour – can be harmful.

I conclude this is often negative for staff (and by association, organizations) even when successful outcomes occur through accomplished customer service. I used the lens of theatre to help explain this. In this sense, even though the service outcome may be positive - a happy customer, a happy employer - the cost for staff (and therefore ironically, organizations) is often thought not always negative; comedic service outcomes disguise tragic consequences for workers and organizations. This feeds the dominance hierarchy which in turn feeds the outcomes, and so on. Ethology helps explain how this dominance occurs.

PART 5 summary

This section applied to the exemplum topic of WRH in service interactions the new conceptual framework synthesized in this thesis. Specifically, the chapters considered the dynamics, impacts and effects of WRH, and the outcome of those effects, through theoretical analysis.

This indicates something of the complexity of the behaviours studied. Analysis notably indicates the complexity of the FFF and emotional reactions in and between parties in interactions, e.g. cross-over and lag of trajectories. It also identified that WRH comprises multiple conflicts, e.g. in service workers as well as between the customer and the organization or its representatives. I also outlined the tension or conflict between behavioural inclinations propelled by survival needs and the organizational norms (and wider social norms) prohibiting their expression. I suggested customers are less restricted than staff by organizations regarding expression of emotion and behaviour, despite organizations' professed position on WRH as ubiquitously adopted in zero tolerance policies.

I argued that hostility, stress and emotion occur in service-based WRH but are adaptive, viz. are survival-oriented and powered by evolved mechanisms/systems/complexes. These behaviours and experiences are influenced by biological, psychological and social factors. Throughout, the biopsychosocial nature or character of behaviours has been emphasized. I opined the impacts of effects of hostility, stress and emotion on both parties in interactions is itself biopsychosocial, and thus potent and deeply-effecting. I argued that much WRH behaviour is ritualized in form but that the biopsychosocial impacts of these behaviours and experiences have the effect of ritual on customers and workers. I also offered a plausible explanation of how this effect occurs (through connected processes of impact on the psyche through bodily experience, body and character armouring and hexis). I further claimed that this sustains the status hierarchy in relationships. I then extended this line of thinking to claim that a dominance hierarchy is the result of this status hierarchy operating over time.

I drew from concepts in ethology to elucidate this argument and draw inferences in analysis. Ethology operates in the evolutionary frame and sees humankind as an evolved species. It accommodates understanding of behaviour as complex and biopsychosocial. Human behaviour is seen as being influenced by biological, psychological and social factors. An ethological frame enables one to see behaviour, based in and driven by potent biological imperatives (connected directly to an organism's urge to survive), as operating in social contexts and having social, as well as physical and psychological impacts and repercussions. It enables one to 'read' interactions between parties in situated contexts whilst still remaining attentive to the phylogenetic and epigenetic (social and cultural) influences operating on and through them.

These chapters have thus touched on Tinbergen's four areas for ethological - proximate cause, adaptation, phylogenetic factors, and ontogenetic factors - though not exhaustively. For instance, my analysis identified the hostile customer as a proximate cause of staff's reaction. (I claim the service credo is another that influences staff's behaviours.) Regarding adaptation, I showed the adaptive function hostility, stress and emotion have, e.g. reaction to threat; emotion display in hostile interactions; behaviour, including ritualized behaviour, enacted to secure status. All operate to foster survival. For instance, customers retain (allotted) status through their behaviour. (Similarly, I argue staff's reaction (stress, emotion) and subsequent behaviour (ritualized behaviour) is also adaptive, and can be seen to foster their survival through adherence to service credo and retain its jobs, though initially allotted status and limits on behaviour resulting in sustained lower status serves to promote a loss relative to customers.)

In analysis I outlined the activity of phylogenetic mechanisms/systems/complexes active in behaviour (e.g. FFF, emotion, hostility, ritualized behaviour). I also indicated that ontogenetic factors influencing the individual in their life-course is evident in the way organizations influence customer's and staff's roles and behaviours in service interactions (which operates in addition to the wider civilizing process influencing peoples' behaviour). I also framed outcomes of WRH incidents in theatrical terms to help explain the positive and negatives and sometimes complex mixed results that ensure from the dominance hierarchy.

The ontology and epistemology used in this thesis has offered new insights into WRH and service work that perspectives and approaches dominating WRH and service work research (which are not pluralist in perspective and do not incorporate biological facets of behaviour) have not identified or recognized exist. I argue the new insights gained in the theoretical analysis supports the relevance of the new conceptual framework also because the thesis has looked at more facets of WRH that past studies have. It has considered what happens, why, to whom, how, and what consequences occur.

PART 6

This section, comprising a single chapter, outlines what contributions this thesis makes to OB/OMS and WRH. I initially indicate some of the limitations the thesis may have. I summarily cover the theorizing process undertaken as the new conceptual framework was synthesized through this, and argue for the validity of such an approach in making contributions. I suggest how the conceptual framework might be used to analyse other behaviours of interest to OB/OMS, not only (Type 2) WRH, and illustrate how Type 2 WRH could be studied empirically using it. I hope these illustrations support the validity and utility of the framework. In similar vein, I outline the organizational benefits of adopting the perspective of the framework to show the approach may be able to make pragmatic impacts in organizational life and is not merely an intellectual exercise of academic interest.

Chapter 20 Contributions and potential future research

Introduction

In this chapter I give a summary of the contributions I believe this theoretical thesis makes. I anticipate some of the criticism that might be levelled at the thesis by outlining the apparent limitations (e.g. weaknesses, drawbacks) of it. I then outline the theorizing process undertaken which resulted in the synthesis of the new conceptual framework. I present the contributions I believe the thesis makes to OB/OMS generally and WRH (and associated fields) specifically. I include an indication of how the topics covered could be empirically studied. I also note some of the other topics the conceptual framework could be applied to, to demonstrate its relevance. I conclude by offering comment on the organizational benefit of the conceptual framework.

Limitations

Use of TE, ethology and the biopsychosocial approach could attract criticism from some quarters, not only in OB/OMS but in social science more generally. I do not subscribe to SSSM super-organicism but those who do might see inclusion of biological factors or use of TE and commensurate concepts like ethology as questionable. Grand Theory (here, TE) is hard to 'test' in OB/OMS and objections to it may be based on this. However, I believe potential future research could empirically study insights inferred from the application of the framework in my analysis. I admit challenges exist apropos testing some of the ideas presented in this thesis, but this does not devalue the ideas *per se*.

As OB is a field typically generating empirical studies, one criticism of this thesis might be that it is non-empirical. The arguments presented in defence of the conceptual framework and the theorizing process hopefully counter much of this potential critique.

Some might claim the trans-disciplinary mentality of this thesis, its importation and application of concepts from outside OB/OMS, and its acceptance of TE and commensurate concepts somehow dilutes the field. This argument is weakened by the fact OB/OMS has historically been, and remains, informed by other disciplines (Bratton *et al*., 2010; Cunliffe,

2009). However, I acknowledge the approach is challenging and could require further clarity and exposition to convince some. A danger of disciplinary-based research is the anchoring of topic study in one discipline. Though useful in providing detailed understanding in specific ways, it risks limiting understanding of topics by restricting potential explanation. A transdisciplinary approach offers a broader perspective and specifically provides an active connection between domains and disciplines which may overcome, or at least contest, disciplinary 'boundaries' and promotes an integrative attitude which avoids the traps of super-organicism or reductionism.

Another criticism of the thesis might be my restricting the application of the framework to a single topic (WRH), and thus undermining my argument about its relevance to other topics. However, I connected WRH with stress and emotion. This contextualized hostility; not doing so would have abstracted WRH, one of the criticisms I have levelled at past WRH research. My argument that hostility is an adaptive behaviour and biopsychosocial in nature/character is also pertinent to stress and emotion. I argue this bolsters my argument that the conceptual framework is not just applicable to hostility (I argue below it may gainfully be used to study other behaviours.)

That I have not presented a new theory of WRH could be perceived as a weakness and limitation of this thesis. I hope the comments on theorizing below counters such criticisms.

A theoretical approach is as valid a way to make contributions as empirical study. Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004) note research can address conceptual problems in meta-theoretical manner, claiming that theoretical frameworks can be created by connecting ideas across disciplines. The resulting synthesis potentially leads to greater understanding of the topic studied. For Ackroyd (2004: 153), valid research "can equally well be theoretical" and "may be mainly conceptual in that its primary attention is given to ideas; to the conceptualization of things and events and what is causing [or contributing to] what" (*ibid.*: 156). This can be achieved by "literature[s] and research related to a particular subject area" being

> "sifted, evaluated and considered in order to understand and to gain some critical purchase on existing knowledge or clarify ideas. Finally, research

> may be primarily theoretical in that active consideration is given to the concepts and ideas that might be useful in understanding a given subject area." (*ibid*.)

I believe my thesis is characterized by these efforts and thus makes contributions through the process of theorizing - specifically by connecting, synthesizing and reconceptualising topics in the interests of clarifying them, showing and forming relationships between them and expanding understanding (Weick, 1995; Whetten, 1989). I acknowledge the analysis is inferential and unsupported by empirical data. I also accept it may not be the only explanation, or an exhaustive one, of what happens in service-based WRH. However, I hope to have shown it is a plausible explanation that future empirical research (see below) could research further.

The conceptual framework

The conceptual framework synthesized from this theorizing process is new and, to my knowledge, has never before been used in in OB/OMS or specific WRH or service work research.

The framework uses TE connected with the biopsychosocial approach and human ethology as an over-arching meta-theoretical framework accommodating multiple paradigms and a range of differing research approaches and findings (i.e. biological, psychological and social research). As noted, my claim is that humans are evolved biopsychosocial beings which can be studied ethologically.

TE has been called for as a relevant way to study many OB topics (Nicholson, 2006; Nicholson and White, 2006). It has evoked negative reactions, apparently because it is distrusted or feared by social science (Laland and Brown, 2011). Like its advocates, I argue it is a potentially profitable approach but it is under-used. This thesis supports its general (interdisciplinary) social science use (Dubreuil, 2010) and past calls for its use in OB. However, I apply it to a topic its supporters have not identified as one relevant for its study. I also augment TE with commensurate concepts not before used in OB/OMS to my knowledge; the biopsychosocial approach to behaviour as a complex, evolved aspect of

human life; and ethology as an epistemology and methodology able to comprehend it. The core features of the conceptual framework accepts -

- *Homo sapiens sapiens* is an evolved species
- Humans are part of not separate to the natural world
- Behaviour is functionally-geared to fulfilling survival needs; this inclines individuals to self-protection
- Biological, psychological and social factors influence human life; biopsychosocial complexes result (behaviour is an example) which have biopsychosocial impacts and effects
- A pluralistic, interdisciplinary approach is required to comprehend biopsychosocial complexes and their impacts and effects
- Human ethology offers an epistemological and methodological way to study human behaviour in context

The theorizing process

I hope to have qualified the relevance of the theoretical (non-empirical) approach in a field dominated by empirical research. This section offers further information on the theorizing process undertaken.

The thesis conforms to ideas about theorizing which is a process in and through which contributions may be made by developing models and hypotheses (Weick, 1989). In this thesis this is evident in the formation of the conceptual framework and the results of its application, e.g. the 'hostility chain'. However, theory creation - apparently rare in OB (Weick, 1995; Whetten, 1989) - is not required when making a theoretical contribution (Weick, 1989; Whetten, 1989). Contributions can be made as per criteria mentioned above (e.g. synthesizing concepts, demonstrating relationships between them, etc.). I do not present a new WRH theory, though I do offer artefacts of theory (e.g. models); I am presenting a new approach, and a defence of its relevance, for WRH and wider OB/OMS.

Recent calls for alternative approaches to WRH indicate dissatisfaction with past and current research trends. My research has attempted to find an alternative without dismissing the findings of WRH research thus far (I have included these by using a meta-theoretical

approach accommodating them wherever possible). In doing this I have manifested Wicker's (1985) claim that thinking differently challenges assumptions about issues and avoids maintaining the restriction of extant ideas. For Wicker (1985) and Whetten (1989), this can make a contribution by expanding scope of comprehension and/or introducing a new approach.

The adoption of TE, the biopsychosocial concept and human ethology constitutes a pluralism which approaches holism. Such a perspective -

- Affords the opportunity to explore interaction between processes and entities, and acknowledges these (e.g. behaviour) are multi-faceted
- Is inclusive of diversity in acknowledging the benefit of varying paradigms' explanations
- Represents an alternative to single paradigm perspectives which are "necessarily limiting" (Lewis and Keleman, 2002: 252) though useful in partially explaining issues from a particular perspective
- Allows use of different lenses to view topics (epistemologically)

Biological, psychological and social research on hostility, stress and emotion shows single paradigms are relevant in explaining a facet of the behaviour or experience. A multi-paradigmatic approach accommodates more than one explanation, e.g. TE, the biospsychosocial approach and human ethology accommodate social insights into and explanations of behaviour as well as biological ones. As a meta-theoretical perspective offering what Miller (1982) calls an over-arching thought model spanning different perspectives, this can move beyond the frames single paradigms enforce on analysis, affording a multi-sided and more complex account of phenomena (hence it is more if not fully holistic).

Glynn *et al*., (2000: 726) notes "organizational theorists tend to homogenize" the "pluralistic world" which simplifies complexity. This can be countered by incorporating complexity in models and theories. Problematizing topics is one way to achieve this

(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007). I have not problematized WRH but rather indicated its complexity, something contemporary WRH research has overlooked. I have argued that a different conceptual framework is requited if such complexity is to be understood.

Some OB/OMS and social science scholars might fear subjugation of their paradigms to a 'higher-order' perspective (i.e. meta-theory like TE), protest about paradigm incommensurability, or claim genuine multi-paradigmatic practice is impractical because it requires so much specialist knowledge. I indicated recent social science research and perspectives dissatisfied with the bio-social division suggests this fear is questionable (and historically-contingent and therefore changeable). A trans-disciplinary, multi-paradigmatic approach seems worthwhile if only to explore (potential) links between domains and disciplines (and their research streams) which might otherwise remain separated. Full integration may not result but some may.

Contributions to OB/OMS and WRH

Researchers have called for new WRH approaches. Some OB scholars have called for TE's use. I have used the latter to address the former, achieved through the theorizing process which argues for a TE-based conceptual framework, as outlined above. WRH is the exemplum behaviour it is applied to.

I claim the conceptual framework makes contributions in two clusters. First, it contributes to OB/OMS in offering a different approach to studying behaviour in organizations. Second, it contributes to the WRH field - and the literature in associated topics, e.g. customer service, work stress and emotion, work embodiment and performativity - by generating new insights through the application of the framework. Some of the contributions outlined below link to academic study of WRH, others to organizational practice. I outline contributions to OB/OMS, WRH and associate topics, in each case indicating issues, questions, etc. these contributions begin to answer or elucidate.

I have challenged the bio-social divide typified by the super-organicist SSSM (which many OB/OMS studies seem to accept). The conceptual framework offers a way to avoid it. Both biological and social - and for humans, psychological - factors influence human life and behaviour, and these can be accommodated in the framework because TE, human ethology

and the biopsychosocial approach are not reductionist (and explain behaviour solely in biological terms). This locates the thesis in an atypical way for the field.

Adopting the biopsychosocial approach recognizes humans and their behaviours are complex and evolved. A pluralist approach to understanding behaviour results in which different, even divergent, research approaches and findings can be accommodated and even potentially integrated (resulting in an holistic outcome) by emphasizing humans are part of the natural world not set somehow above or separate to it)[58]. This acknowledges humans are complex, embodied beings powerfully influenced by biological, psychological and social factors which result in biopsychosocial complexes (e.g. behaviour and the systems propelling it). I know of no study on WRH or service work literature which adopts this position. I hazard that TE-based studies aside, few studies in OB/OMS take this line.

This thesis makes a contribution by showing how OB/OMS may better study corporeality by incorporating biological factors (e.g. the body) to a greater extent than at present. OB/OMS has seemingly overlooked the body, biological issues and bio-social connections in preference for psychological and social foci and explanations. (Wider social science has begun to incorporate such matters more, suggesting a new avenue for organizational study to explore.) The body is the site of feeling (including sensation), personal (inner) experience, and the vehicle for human (social) interaction. In WRH research to date such issues have gone unacknowledged thus remain under-explored, and the connections between mind and body largely overlooked. (Admittedly service work research shows emotional labour has negative bodily effect for workers.) Past WRH studies have not incorporated the body or biological processes to any great degree, and have been super-organicist. In WRH, the body may be the target for violence and the site of stress; in service working it is the vehicle of emotional display in emotional labour. As such, the body requires inclusion in study in these fields.

I claim the framework offers a means to be more attentive to biological (e.g. corporeal) as well as (psycho-)social aspects of behaviour. This results in understanding of experience and performative interaction in social settings. Researchers in disciplines

[58] Humanly-created taxa can imply this as Ingold (1988) and Clark (1988) note.

influencing OB have begun to study such issues (and draw from TE), indicating OB might be wise to follow suit. Approaches dominating OB/OMS and WRH research would likely not have arrived at my analysis nor its inferences because biological issues - the biological imperatives for action, mechanisms/systems/complexes driving it, the arousal necessary for behavioural enactment, the effects of same - would probably have not been included in study.

TE and ethology acknowledges behaviour is evolved to serve survival purpose. This is seemingly an unpopular view in OB/OMS and not widely accepted, though some researchers do call for evolutionary approaches. I argued hostility, stress and emotion are adaptive, evolved behaviours geared to survival and driven by very potent mechanisms/systems/complexes, e.g. the limbic system, FFF/stress, emotion. I argued hostility has functional utility – it is not always or necessarily negative (though it and its effects on targets may be unpleasant and damaging). Hostility is a normal behaviour which appears in some conditions and circumstances for understandable and utilitarian reasons. WRH research has never-before recognized this, nor applied TE to WRH. Expressing it - and using TE to elucidate it - makes a contribution by reframing the behaviour. It also fulfils recent and critically-inclined research calls for alternative approaches to WRH. My approach beneficially allows us to avoid locating WRH in the standard discourse assuming WRH is deviant, defective behaviour requiring (organizational) correction or remedy. Some WRH may be criminal and/or pathological but it seems surprising the adaptive benefit of such behaviour(s) has not been considered or researched in the WRH field. I suggest WRH's function has been overlooked because value judgements framed its analysis and still do so.

I indicated the stress reaction and behavioural responses inclined to are propelled by the limbic system and FFF. This identified what mechanisms/systems/complexes are involved in behaviour, what they do and what effect they have on individuals. I also showed hostility is connected to stress and emotion (the proposed 'hostility chain'). (These are behaviours the limbic system is also involved in.) This model shows how the customer and worker are connected (in the interaction dyad). It indicates a stressor (i.e. a hostile customer)

releases staff's internal and automatic (stress) reaction (through LS and ANS activity). As such, a proximate cause for staff's behaviour can be identified[59].

I indicated that though valuable, the hard-wired parts and functions of our body-minds evolved over millions of years may lead to tension or even conflict between the behaviours they incline people to and the contemporary setting they continue to operate in. Though hostility, stress, etc. are retained because of their adaptive benefit, and humans may be generally well-adapted to contemporary contexts regarding capacity to control behaviour (i.e. restrain violence, maintain social norms expected of us), some of the impacts and effects of social- and/or self-restraint on behaviour may be negative. Humans may not be as well-adapted to the unused arousal created by behavioural inclinations driven by these systems. These mechanisms/systems/complexes have not been included in WRH research to date. I showed something of the evolutionary history and adaptive benefit of hostility, stress and emotion to qualify why such behaviours still obtain. This is new in WRH research but enables the deep history of behaviour and mechanisms/complexes propelling it to be incorporated into analysis. Knowing how behaviour operates and the effects it has requires us to reframe it as multi-faceted and complex.

The structure of my analysis of WRH in service work illustrates the scope this reframing has; it allows a natural historical account of behaviour without denying specific social context. It is attentive to biological, psychological and social aspects of behaviour, i.e. how behaviour is propelled and shaped by and through biological, psychological and social influences and has biological, psychological and social impacts and effects for parties. It enables consideration of intrapersonal matters (internal reaction, inner feeling) and interpersonal issues (responses (behaviours) produced for social interaction), and shows their connection. WRH studies to date have not to my knowledge mentioned such matters.

I argued human ethology is a valid and useful lens through which to study behaviour. Ethology is attentive to context and hence social factors, not merely biological

[59] For workers, the stressor is the customer's behaviour. The context influencing expectations about their EL is another potential stressor. The customer's stressor could be poor service or another cause (e.g. life or daily stressor unrelated to the event). This indicates causes are complex and not associated with simple effects. For customers and workers behavioural responses are coloured by external (social, organizational) factors as well as internal ones, though I argue customers' status allows freer emotional expression and behaviour.

ones. I believe human ethology can help operationalize my conceptual framework as an epistemology and methodology (I do not use it as the latter in this thesis, but empirical research could). Instating this approach makes two contributions. Firstly, it locates behaviour in a complex nexus of biological and social influences without zoomorphizing humans or reducing their complexity. It enables one to consider Tinbergen's core foci – causation, development (ontogeny), evolution (phylogeny), and function (adaptation). This enables study of more facets of behaviour when analysing a particular event or behaviour (though researchers might limit focus on one or two to make research specific, detailed and manageable.)

Secondly, it offers a useful way to study behaviour. One of ethology's benefits is that it studies behaviour in the natural environment (here, social interaction). In this, it observes and analyses what happens between interactants. Though ethology is observation-based it also allows for experimentation, which expands the number of ways to gain insights into behaviour. Ethology is alert to mechanisms/systems/complexes 'beneath' public behaviour which exert potent effect but are not always apparent to observers (or indeed to interactants). The biological ones mentioned automatically and subconsciously function in behaviour and are deeply-involved in it because of their survival basis. Including them in OB/OMS study allows us to see more fully what is influential in interactions. We probe to 'deeper' levels of human behaviour by acknowledging their presence, influence and effects. This results in a more comprehensive account of behaviour and experience. It is evident in my analysis which considered, for example, the biological, psychological and social mechanisms/systems/complexes operating in specific behaviours. An approach not evolutionary, biopsychosocial or ethological in character would have not included such factors, and as such they would not have been taken into account in analysis.

I claim contextualizing WRH makes a contribution. WRH research often decontextualizes events (cf. Grandey *et al*. (2004) and Hopp *et al*. (2012) apropos hostility in service work contexts). I contextualized WRH in a number of ways, e.g. by locating it in service work, connecting it to other behaviour and experiences, and noting the various influences on it (i.e. biological, psychological and social). Contextualizing WRN in service work (by no means the only context WRH appears in) allowed consideration of specific social

factors influencing behaviour. A contribution may be seen in my expansion of the service triangle concept. I first recast this as a status hierarchy by arguing status is allocated customers and staff in service credo. I then suggested status is evident in roles and behavioural displays enacted by parties in interactions. I further extended this concept to posit the status hierarchy is a power vector in which staff serve both customers and the organization.

I also contextualized WRH by linking it to other behaviours (stress and emotion). Furthermore, I drew from general (non-work) research on stress, emotion and hostility to inform understanding of behaviours. (Using general hostility research is advocated by Anderson and Bushman (2002) but is rarely done in WRH research,) Isolating hostility from its context, associated behaviours and wider scientific research seems naïve, unhelpful, and under-represents its complexity. Drawing from general hostility, stress and emotion (e.g. to identify biological, psychological and social explanations and overlaps of same), and service work research, expands WRH study beyond the parameters of the field into connected fields. The previously-mentioned use of meta-theory to accommodate these biological, psychological and social findings of hostility, stress and emotion research constitutes another expansion.

By exploring complexities of WRH I indicate it is a more complicated phenomenon than research (or organizational practice) has thus far acknowledged. In effect, I have supplemented 'input, process and output' WRH models by exploring the dynamics, impacts and effects of WRH in context for staff, customers and organizations. These begin to answer questions about why WRH occurs, why it is so effecting, what happens in it, etc., which WRH research thus far has surprisingly not explored deeply. Provisional contributions for each are now outlined.

Regarding dynamics of WRH interactions, WRH and customer service fields are expanded through appreciation of complexity inherent in interpersonal interactions. I illustrated this by exploring inner experience and its effects on behaviour (responses) for individuals and between interacting parties. I noted the role required of staff, especially if and when hostility occurs, is complex and hard to achieve because customers are interactive participants.

Apropos impacts, I considered the trajectory of the stress reaction, including overlaps, in the customer-worker dyad, and the damage this can cause, e.g. noting stress/arousal may be exacerbated by staff's emotion regulation to enable emotional labour. I also indicated multiple conflicts exists in WRH. I suggested for staff, conflicts exist in role conflict, in dramaturgical stress of maintaining role, and between the role and the real self. WRH research tends to see conflict in a simple, one dimensional way, e.g. between customer and organization (Type 2) or between colleagues (Type 3). The idea multiple forms of conflict might exist in Type 2 WRH has seemingly not been suggested. I also noted managing such impacts may elevate stress/emotion and have negative effect. Impacts effect the body, the psyche, the behaviour enacted and social standing (status). The literature has not before mentioned such issues about service-based WRH interactions.

I make further contributions to WRH and service work fields through the argument ritualized behaviours occur in WRH interactions - and that these have ritual effect for interacting parties. I drew from ethology to argue that behaviour in WRH is typically symbolic - ritualized behaviour - but is propelled by the same systems driving hostility (LS-influenced ANS arousal). Threat and appeasement and submission displays are examples of fight and flight respectively, but restrained by evolution to limit damage incurred by parties. This is a novel reading of WRH, and one not possible without an ethological approach. This reading makes a contribution by helping explain why WRH is often not violent or severely physically damaging, viz. why WRH hostility appears in the forms it typically does (e.g. verbal abuse, intimidation). I also noted ritualized behaviour is not only driven by but also elevates arousal, which can have detrimental effect. This contributes to the field by helping explain how and why WRH is harmful despite it often not being violent and why we should not consider that non-violent or -physical WRH is not damaging.

I presented the novel idea that WRH has ritual effect for staff and customers through biopsychosocial impacts on individuals enacting roles. I suggested plausible ways this occurs (through biopsychological impacts, hexis and body and character armouring). I proposed social influences function (partly) through corporeality (e.g. biopsychological impacts, hexis) and derive some of their power from this, e.g. through ritual. I proposed this is how staff's and customers' status occurs and how parties are positioned as α and β in the

dyad because of ascribed status in an artificial hierarchy. I further argued the outcome of ritual helps explain how a dominance hierarchy occurs. (I drew from ethology for the concept of dominance hierarchy.) Customers' and staff's status is galvanized through wins and losses respectively and the biopsychosocial impacts/effects these have. This offers new insight into why and how WRH has on-going effect because it explains that customers can exercise power through status even to the point of enacting hostility, which organizations tacitly support and thus contribute to WRH. It also helps explain why workers rarely counter-aggress hostile customers and remain in service posts despite the negative impacts they experience. Staff is trained to retain lower status, that of β in the customer-worker dyad and γ in the status hierarchy/power vector. The expression (or non-expression) of behaviour fostered by status allocations has potent effect on parties and sustain the relationships involved in service work.

I extended the notion service work requires staff's acting (identified in Hochschild's seminal research) by noting staff and customers enact (i.e. perform) embodied roles in action that is fundamentally dramatic (because it is hostile, stressful and emotional). I noted customers and workers are actors, directors, audience members and 'playwrights' scripting the drama in *ad hoc* fashion in interactions. I also extended Huxley's idea of the body in the play by directly connecting phases of dramatic action and arousal to show links exist between activity in embodied interactive performance and personal psycho-physiological state. (Again, this shows the importance of considering biological factors in behaviour.) I further used the theatrical lens to explain that the biopsychosocial outcomes of status-based, -driven and -sustaining wins and losses in such interactions are broadly comedic and tragic outcomes, and that comedic ones can disguise tragic ones. These readings again indicate why WRH is hard to address. Hostile service interactions seem comedic unless staff incurs noticeable injury. Organizations might erroneously assume damage is not harmful or occurs at all, believing HSM approaches keep WRH controlled (if frequent or serious physical injury does not occur).

The new conceptual framework applied to WRH fulfils the call in recent research for alternative approaches to topic. I believe it offers numerous benefits. First, I have not limited the thesis to a single sector so I could generalize about WRH. Second, I have sought to

understand WRH, not merely restate its scope. Third, I have actively sought to position WRH in a different way to current trends in WRH research. This alternative approach may register as a contribution in offering a new line of thinking that is broader than a specialised empirical study would be and allows for a wider perspective on behaviour. Its pluralism enables inclusion of diverse research findings and approaches.

The analysis chapters, in applying the new conceptual framework for WRH, have attempted to demonstrate its plausibility, indicate its applicability and offered new insights into topics. These have touched on the core questions Tinbergen founded for ethology's focus, all of which are connected to TE –

1. The proximate causes of behaviour; stimuli in specific social contexts eliciting reaction, viz. hostile customer eliciting staff's FFF/emotional reaction, social influences (e.g. service credo norms) limiting behaviour
2. The phylogenetic evolution of biological/physiological complexes/systems/mechanisms driving behaviour; LS and its activity (e.g. FFF) are evolved.
3. Behaviour's adaptive benefit; hostility, stress and emotion have survival advantages and operate functioning to promote self-interest. WRH and responses to it can be seen as such.
4. Ontogenetic development of mechanisms/systems in individuals' lives, e.g. how the civilizing process and organizational influences (like service credo) influences staff's (and customers') behaviour displays

By attending to all of ethology's core foci, I claim the validity of using the ethological lens is defended. I suggest this strengthens my claim a TE-based approach is useful because ethology can operationalise TE.

Empirical research

I believe the topics analysed 'theoretically' can be studied empirically. This section does not present a fully-designed study proposal with a methodology, methods, research questions and analytic techniques detailed and defended but rather outlines how some

aspects of the topics analysed could be empirically researched. This information is presented in tables for ease of reading.

Research design

A single study would not be able to accommodate everything my analysis includes; pragmatic issues (e.g. time, finance, data volume, complexity) would render such an attempt difficult. A series of less complex, shorter longitudinal studies using multiple methods could be conducted focusing on specifics issues, e.g. dynamics of interactions, impacts of interactions, staff experiences, customer experiences, etc. Longitudinal studies would be required to test and retest behaviour and experiences over time e.g. returning to subjects after months or a year (van Dierdendonck *et al*., 2001) to investigate changes in e.g. personal experience, stress levels, ill-health, professional status, etc. This could provide historically-contextualized results that other designs could not (Meier and Spector, 2013).

In order to study if WRH is a common service work experience a multi-sector study would be required, i.e. to consider WRH in a range of 'at risk' work environments, e.g. as identified by BCS/CSEW. Though focusing on the UK (a comparative study could be done in other nations), this could help better identify WRH's general appearance and effects. The objective is not to research WRH's prevalence (many studies do so) but investigate its dynamics, impacts, effects and outcomes. Thus, studying staff who face WRH is imperative. A sample drawn from an initial staff survey and/or a snowball sampling approach could identify who experiences WRH and thus which workers to focus on in studies.

Multiple methods

Multiple methods seem beneficial because they can potentially expand and corroborate single methods' findings by approaching the topic from numerous angles (David and Sutton, 2004). This is preferential to a reliance on one method, especially for complex topics. By approaching a topic from different angles using differing methods, a more detailed or nuanced picture may emerge. Each method indicated below has benefits, and their connection offers potentially more comprehensive findings and insights. Here, triangulation could include social and biological research methods. Those of potential use include social

and biological science methods. This may foster inclusion of different levels or facets of complex behaviour by drawing on relevant specialist techniques associated with apposite sciences (see Hurrell *et al*. (1998) regarding mixture of social and biological methods). Gaps may exist between findings from each, as might be expected in triangulation and especially when using methods drawn from different traditions, but this does not mean complete disconnection exists; methods and approaches specializing in a domain and 'level' of analysis may help build a more complete and multi-layered or -faceted picture of phenomena.

Social science research methods

Document analysis, interviews and observation are all relevant, familiar and well-used qualitative methods and a combination noted as particularly useful (Halfpenny (1979) citing Flynn (date unspecified)), e.g. it avoids reliance on subjects' reports/accounts and allows one to check observations against interviewees' accounts.

Individual recollections of experience, opinion, self-insight, etc. are all relevant in acknowledging subjectivity of experience. This is relevant apropos the cluster of related behaviours studied in this thesis because they are corporeal, emotional, psychological phenomena occurring intra- and inter-personally. Subjects' sense, perceptions, thoughts and sense-making of experiences can be partly accessed from idiographic methods such as interview, self-report (survey, questionnaire; see Spector and Jex, 1998), diary/personal narratives, etc., though the possibility of deceit, vagaries of recall and self-presentation (performance, self-bias) colouring data exists.

Questions in interview and survey/questionnaire could focus on issues like –

- perception of relative status/power of parties in interactions
- extent of perceived acting in service delivery, how such performance is accomplished, and what impacts and effects of this are
- whether workers feel inclined to counter-aggress, and why they do not
- whether and how staff actively suppresses emotion, arousal and behaviours
- who staff focus on in service interactions

- what feelings occur in staff when delivering service, when under stress, when emotional and/or when facing hostile customers
- whether staff is aware of stress, feelings and bodily sensations and what impact these have on performance
- whether differences exist between the Professional Service Worker presented in role and the 'real' self, if these are in tension, and how workers
- manage this tension
- whether staff intentionally selects and consciously monitors and controls body use (e.g. gestures, postures) in interactions or not

This list is not exhaustive but does indicate the range of issues such methods might profitably explore. Research should focus on those who are involved in and are affected by interactions' dynamics, e.g. staff and customers. (Managers could also be included in such a study.)

Using video footage of actual or staged WRH incidents and general service interactions could prompt recall, sense-making and discussion on issues like –

- identifying postures, gestures and motion associated with behaviour, emotion and status to ascertain –
    - if status can be perceived from behaviour in interactions (and thus the more powerful party identified)
    - if interpretations are the same or similar across workers, groups (e.g. the sexes, different ages, etc.) and sectors

Models suggested in the thesis, e.g. the status hierarchy and power vector, might be employed in exercises. For instance, subjects could be asked to identify from film or case studies who they believe are powerful in interactions and how such power is exercised. This could help identify how workers perceive status and power, explore perspectives and reasons for this, and as a prompt to talk about personal experiences.

Analysis of organizations' documents would provide opportunity to identify the extent, type and use of organizational provision to address WRH, e.g. policies, work

procedures, reports. Organizational attitudes to WRH could be identified or interpreted. This could help identify the context staff works in and help identify whether organizations contribute to WRH.

Observation of staff might yield important data on issues like –

- whether workers use organizational WRH provision (e.g. policies, procedures, reporting systems) as trained/expected
- what WRH behaviours staff face (e.g. verbal aggression, intimidation, threat, assault)
- who aggresses (e.g. males, females; age of aggressors)
- what staff's responses are, e.g. verbal and non-verbal communication before (i.e. in anticipation of), during and after incidents
- what body use workers individually and generally display in such interactions
- what post-incident recovery practices staff use, if any
- whether staff's embodied behaviour manifests service credo

A study might have to target observation times to observe times when staff suggests WRH is likely to occur but staff's general (service) behaviours could be observed at times when WRH does not appear. Overall trends regarding times, conditions and forms of and responses to WRH could be gathered and compared for individuals, organizations, sectors and across sectors. Idiographic methods could triangulate with these observations, e.g. to explore if staff behave as they recall doing or as expected.

Biological/behavioural science research methods

Using biological research methods could help identify the presence, strength and potential effect of stress reaction in the form of stress chemicals e.g. cortisol and testosterone (Bateup *et al*., 2002; Carney and Mason, 2010; Mazur *et al*., 1997) following changes to physiological arousal. Though apparently rare in business schools (cf. Carney and Mason, 2010) this manifests interest in biological facets of human behaviour evident in some recent social science and OB/OMS research. Relatively simple-to-administer methods such as heart-rate and blood pressure measurement (e.g. Evans and Steptoe, 2001) could

be used to identify (changes to) stress levels before, in and following routine and hostile service interactions. These methods can be used in naturalistic (field) studies and experiments, e.g. heart rate monitoring using a wrist-located instrument, salivettes to capture saliva samples then analysed in the laboratory. The researcher would probably be reliant on subjects' data collection because a longitudinal study measuring physiological state before, during and after events would need many samples to establish base-line data and chart arousal trends[60].

Lab-based experiments could be run to explore issues, perhaps following observations. Lab-based studies testing for associations between arousal in behaviour (e.g. Carney and Mason, 2010) and survey/questionnaire studies on reported arousal, e.g. perceived stress (e.g. Chandola *et al*., 2006), might shed light on behaviours observed and tested in natural settings. For instance, studies on posture and arousal leading to improved task performance (Carney *et al*., 2010) or elevated arousal when competing in opposition-based games (Mazur *et al*., 1997) might help explain arousal seen in similar naturalistic situations, e.g. correspondences or correlations between effect of arousal created by adopting postures in ritualized behaviour during staged status-based hostile interactions (in which staff role-play customers and workers) and arousal occurring in actual WRH interactions. Studies could be designed to compare how role effects arousal level, whether emotional regulation reduces or elevates arousal in interactions, and to identify if staff expressing emotion or even threatening counter-aggression experience elevated or reduced arousal. Such experiments could be compared to findings from actual routine service and WRH interactions to establish if correlations exist between e.g. emotional regulation and arousal. Similarly tests might be able to ascertain if customer and staff arousals cross-over during actual or staged interactions. (Again, tests could be triangulated with interview and discussion apropos recollections of past experiences, feelings, emotions, recalled sensation and other corporeal experiences.)

[60] Initial tests for health (e.g. CV disease) might be required to ensure those with tendencies to ill-health were not included in studies, partly to guard against falsely-skewed data because of chronic conditions and partly to from illness resulting from the study itself.

Testing my inference that WRH has a ritual effect through biopsychosocial impact is difficult, perhaps impossible, because service work is not designed to function as ritual. However, I defend my inference is no more unreasonable than Rosen's (1988) claim office parties function as rituals (his research was not specifically about rituals in organizations).

Research outline

The connection of ideas in the synthesis of the framework and its application constitutes examples of propositions which could propel an empirical study. These propositions could be operationalized into testable hypotheses and research questions (which I do not included here). Each table below focuses on a particular topic or cluster of topics. The methods cited show how data could be accessed; multiple methods indicate how triangulation may usefully benefit the process; and entries under the final column indicate what the aim of getting such information is. None is exhaustive; they are offered as indicative.

Table 20.1 – hostility, stress and emotion

Proposition	Hypothesis	Method(s)	Data sought
WRH exists in service work interactions	Service work interactions increase WRH's appearance	Observation Interview/self-report Documents	If WRH is connected to service work
Staff habituates to WRH	Repeat exposure to WRH leads staff to accept it as a 'normal' feature of work	Interview/self-report	If staff comes to accept/expect WRH
WRH is harmful to staff	WRH impacts workers negatively	Interview	If staff understands or underestimates WRH's damage; how staff frames it
Stress associated with WRH harms staff	Stress increases through WRH	Interview Documents (staff absence, illness) Stress chemical test Field experiment – WRH role play to test arousals	If stress does occur (even in faked interactions), to what extent, if allostatic load increases over time, if this manifests in staff behaviours.
Hostility, stress and emotion are connected	Stress and negative emotion follow facing WRH	Interview Observation	If hostility is linked with ('causes') stress and emotion

Table 20.2 – dynamics of WRH interactions

Proposition	Hypothesis	Method(s)	Data sought
WRH is a stressor	WRH triggers stress reaction	Interview Field or lab experiment Stress test in field Observation	If staff identifies WRH as stress-related; if stress can be said to be elicited in WRH situations
WRH is an emotional experience	WRH triggers 'negative' emotion, e.g. fear	Interview Observation	If staff identifies WRH's emotional facet; what emotions WRH stirs
Professional service workers tend not to counter-aggress	Countering aggression with aggression is not an option because service credo and/or staff's interpretation of same demands staff displays non-negative emotions and behaviours	Interview Documents Observation	Whether counter-aggression is desired, inclined to or enacted; why or why not. What the norms are restraining such action
Professional service workers tend to remain in such jobs	Investment in work and its benefits buffer against drawbacks	Interview Observation	Pros of service work may balance or outweigh cons (e.g. WRH)

Service work is emotional labour	Use of emotions are required in service work, including dealing with WRH	Interview	If staff uses emotion in display/interactions; which emotions are used and why
Emotional labour requires emotional regulation	Suppressing some emotions is necessary for service to be delivered	Interview	If staff does self-regulate emotion to produce emotion display and 'appropriate' behaviour
Emotion labour is stressful	Use of emotion in service work through regulation will trigger stress reaction	Interview Lab or field experiment Test of stress reaction in field observations	Whether the process of emotion regulation in emotional labour increases/extends stress
Emotional labour can alienate workers	Service workers can become alienated from work, the employer and themselves through doing emotional labour	Interview	If service work might itself be harmful because of regulation of emotions; what forms this takes
Staff's collegial support buffers against negative work experiences	Staff forms self-help communities to help itself	Interview Observation Questionnaire on social support	Whether staff contributes to its own welfare

Ritualized behaviour appears in WRH in service interactions	Ritualized behaviour will be evident in automatically-adopted posture, gesture, motion, etc. in display by both (hostile) customers and (appeasing) staff due to arousal and emotional state of parties and will have physiological effect on same	Closed-circuit television footage Observation Lab experiments (test postures and arousals, role plays to identify behaviours used) Interview Field experiment (planted hostile 'customer') to test arousal changes	What behaviours appear in display; if they are automatically used; what their associated arousals are; if display itself creates arousal; if the customer-worker interaction manifests in anticipated hostile-appeasing/submissive behaviours

Table 20.3 - customer-staff status

Proposition	Hypothesis	Method(s)	Data sought
Customers are 'licensed' to behave aggressively	Staff perceive customers are permitted to behave with aggression in service work interactions	Interview	Staff's view of organization regarding tolerated customer behaviour
Staff is not allowed to behave with aggression	Staff perceive it is not permitted to display aggression in interactions	Interview	Staff's view of the organization regarding expected/desired worker behaviour
Customers and the organization are more powerful than staff	Staff is of lower status and has less capacity to exercise power than other parties	Interview Observation	Evidence of and staff's perceptions (and understanding) of status hierarchy/power vector in the service triangle
Customer are the focus of service work interactions	Customer needs are prioritized	Interview Observation	How service credo expectations dictate behavioural norms

Table 20.4 - impacts of WRH interactions on service workers and customers

Proposition	Hypothesis	Method(s)	Data sought
Customer aggression and emotional expression is negative for workers	Staff perceives customer's expression of emotion and aggression as having negative affect for it	Interview	Whether hostile customers are seen by staff as having negative impact
WRH, stress and/or emotion from service interactions impact workers in biological, psychological and social ways	Workers' physical and psychological wellbeing are effected by WRH regarding illness, alienation, dissonance, etc. which serves to effect workers' status	Interview Test for stress in experiment (e.g. on recall of or watching video footage of WRH) or in field test following WRH incident Questionnaire on stress and emotion experiences	Whether WRH makes multi-form impacts and how this occurs

Table 20.5 - effects of WRH interactions on customers and staff

Proposition	Hypothesis	Method(s)	Data sought
Biopsychosocial impacts influence retention of status and associated behaviour(s) of interacting parties	WRH in service settings has ritual effect on participants	Observation of status displays in interaction Interview	Whether the status hierarchy and its power vector sustains the ascribed status and influence of interactants
The effect of WRH's biopsychosocial impacts is that of ritual	Arousals driving behaviours in social context create arousals which sustain that social order	Observation of behaviour in interaction Field test of stress chemicals	The subtle, potent and multi-form effects of behaviour on the body-minds of staff and customers maintaining relationships

Further applications of the conceptual framework

I believe the framework is applicable not just to WRH as outlined above, but to other and specific aspects of WRH and OB/OMS generally. Some examples are given below.

WRH research

Type 3 (intra-organizational) WRH might be gainfully studied using the conceptual framework. Colleagues up and down or across the organizational hierarchy are as likely to face situations characterized by contest as by cooperation, e.g. securing promotion over co-workers, disputes with a 'superior' or 'subordinate'. These are scenarios in which resources may be scarce, self-interest is important and self-protection relevant, in which alliances may form or break, and status can be challenged and change.

Displacement of arousal released in WRH encounters might be studied by considering if and when staff channels its energy and emotion into resistance or retaliation aimed against the customer and/or the employer, i.e. if Type 2 incidents may influence Type 3 interactions. Such resistance and retaliatory behaviour could be understood not as pathological or misbehaviour but as rational motivation (even a moral imperative) to defend personal interests following stressful, upsetting experiences. (It is possible such a study might bridge between US and UK research streams. US studies tend to research Type 3 (collegial, intra-organizational) aggression; European research tends to focus on Type 2 aggression.) To my knowledge not study of this kind exists.

The Customer and the organization was included in analysis. Specific studies might focus on customers' perceptions of WRH, parties' power and status, service credo, reasons for hostile behaviour, and formation of customer identity through service experiences. A study of organizational perspective regarding WRH was mentioned previously, and could be expanded to consider issues like employers' influence on discourse on WRH, HSM, welfare and stress; the effect of same; and organizational fears of WRH, of losing customers and of sanction for not implementing HSM driving their behaviour.

A study could be designed to explore differences between the sexes regarding response to hostility. This could test the female 'tend and befriend' hypothesis, explore whether males do tend to aggress quicker and more frequently than females, and whether

females' behaviour shows peacekeeping inclinations, e.g. cooperation to solve aggressors' problems. (Type 3 – intra-organizational – aggression might be a more suitable context for this study.)

Korczysnki (2003) claims staff self-organizes efforts (communities of coping) to manage impacts of service work in the absence of organizational aid. An evolutionary-based study exploring formation and outcomes of these might elucidate such communities' benefits and dynamics.

Effects of in-group alliance and affiliation, e.g. as Professional Service Workers or Customers, might be gainfully studied using the approach to explore how status, identity and obedience to group norms occur, where tensions exists between in- and out-groups, and how this effects parties.

Similarly, staff's cooperation with the organization and its credo could be studied, e.g. one could explore if benefits of continued work outweighs negatives hostile service incidents has for staff, and hence if adopting the submissive role has some survival benefit and is not as negative as it appears.

General OB/OMS research

Nicholson and White (2006) note many topics in OB can be studied through TE. Used already to study a range of topics, others amenable to TE-based analysis include emotion, motivation, interaction, negotiation, and judgement (Nicholson and White (2006). One could add to this list the organizational manifestations of behaviours considered evolved, e.g. ethics (Hauser, 2006; Wright, 1994), narrative and storytelling (Young and Saver, 2001), cooperation (Debreuil, 2010), and innovation (e.g. imagination (Mithen, 2001)). Other organizational topics that could feasibly be explored using the approach, perhaps particularly in dyadic or small group interpersonal interactions, include organizational culture and its transmission, politics, economics, leadership, followership, (in)tolerance, race relations, gender relations, power, social support, strategy, alliances, take-overs, risk-taking, decision-making, (in)justice, and learning.

Research could investigate cooperation, e.g. staff's involvement in helping decide and design service work credo and WRH policy and procedure. Similar studies might focus

on mutually beneficial alliance-based behaviour addressing issues like HRM practice; ethics and corporate social responsibility; general management practice; gender, race, faith and diversity issues.

TE might help explain and challenge the 'business is war' mentality centralizing aggressiveness/hostility by showing hostility is not the defining characteristic of our species (a misinterpretation of TE) and thus help organizations identify less damaging alternative mentalities. TE could also be applied to potentially help change damaging organizational ecological and environmental practices. TE might even be used to trace historical objections to TE in OB/OMS and social science generally, and help explain why it has not been widely adopted whilst other schools of thought have come to dominate (McKinley *et al*., 1999).

Doubtless other examples of TE's possible use exist; the few referred to here are indicative of its relevance.

Organizational and practical relevance

The contributions outlined earlier in this chapter largely constitute contributions to the academic study of WRH. The empirical potential outlined shows service-based WRH could be studied using the conceptual framework presented in this thesis, e.g. to investigate the inferences made in theoretical analysis.

I also believe this thesis makes contributions to WRH practice. This is the realm of organizations and stakeholders for which WRH is a real challenge requiring responses.

My attention has focused on behaviour in context, experiences of it and the impacts, effects and outcomes of WRH. Consideration of staff's experience has figured largely in this. (My approach has been attentive to staff's potential needs rather than organizations', though the latter may benefit from the former being treated well.) My approach has thus not been managerialist, i.e. it does not seek to manage WRH as HSE and employers may wish to, nor prioritise organizational interests. Many organizational responses are managerialist and use HSM to try to control or prevent WRH and I have criticised this approach as being of questionable efficacy. Instead, I have primarily advocated understanding WRH better. This is a broader perspective on the topic.

Empirical research could yield further insights into WRH (as indicated) but pragmatic dividends may also result from the conceptual framework offered. I contend that the framework is useful for organizations in itself in offering an alternative perspective which could yield new organizational responses.

Reframing behaviours to see them as evolved and biopsychosocial (i.e. influenced by biological, psychological and social factors and having biopsychosocial impact) encourages a different perspective on behaviour in organizations than currently seems to exist. This perspective would imply that WRH may not be susceptible to managerialist, instrumentalist HSM methods to address it because it is complex and thus hard-to-manage. The relevance and utility of typical methods to address WRH (e.g. zero tolerance policies, risk assessments) may be questioned given human nature and the complexity of human behaviour. Such methods seemingly fail to address WRH because the reference frame imposed on the topic is not cognizant of the reality of hostility. Moving from HSM's approach to predict, prevent and control WRH to a position attempting to first exploring WRH with the objective of understanding it better seems sensible. Organizations could adopt this mentality and explore the issue further. This might relax organizations' reliance on assumptions and advice about WRH, including common methods to address it, issued by stakeholders. It is feasible more successful responses to WRH might follow if organizations fixated less on prevention and control and focused more on comprehension. The trend of trying to predict WRH to prevent it might give way to a better understanding of hostility as a natural, potent and complex (biopsychosocial) evolved human behaviour with a deep history which tends to (understandably) appear under specific circumstances, circumstances perhaps promoted by organizations' service credo. This seems to me to be a more realistic perspective on behaviour and a more sensible organizational response to it.

Organizations could apply critical thinking about their expectations of workers' behaviours and performances, e.g. whether job design operates against staff's interests and its delivery of its service standards. Nicholson's (2010) call for job redesign attentive to human behaviour is still relevant as a way to potentially improve conditions for workers. In essence, organizations may critically assess if their expectations, practice, etc. takes into account the complexity of human behaviour. (Adopting the perspective outlined above would

help them do so.) Acknowledging the performativity of service work (thus the artifice involved) might be one way organizations can effect such changes easier; changing the 'script' and role expected of service workers may alter organizations' expectations of staff's behaviours. Adjusting customer service credo by raising staff's status to a position of greater parity with The Customer is possible. This could feasibly alter behaviours of staff and customers in interactions and the effects these have.

The result of adopting this different perspective, and the greater understanding of the complexity of human behaviour I suggest the conceptual framework offered brings, may lead organizations to revise pragmatic approaches and responses to WRH, e.g. questioning HSM and bolstering it with other measures. Additional and pragmatic ways to develop better practice include implementing training staff, e.g. in service delivery and recovery; in conflict management and conflict resolution skills (Leather *et al*., 1998); in stress management skills (and build into work time opportunities for de-stressing following hostile encounters) to support aggressed staff. Organizations could also redesign procedures and policies (e.g. zero tolerance); place greater focus on staff's occupational health and welfare; and actively learn from past incidents (Grossman, 2004). These multiple responses may help deal with the complex impacts and effects of complex behaviour by altering the context staff works in. I would advocate an approach to WRH similar to RCN's advice; a multi-faceted effort to tackle a challenging issue in a variety of linked ways. Doing so could constitute organizations' consciously considering how they may unwittingly contribute to WRH, and alter practices and thinking by accommodating a different view.

The changes outlined above as examples would require organizations to shift (perhaps radically) their perspectives regarding WRH and service work. Whether they are prepared to is debatable; it would seemingly require augmenting and altering common approaches in use, or even rejecting them. But such a re-framing of behaviour could lead to positive outcomes for all parties. Organizations could explore the evolved and biopsychosocial complexity of behaviour and this could evolve their understanding of a host of behaviours in organizations including, but by no means restricted to, WRH.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Glossary

Definitions and explanations of terms (and abbreviations) appear in the text when they first appear. This Glossary is intended to function as a quick reminder to readers of key words and phrases.

Aggression

Behaviour that can take many forms but comprises action expressing hostility towards another. It is distinguished from aggressivity, which is a feeling of aggressiveness that is not necessarily expressed in action. Some typologies differentiate instrumental aggression from hostile aggression; the former is when unintentional harm occurs in the course of action, e.g. self-defence, the latter when harm is deliberate. Aggression may be covert or overt, mild or severe, physical or non-physical. (See Hostility, Work-related hostility and Violence.)

Allostasis

A concept expanding the notion of homeostasis by proposing no optimum level for physiological arousal exists but a stable physiological state can occur in a range of arousals. Allostasis implies individuals can habituate to higher levels of stress.

Allostatic load

The negative outcomes of habituating to higher stress levels as per allostasis.

Appeasement display

Ritualized behaviour (e.g. posture, gesture) used by an individual to placate an aggressor, demonstrate no intention to attack or signal weakness (see Submission Display and Threat Display).

AQAL (All Quadrants, All Levels)

Wilber's concept which positions the organism, psyche and socio-cultural facets of human life in an evolutionary context. Its vertical axis demarcates internal and external facets of life, the horizontal axis marks individual and collective facets of life. Diagonal axes depict evolutionary phases of development. The model is seen in this thesis as an example of an integrative and biopsychosocial approach (see Biopsychosocial).

Biopsychosocial

Term used in this thesis to means an approach which does not anchor analysis or explanation of human life and behaviour in any single frame of reference (biological or psychological or social) but views same as a complex comprising biological, psychological and social facets. Such a perspective is inherently pluralist, integrative in character and tends towards holism.

British Crime Survey (BCS)

An initially irregularly-conducted and then annually-run survey of English and Welsh adult workers regarding workplace aggression and violence. It is conducted by the British Home Office. It has been super-ceded by the annual Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW). The Health and Safety Executive draws from these statistics.

Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW)

See British Crime Survey.

Customer sovereignty

A term used in service work research to denote the elevated status ceded customers. Customers may not be as powerful as the phrase implies, e.g. organizational bureaucracy may counter apparent sovereignty.

Dominance hierarchy

An ethological term for aggression-based social order in groups. Status can be gained and retained through the use of hostility (physical or otherwise) to subordinate others.

Embodiment

A word meaning both being embodied (i.e. having a body and being subject to its limitations, sensations, etc.) and the act of embodying (e.g. when presenting the self). The social position occupied by a person may be seen in embodied social displays (as per hexis).

Emotional labour (EL)

Defined as the use of emotion in work, specifically to engender positive emotion in customers, patients, etc. EL is the professional version of emotion work (EW) which all people do in life. Service workers notably undertake emotional labour, but other workers do, too, and EL is a feature in many workplaces and jobs.

Emotion regulation (ER)

The control, by the self and/or another of emotion, particularly its display.

Emotion work (EW)

The general use (e.g. presentation, manipulation) of emotions in social life, which includes ER. The professional (e.g. commercial) variant of EW is EL.

Fight, flight or freeze (FFF)

The core stress reaction to any threat (physical, psychological or social), FFF sees an immediate chemical reaction priming the body for motion (fight, flight) or stasis pending action (freeze). Freeze is often overlooked as part of the syndrome; tonic immobility attends search for salient data prompting subsequent action in response. FFF may be enacted in symbolic form (e.g. ritualized behaviours; fight in threat display, flight in appeasement and submission). The limbic system (LS) coordinates the reaction, though the older reptilian brain (R-complex) is involved in associated body system control (e.g. respiration and heart rates).

Useful in promoting survival in emergency situations, and geared for short-term activity, FFF can be damaging if chemicals released in it go unused and/or the individual is chronically activated into the reaction.

Homeostasis

A concept in stress research positing that bodies have an optimum level of arousal which individuals need to return to following stimulus. This is contested by the concept of allostasis (see Allostasis and Allostatic Load).

Health and Safety Management (HSM)

The practice of attempting to establish and maintain safety and welfare in the workplace. The HSE (see Health and Safety Executive) coordinates the dissemination of materials about this to employers, which are legally obliged to make effort to address foreseeable harms workers may be exposed to (failure to do so can result in fines or legal action). HSM efforts undertaken by organizations typically includes a risk assessment to identify the likelihood of harm from hazards and to implement various control measures to limit such harm occurring if the hazard cannot be removed. HSM is enshrined in regulations and legislation which specifically refer to aggression and violence at work. Examples of HSM used in response to address WRH include zero tolerance policies and security provision.

Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

The UK's official, government-backed organization responsible for disseminating Health and Safety Management information and coordinating activity regarding same. HSE can investigate incidents and employers, and bring legal action against same if required. (See Health and Safety Management.)

Hostility

A generic term used to cover aggression and violence. (See Aggression, Work-related hostility and Violence.)

LCA (Last Common Ancestor)

The ape that the *Homo* genus and *Pan* genus (chimpanzees and bonobos) shared some 5 mya.

LUCA (Last Universal Common Ancestor)

The shared ancestor all life sprang from.

Limbic system (LS)

In MacLean's triune brain theory, this cluster of connected brain features sits beneath the cerebral cortex ('higher' brain functions and areas especially associated with human functioning) and over the ancient reptilian brain (R-complex). LS is believed to be involved in formation of emotion, aggression and stress reaction. Research notes sensory data routes to LS faster than to the cortex, implying reaction occurs faster than conscious and deliberative thought.

Mya (million years ago)

The term used in evolution, geology, palaeontology, etc. to measure time.

Neo-evolutionary theories (NE)

Theories and approaches growing out of the theory of evolution (TE). DIT (Dual Inheritance Theory), EP (Evolutionary Psychology) and HBE (Human Behavioural Ecology) are the three prime examples. These differ but all basically remain commensurate with the core tenets of TE.

Organizational Behaviour (OB)

A field of study focusing on behaviour in organizations and typically addressing topics such as power, leadership, culture, identity, etc. OB is a specific field of OMS.

Organization and Management Studies (OMS)

A generic term for the study of organizations and management, including but not restricted to businesses and professional management practices.

Performance

Two senses of the word are used in this thesis. Firstly, performance refers to capacity to meet standards required to execute a work task sufficiently well. (Poor performance implies the requisite standard has not been met, good performance implies that it has or has been exceeded.) Secondly, performance means enactment in presentational work, e.g. emotional labour/service work in which a role is performed. Performance includes (re)presentation such as acting, and in which the body is used in expressive presentations. This occurs in social interaction generally as well as formal performance genre (e.g. theatre). The two uses are connected, e.g. interactive workers' ability to perform in enactments and thus meet professional standards of service.

Performativity

The capacity or urge to present the self. This is not only seen in performance genres (like theatre) but in social life generally.

Ritual

A social practice in which members of society are subjected to a process inscribing meaning through psychological and physical channels. The body is involved in this as the vehicle through which meaning is accomplished (through sensation, experience, etc.). Typically, those undergoing the ritual move from one status to another. The impact of ritual is not only experienced by them but also by witnesses and officials conducting the ritual.

Ritualized behaviour

Behaviour that over time has evolved to take a symbolic form, e.g. threat display is ritualized aggression. This is hostility (it is propelled by the same mechanisms, systems or complexes as actual hostility) but can be expressed (unlike violence, which is largely socially

prohibited). As such, ritualized behaviour reduces risk of harm because of its symbolic form. It is posited a direct link exists between ritualized behaviours, ritual and theatre.

Service staff

Workers who occupy 'contact' roles with customers, patients, etc. and thus who represent the organization. Face-to-face and voice-to-voice workers can be included in the category. (The former are the focus of this thesis.)

Service triangle

The relationship between key parties in service work and delivery – the customer, the organization, and the service worker.

Service work

A widespread type of work in which customers, patients, etc. are responded to, helped, etc. in face-to-face or voice-to-voice settings. Service work occurs in the private and public sectors. BCS/CSEW statistics indicate it is a common link across diverse sectors apropos WRH.

Standard Social Science Model (SSSM)

The apparent dominant approach in social sciences. SSSM is super-organicist in perspective, but is contested by some recent social science research incorporating biological issues like the body into study. SSSM was seemingly historically established for philosophical and political reasons, but earlier social science seems not to have divided the social and biological domains as radically.

Status hierarchy

A term for an individual's rank in a social group based on power. (I contend the service triangle is a status hierarchy.) Status can be perceived, earned or ascribed. Higher status individuals enjoy privilege, lower status individuals do not. However, status is subject to change. In this thesis, the following notation denotes relative status; α (alpha), the most

senior member of a social group; β (beta), the second highest-ranking member in a group); γ (gamma), the third highest-ranking group member. Status hierarchies are not necessarily driven by hostility; dominance hierarchies are.

Stress

The experience and state experienced following a stressor's influence (see Stressor). Technically this is termed 'strain' but stress is retained in this thesis because of its common use. Stress may be useful in helping an individual meet challenges (eustress) or negative (distress) in hampering their response to challenge. Distress is associated with damaged health. FFF can be seen as the core stress reaction to challenge.

Stressor

A stimulus that triggers a stress reaction. A stressor may be physical, psychological or social. In this thesis, an aggressor is seen as a stressor triggering the core stress reaction (FFF).

Submission display

Ritualized behaviour signalling capitulation to an aggressor. It is used in order to prevent injury and stop the interaction (see Appeasement Display and Threat Display).

Super-organicism

A view that maintains the social domain is fundamentally different and disconnected to the biological domain. This propelled and resulted from the division of natural and (then-developing) social sciences.

Theory of Evolution (TE)

A synthetic theory drawing from Darwin and other early thinkers and Mendel's genetic work. Subsequently built on by Neo-evolutionary theories (NE). TE is often synonymous with Darwin, but other versions obtain, e.g. Lamarckian. This thesis uses a broad generalized definition influenced by Darwin and NE.

Threat display

A ritualized behaviour used to demonstrate power, status and readiness to attack, threat display is employed to encourage the opposition into capitulation (see Appeasement Display and Submission Display).

Violence

A form of aggression or hostility taking the form of physical action intending to effect or actually effecting physical (and/or psychological) harm to another person. (In cases where a projectile is thrown, assault occurs even if it misses its intended target.) (See Aggression, Hostility and Work-related hostility.)

Work-related hostility (WRH)

My term for what appears in the research literature and organizational practice (e.g. HSE) as workplace or work-related aggression or violence. A broad definition, WRH could include bullying as well as more overt forms of hostile behaviour. Such behaviours could be physical or non-physical, and injury sustained might be apparent or subtle. Numerous typologies exists identifying sources of WRH. The type of WRH focused on in this thesis is customer-to-worker hostility. Others are worthy of attention, notably intra-organizational (or worker-to-worker) hostility. North American research seemingly focuses on collegial (intra-organizational) WRH, whereas European studies typically look at customer-to-worker forms. (See Aggression, Hostility and Violence.)

Zero Tolerance

An NHS initiative to reduce WRH incidents which became widely adopted in a diverse range of sectors as a strategy to express organizations' refusal to accept WRH. Zero Tolerance policies (typically expressed in threatening tones promising legal reprisals for aggressors) are displayed in public places in many organizations to deter aggressors.

Appendix 2 Further notes on TE

In chapter I outlined the core tenets of TE I accept in this thesis. This appendix offers some more detail readers may find useful.

TE's concept of natural selection "accounts for the design of organisms and for their diversity" (Ayala, 2012: 6), though evolution lacks a designer. Natural selection is the "preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations" (Ayala, 2012: 28, quoting Darwin (1859), page uncited), variations which may arise randomly, and it is this 'pull' which projects development onward. Heredity preserves useful variations because they foster survival.

This process - Darwin termed it 'descent with modification' - does not necessarily yield complexity for every organism. Some organisms are as 'simple' as they were millions of years ago because they have come to fit their environment and need not develop. However, humans have evolved into a complex and highly intelligent social animal. It is humans' high intelligence, capacity to adapt to different (and multiple) environments, and complex social life which seems to differentiate us from our nearest evolutionary cousins.

The evolution of species changes over time as species split from common ancestry ('speciation'). New species do not necessarily run parallel or at the same velocity following speciation; some die off, others succeed (though they might later fail). For instance, only *Homo sapiens* of the other human species survived because it was able to adapt to the changing environments it moved into (Montelle, 2009). However, *Homo sapiens* was a late form of the *Homo* genus. Some earlier forms ('chronospecies') existed contemporaneously with *Homo sapiens* for some time. On speciation from a shared chronospecies, *Homo sapiens* followed a different evolutionary path, as did all previous ancestral hominids on splitting from earlier ancestors, and as did the apes which became the *Pan* and *Homo* species on splitting from a shared last common ancestor (LCA) c. 5 - 8 million years ago (mya) (figures vary). This is a pattern identical back through the branches of evolutionary history. Tracing that pattern backwards shows sub-species link into species, related species into genera, related genera into families, families into orders, orders into classes, classes into phyla and phyla into kingdoms, each stage having common ancestry. "We are

subspecies *sapiens*, species *sapiens*, genus *Homo*, Family Hominidae, Order Primate, Class Mammalia, Phylum Chordata, Kingdom Animalia." (Skene, 2009: 81). Humankind are of the animal kingdom - and wider life on earth (Ingold, 1988). Humans are part of what Capra (1996), echoing Darwin, calls the 'web of life'; in some ways unique and distinct but not unconnected from primates, mammals and other animals.

That natural history - of human, ape, mammal, animal and wider organic life - presents sobering figures regarding the evolution of mankind. An evolutionary view gives a scale and perspective apropos mankind that is absent in much social science. Humans have a place in a vast natural pre-history and a deep connection with the natural world. If we trace links far enough back, we find ultimate connection to all other life – a shared last universal common ancestor (LUCA). In more recent timeframes, comparative zoology, fossil analysis and DNA testing demonstrates an LCA with monkeys c. 25-30 mya, orang-utans c. 10 mya, gorilla c. 8 - 10 mya, and *Pan* c. 5 - 7 mya (Wrangham and Peterson, 1997). *Pan* is genetically closer-related to humans than to gorilla.

Regarding human evolution, earliest hominins (members of human lineage that were transition genera between apes and mankind) emerged c. 6 - 5 mya with the increase in number of genera c. 3 - 2 mya (Toth and Schick, 2005). Humans, the *Homo* genus, emerged c. 2 - 1.7 mya and *Homo sapiens* (anatomically modern humans) emerging from c. 400 - 150 millennia ago (Klein, 2005). Pettitt (2005) states modern behaviour seems to have emerged in Africa in the Stone Age and in Europe, following migration from Africa, in the later Stone Age (Upper Palaeolithic) c. 40 millennia ago. This is relatively recently in evolutionary time.

This perspective somewhat decentres mankind in the scheme of things, but it does not deny our species its importance or uniqueness (indeed, it may highlight it). Our differences serve to differentiate, and our similarities to connect, us with near and more distant cousins.

Appendix 3 Holons and holarchy

Emergence can be seen in terms of Koestler's (1967) concept of holons, which is cited as an example rather than a definitive explanation.

Holons can be physical entities, e.g. hydrogen and oxygen, but can also be nonphysical, e.g. social forces, that can have physical and non-physical effect. The idea specifically illustrates how entities connect.

Holons are 'part-wholes' (Corning, 2002); wholes at one level and parts at the next successive scale. A holon is superordinate (whole) at the 3rd level (see table below) but subordinate (a part) at the 1st level of the next scale (Mella, 2009). For instance, genes emerge from complex interactions of other entities; they are wholes at the genetic level but form an interactional entity on the biological level, helping create other levels of biological complexity. Holons straddle boundaries as the result of combined and interactive lower holons and ingredients in what will become the next level of holons. What exist are "intermediary structures on a series of levels in an ascending order of complexity", holons being "nodes on the hierarchic tree which behave partly as wholes or wholly as parts, according to the way you look at them" (Koestler, 1967: 48). They are structuring and structured entities –

> "at each hierarchical level, the holons undergo the effects of the structural or operational variations of the subordinate holons [which produce it] and in turn produce variations in the behaviour of superordinate ones [help produce it]" (Mella, 2009: v).

Thus,

> "the living organism is not a mosaic aggregate of elementary physicochemical processes, but a [*sic*] hierarchy of parts within parts, in which each holon… is a closely integrated structure equipped with self-regulatory devices, and enjoys a degree of self-government" (Koestler, 1967: 70).

Koestler's term 'holarchy' (1967) indicates the structure and structuring process of 'lower' level holons build into 'higher' ones rather than being separate as the hierarchy implies. Turnbull's (2001) holarchy diagram, cited in Mella (2009), with my amendments (in italics), in the figure below shows constituent holons, boundaries, and fuzziness –

Figure A3.1 - holarchy; holons, fuzzy domains and discipline 'boundaries'[61]

Domain (& discipline)	**Holons**		
	1st level	**2nd level**	**3rd level**
Physical (physics)	Particles	Atoms	Molecules
Chemical (chemistry)	Molecules	Compounds	Bases
Genetic (genetics)	Bases	DNA	Genes
Biological (biology)	Genes	Chromosomes	Cells
Anatomical (anatomy)	Cells	Organs	Biota (individuals)
Psychological (psychology)[62]			
• *Biopsychological (biopsychology)*	*Mind-body system*	*Data-processing*	*Individual behaviour*
	↓	↓	↓
• *Psychosocial (social psychology)*	*Identity (socialized)*	*Reflexive sentience*	*Interactive behaviour*
Social-sociology	Biota (individuals)	Families	Communities

[61] The exemplum hierarchy's reversal of domains and disciplines order is not meaningful.
[62] Psychology itself manifests the bio-social divide/overlap. Biopsychology and social psychology operate at ends of the discipline's span and could be classified as biological and social sciences respectively; they adopt different stances on core issues, e.g. learning, and arguably function as different disciplines (as per biological anthropology and social anthropology). (Scott's (2007) previously-mentioned notion psychological-cognitive and biological systems exist in parallel seems resonant here.) Quite what holons could be entered in the psychology section of the table is moot and outside the scope of this thesis; my entries are admittedly speculative. As Restak (2012) remarks, issues centring on how, why, when, etc. the brain becomes 'mind' tease psychology and cognate disciplines to the point of being among the most challenging topics facing scientific research.

The "power of life to 'build *up*' complex systems out of simpler elements… order out of chaos" (*ibid*.: 199; italics in original) results in an holarchy of complexity in which holons interacting with each other and contributing to higher complexity can be linked and described through the concept of emergence. Such complexity can be seen in the behaviours of evolved creatures, e.g. *Homo sapiens sapiens;* an evolved species enacting complex behaviours due to complicated brains and bodies but having ape, mammalian and pre-mammalian heritage.

The table of holons demonstrates emergent complexity arises from holons' interaction. I suggest this complexity can be seen in our species' very being and behaviour. The resultant of holons' interactions can shed light on how new physical and non-physical mechanisms, systems, and complexes, emerge - and do so as a feature of the evolutionary process. The evolutionary frame allows us to see these enduring or perishing, according to their survival benefits. One might replace the domain/discipline hierarchy with the holarchy to indicate connections between the biological and social domains. Holarchic thinking seemingly overcomes problems inherent in the hierarchy. The hierarchy tacitly implies its own weaknesses, inviting reconfiguration into an holarchy. Yet, the quasi-traditional hierarchy still commonly obtains.

Holons, which span levels and build into an holarchy rather than an hierarchy, can be seen to link biological and social domains (through the psychological one). The result of holons' interactions can shed light on how new physical and non-physical mechanisms, systems, and complexes, emerge - and do so in/through the evolutionary process. The holonic perspective (and the biopsychosocial one) like TE can bring findings from specialist sciences together into a framework for theorization and study because it shows the links between domains they study.

Appendix 4 Notes on Wilber's AQAL model

The notes following provide some further information apropos Wilber's AQAL model cited in chapter 3. Readers should consult Wilber for full information on his complex model and associated thinking.

SF1, 2 and 3 in the upper right quadrant refer to advanced structural-functional cognitions. In the upper right quadrant, prokaryotes are cells (like bacteria) which lack nuclei and eukaryotes are organisms with a nucleus containing DNA "in a membrane-bound sac" (Pallen, 2009: 333).

Wilber (1983) considers stages of cultural development are deep structures identical across differing cultures, though surficial differences formed by specific contingencies exist.

Summarising Wilber (1983) re: the culture and social quadrants -

- the pleromatic, protoplasmic, vegetative and locomotive stages are those of biophysical nature.
- the uroboric stage is that of primal natural unity; it relates to behaviour propelled by the R-complex (primarily) and Limbic System (secondarily) - pre-mammalian and mammalian (animal) levels of human behaviour. It is self-centred, embedded in 'lower' life forms, and impulse-ruled; body and mind are undifferentiated in consciousness; no self-consciousness exists.
- the typhonic stage sees mankind still bound by the body and without a separated mind. This relates to the earliest *Homo sapiens* and represents a higher mammalian (ape-human) stage.
- the possible future centauric stage would seemingly see human and animal natures unify.

The AQAL map shows biological, psychological and socio-cultural facets of behaviour in an evolutionary context; and can show the personal, quotidian and specific experience and the collective, transpersonal and generic. AQAL's "four quadrants represent the basic ways that we can look at *any* [single, individual] event" (Mella (2009: 30) citing Wilber (2004, page

unknown, emphasis in original) and is relevant for *every* (human) event. (The figure below is adapted from an anonymously-authored one cited at www.integralworld.net.)

Figure A4.1 - AQAL's Everything and Anything frames

Everything (Ultimate level)		Anything (Personal, common level)	
Personal reality	*Personal reality*	*Individual identity*	*Individual identity*
Self	Brain	Self-awareness	Behaviour
Consciousness	Behaviour	Consciousness	Physical activity
I	**IT**	**I**	**ME/MINE**
Immaterial reality	*Material reality*	*Subjective identity*	*Objective identity*
Immaterial reality	*Material reality*	*Subjective identity*	*Objective identity*
WE	**ITS**	**WE/OUR**	**ITS/YOU/YOUR**
Culture	Social system	Interpretive worldview	Social activity
Worldview	Environment		Environmental activity
Collective reality	*Collective reality*	*Relational identity*	*Relational identity*

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